

JPRS 79513

24 November 1981

# Near East/North Africa Report

No. 2440

**FBIS**

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

#### NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

#### PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

24 November 1981

## NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

No. 2440

## CONTENTS

## INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

- Report on Jordanian Brigade Suffering in Northern Iraq  
(AT-TALI'AH, 12 Nov 81)..... 1

## OPEC AFFAIRS

- OPEC Policy Considerations Examined  
(EL MOUDJAHID, 14, 15 Oct 81)..... 2

## ALGERIA

- Vocational Training, Institutional Requirements Examined  
(Kamal Zemouri; REVOLUTION AFRICAINE, 2-8 Oct 81)..... 12

## BAHRAIN

- Saudi Daily Interviews Foreign Minister  
(Manama Gulf News Agency, 8 Nov 81)..... 20

## IRAN

- Khomeyni Reportedly Looking for Solution to War With Iraq  
(TANJUG, 1 Nov 81)..... 21
- Military Said Unhappy Over Choice of New Premier  
(IRAN PRESS SERVICE, 5 Nov 81)..... 22
- Inside Opposition Groups Adopt New Tactics Against Regime  
(IRAN PRESS SERVICE, 5 Nov 81)..... 24
- Mojahedin-e Khalq Reprimanded for Plots, Assassinations  
(JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI, 3 Oct 81)..... 26
- Iranians' Resentment Turns Against Leftist Leaders  
(IRAN PRESS SERVICE, 5 Nov 81)..... 28

Opposition Groups' Coalition Reported Progressing (IRAN PRESS SERVICE, 5 Nov 81).....	31
Opposition Support of Military Reviewed (Radio Iran, 30 Oct 81).....	34
Measures Taken To Improve Sectors of Economy (BURS, various dates).....	37
Electricity Output	
Animal Husbandry	
Tehran Water Works	
Reporter in Tehran Looks at Evin Prison, Executions (HUFVUDSTADSBLADET, 18 Oct 81).....	46
Economic Disaster Looms Closer (IRAN PRESS SERVICE, 5 Nov 81).....	48
New Split in Kurdish Ranks (IRAN PRESS SERVICE, 5 Nov 81).....	50
Future of Multimillion-Dollar Petrochemical Complex Uncertain (SOBH-E AZADEGAN, 24 Oct 81).....	51
Skirmishes Between Iranian Pilgrims, Saudi Police Reported (ETTELA'AT, 5 Oct 81).....	53
Anti-Zionist March in Mecca	
Letter of Protest to Interior Minister	
Purges, Executions in Army Discussed (Voice of Iran, 28 Oct 81).....	58
Report on Executions, Domestic Unrest (AFP, 29 Oct 81).....	60
Briefs	
Tea Production	61
Labor-Intensive Projects	61
New Deputy Minister	61
Bazaaris Reportedly Arrested	62
Praise for Khomeyni	62
Ardakan Friday Imam	62
Motor Oil Allocation	62

## IRAQ

Opposition Leader Calls on Army To Defect (Hasan Mustafa al-Naqib; Voice of Iraqi Kurdistan, 8 Nov 81).....	63
---	----

Official Rebukes Bright Star Maneuvers (INA, 15 Nov 81).....	64
---	----

## ISRAEL

Background of Cabinet Ministers Discussed (MA'ARIV, 6 Aug 81).....	65
---	----

Menahem Begin -- Prime Minister, by Ilan Kefir  
 Ariel Sharon--Minister of Defense, by Ya'aqov Erez  
 Yoram Aridor--Minister of Finance, by Shraga Maqel  
 Simha Ehrlich--Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of  
 Agriculture, by Aharon Periel  
 Yitzhaq Shamir--Minister of Foreign Affairs, by Ilan  
 Kefir  
 Ya'aqov Meridor--Chairman of the Ministerial Committee  
 on Economic Affairs, by Shraga Maqel  
 Hayim Corfu--Minister of Transport by Shraga Maqel  
 Mordekhai Tzipori--Minister of Communications, by Ya'aqov  
 Erez  
 Yitzhaq Moda'i--Minister Without Portfolio, by Oded Shorer  
 Gideon Patt--Minister of Industry and Commerce, by Yitzhaq  
 Dayish  
 Yitzhaq Berman--Minister of Energy, by Oded Shorer  
 Avraham Sharir--Minister of Tourism, by Yehoshua Kahana  
 Moshe Nissim--Minister of Justice, by Tzvi Singer  
 Eliezer Shostak--Minister of Health, by Yeshayahu Avi'am  
 Zevulun Hammer--Minister of Education and Culture, by Yosef  
 Waxman  
 Yosef Burg--Minister of Interior, Police, and Religious  
 Affairs, by Yosef Waxman  
 Aharon Abu-Hatzeira--Minister of Labor, Social Betterment,  
 and Absorption, by Tali Bashan

Appointment of Sharon Assessed (Yoel Marcus; HA'ARETZ, 4 Aug 81).....	81
--	----

Commentary on David Levi (Gid'on Allon; HA'ARETZ, 10 Aug 81).....	84
--	----

Moshe Qatzav, Deputy Minister for Urban Renewal (Talila Ben Zakai; MA'ARIV, 7 Aug 81).....	86
---	----

Miryam Glazer, Deputy Minister for Education, Culture (Talila Ben Zakai; MA'ARIV, 7 Aug 81).....	89
---	----

## KUWAIT

Minister Explains GCC Economic Agreement (KUNA, 12 Nov 81).....	92
--	----

Goals of Bright Star Maneuvers Criticized (Jasim al-Mutawwa'; AL-WATAN, 8 Nov 81).....	93
---	----

Briefs Publications, Rallies Laws	94
--------------------------------------	----

#### LIBYA

'VOAH' Attacks U.S. 'Plots' Against al-Qadhafi (Voice of the Arab Homeland, 6 Nov 81).....	95
---	----

Briefs	
POLISARIO Delegation	97
Bright Star Danger	97
Envoy Meet Greek Official	97
PFLP Cable	98
Mengistu Support Cable	98

#### OMAN

Oman Front Radio Scores Muscat Consultative Assembly (Voice of PFLO, 5 Nov 81).....	99
--	----

PFLO Radio Says Bright Star Exercises 'Demean' Oman (Voice of PFLO, 7 Nov 81).....	100
---	-----

#### PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

Briefs	
U.S. Maneuvers Condemned	102
Trade Unions Support Cuba	102

#### QATAR

Stand Against U.S.	103
--------------------	-----

#### SAUDI ARABIA

Minister Interviewed on Peace Plan (Ahmad 'Ali; AL-DUSTUR, 10 Nov 81).....	104
---	-----

Deputy Premier Previews Arab Summit in Fes (SPA, 7 Nov 81).....	106
--	-----

Foreign Minister Interviewed by Beirut TV on Peace Plan (SPA, 8 Nov 81).....	107
---	-----

New Rules Recommended Concerning Government-Subsidized Students Abroad (Hamad al-'Askari; AL-RIYAD, 10 Aug 81).....	109
---	-----

Task, Objective of Institute of Public Administration Discussed (Habib Rahaman; SAUDI BUSINESS, 9 Oct 81).....	114
Results of Survey Made Among Female Literacy Students (Susan Mustafa; AL-RIYAD, 15 Aug 81).....	116
Plans for New Railroad Line Reviewed (AL-RIYAD, 24 Aug 81).....	125
Five Ports Handle Increasing Imports (Ahmad Kamal Khusro; SAUDI BUSINESS, 9 Oct 81).....	127
Briefs	
New Schools in Western Province	129
Agreement With U.S. Oil Firms	129
SUDAN	
Briefs	
Tunisian Ambassador	130
Message From Numayri	130
Message From Mitterrand	131
Additional SSU Duties	131
TUNISIA	
Tunis/Soviet Cooperation (Editorial Report)	132
Arms Deal Revealed (Editorial Report).....	133
YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC	
President's Thank-You Cables to Saudi King, Prince (San'a' Domestic Service, 8 Nov 81).....	134

INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

REPORT ON JORDANIAN BRIGADE SUFFERING IN NORTHERN IRAQ

JN121215 Jerusalem AT-TALI'AH in Arabic 12 Nov 81 pp 1, 11

[Text] News reports received from Amman and Baghdad have stressed that Jordanian military units were sent to Iraq after the visit to Baghdad by the Jordanian regime's leaders in the wake of the great defeat and losses inflicted on the Iraqi army in the battle to break its siege on the Iranian city of Abadan and in its withdrawal to the west bank of Karun River.

News reports say that Jordan had previously called for volunteers including retired military personnel, for service in the Iraqi army and other units such as the medical service. The sending of combat units to make up for the Iraqi army's impaired ability to confront the raging revolution in Iraq's Kurdistan is a new development. Arrivals from Amman and Baghdad said that the forces of the communist partisans and the Kurdish Peshmerga had inflicted heavy losses on a Jordanian brigade as it was carrying out search operations in Kurdistan against the revolutionaries. These losses amounted to hundreds of dead and wounded, in addition to hundreds captured, whose leaders were put on trial by the partisans.

Reports say that the Jordanian brigade's losses are basically attributed to its commanders' ignorance of the real situation in Kurdistan and the nature of the region, in addition to their adoption of a method different from that of the Iraqi forces, which confine their presence to the tops of mountains and move in large columns at specific times and only along main streets to avoid clashing with the large and effective revolutionary forces.

Jordanian authorities are still keeping this matter secret for fear of the impact news of these large losses will have on the situation in Jordan despite the elapse of 3 weeks after the brigade's tragedy.

CSO: 4404/108

OPEC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS EXAMINED

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 14, 15 Oct 81

[14 Oct 81 p 14]

[Text] The decline in petroleum demand would appear to be the result of the impact of numerous factors, including in particular:

--The generalized slowdown in the economic growth of the industrialized countries, whose average rate of expansion of gross national product should stabilize barely above 1.5 percent per year for the next 10 years;

--The success of policies of economizing on energy achieved in the home-use and industrial sectors by the governments of the Western countries;

--The increased importance attached to coal and the establishment of nuclear electricity generating plants--in various forms and at various intervals, but which are nonetheless beginning to make their effects felt--and in a much more timid way the limited impact of "new forms of energy" at present;

--The appearance on the petroleum market of new producers that are not members of OPEC, such as Mexico, the North Sea area, Egypt, and Malaysia. The discoveries of oil in these areas should strengthen in the future the already noticeable decline in imports from the OPEC countries.

The Western media have expressed total satisfaction. They have hastened to conclude that "the cards have changed hands," and that the domination of the oil market by the producing countries is completely over. In short, the time for revenge is at hand.

Certainly, we are far from the energy crisis and the gloomy prospects which were a matter of general agreement hardly 2 years ago.

What miracle has happened, then, to modify the world energy situation so fundamentally in such a short time.

In reality, this pessimism regarding demand--which unfortunately certain members of OPEC have accepted so quickly, giving it more authenticity--is only aimed at confusing the facts of the problem.

However, the view that there has been a structural decline in petroleum demand deserves to be taken up and analyzed, even if the forecasts on which this alleged decline is based are strewn with objections. It is nonetheless true that, beyond the monetary pressures on the market and prices, the OPEC countries have political and strategic interests involved.

#### The Market Crisis Before 1980

The bulk of the studies on long term supply and demand published before 1980 were of the view that the increase in demand for energy during the 1980's and 1990's would inevitably create severe pressure on petroleum supplies, which could seriously disturb the pursuit of economic growth in the industrialized countries.

The impact of this pressure, which might develop after 1983, according to some sources, and by 1990 at the latest, according to others, would lead to a grave energy crisis and, as a consequence, would push prices to very high levels.

In this context it was considered that massive recourse to petroleum from OPEC countries would remain unavoidable and that petroleum would remain the leading form of energy (one-third of the energy consumption of the Western world in the year 2000).

---

#### FORECASTS CONCERNING THE OPEC ZONE FOR 1985

---

Source of Forecast	Level of Demand for OPEC Petroleum in Millions of Barrels Per Day
EEC [European Economic Community]	38.0
U. S. Department of Energy (1979)	36.0
IEA [International Energy Agency] (1978)	42.9
<hr/>	
PIVING [not otherwise identified] (1978)	36.6
EXXON (1978)	40.0
Congressional Research Service, U. S. Congress (1977)	42.9
WAES [not otherwise identified]	45.0

---

The estimated productive capacity of the OPEC zone for 1985 would be about 35 million barrels per day, and any substantial increase above this figure is conceivable only with difficulty. The OPEC zone would therefore not be in a position to satisfy needs of this size.

An increase in petroleum prices seemed inevitable. This conclusion, shared by all of the studies, resulted from the tendency toward an increase in demand and the leveling off of production.

According to these same studies many factors would contribute to increasing the demand for petroleum:

- 1) Non-petroleum-based energy is not immediately available. Between 6 and 10 years would be needed to complete construction of a project for the production of energy;
- 2) The cost of equipment for the production of non-petroleum-based energy is generally higher than that for conventional petroleum equipment;
- 3) The developing countries, where housing is often dispersed over a wide area and where there is no natural gas or electrical network, will largely use petroleum. Their consumption should increase a great deal to satisfy the needs of a regularly growing population.
- 4) With the exception of natural gas, all non-petroleum-based energy requires long and costly adaptation;
- 5) Finally, in case of an unforeseen increase in requirements caused by economic recovery in the industrialized countries, petroleum is the only form of energy available in instantaneous fashion and in a relatively sufficient quantity.

As against this prospect for an increase in demand, production threatened to level out or even decrease.

The principal question which then dominated all these forecasts was knowing how far petroleum prices could increase and when they would reach their maximum level.

In these same forecasts petroleum prices of \$50, \$60, and even \$100 per barrel were regarded by some of them as highly probable, before massive investments in the production of new forms of energy could be carried out.

Taking into account the very long period of time before these new sources of energy would begin to make their weight felt on the world market (estimated by specialists at 50 years, or the normal cycle required for the transition from one dominant energy source to another), the next 2 or 3 decades would be a very difficult period from the point of view of energy supply.

Even in time, it was estimated, when this evolution would have taken shape, crude oil would continue to benefit from a substantial market and supplementary premiums by reason of its use as a source of petrochemicals, which could only be substituted for with difficulty.

Those were the dominant ideas which made it possible to think that the role of extracted petroleum in the OPEC countries would still be, and for a long time, decisive in the long term energy balance.

#### Demand for OPEC Petroleum in Recent Forecasts

The new forecasts of the long term energy situation are giving space to new suppositions incompatible with the considerations which prevailed before 1980. These studies have given consideration in particular to the following ideas:

--The rate of economic growth in the industrialized countries should slow down substantially in the course of the next 2 decades, and that cannot be due solely to traditional cyclical factors;

--The relationship between economic growth and energy consumption is undergoing profound change, in the sense that positive growth in economic activity could henceforth occur at the same time as a much weaker growth and even a negative development in energy demand.

--In the industrialized countries a general tendency toward a change in the composition of the types of economic activity is emerging progressively in the fabric of the national economies. This change could influence the level of energy consumption.

--The rate of non-OPEC production should increase over the medium term, which accompanied by a decline in overall demand, will probably lead to a reduction in the contribution made by OPEC petroleum to the market.

--The physical constraints on the production of OPEC crude oil, presumed to be very important in the older forecasts, no longer seem to have the same relevance.

--A decisive acceleration in the development of substitute forms of energy in all of the industrialized countries.

These factors, taken together, have led some observers to conclude that "the energy crisis" will not be as severe as it had been imagined and that there is even a serious doubt that it will occur.

A comparison between the newer and the older forecasts shows that the forecasts concerning the levels of world energy demand, world petroleum production, and the petroleum production "required" of OPEC in 1985 and 1990 have been noticeably adjusted to lower levels during the last 2 years. It is forecast that the export demand for OPEC petroleum will decrease by 25 percent in 1985 and by 33 percent--or by one-third--by 1990, while requirements for petroleum imports by a country like the United States will decline by half, compared to the initial forecasts.

This comparison also makes it possible to note a reduction in the contribution of petroleum to total energy consumption, by reason of the substitution of other sources of energy and above all because of a substantial reduction in the contribution of OPEC to total petroleum production, linked to a greater availability of non-OPEC sources of supply.

[15 Oct 81 p 7]

#### An Artificial Surplus of Short Duration

[Text] These forecasts deserve to be examined carefully. We analyze below the behavior of the three factors which are the most often mentioned to justify the evolution toward a decline in demand. These concern:

--The level of economic activity;

--Economies achieved in the use of energy;

--The recourse to substitute sources of energy.

## A Growing Level of Economic Activity

The level of economic activity is one of the principal determinants of the level of energy consumption.

The habit has developed, especially in forecasts of energy consumption, of reducing thought on economic growth to the single standard constituted by the economies of the industrialized countries.

To be complete, it is necessary to examine the prospects for economic growth in all regional groups of countries taking part in the world economy, and first of all within the member countries of OPEC, whose economic and demographic dynamism will soon make them important consumers of energy resources. Their demand for primary energy has already tripled in the course of the past decade. A more detailed analysis of these latter tendencies and of the development plans projected for the future indicates that their rates of growth will continue to be high.

The objectives already known in terms of the construction of petrochemical plants and of refineries for local requirements and for export needs will involve a growing use of hydrocarbons. In terms of volume the available estimates place local demand in the OPEC countries in 1985, 1990, and 2000 at 4, 5, 6, and 12 million barrels per day, respectively [sic; only three years are given, while four levels of local demand are given], for an annual growth during the period in the order of 9 percent per year.

The same tendency in economic growth is expected in the other groups of under-developed countries of Latin America, Asia, and Africa. This growth, dominated by intensive industrial development, will certainly be translated into increased demand for petroleum, as alternative energy sources to petroleum (nuclear energy, coal) are difficult to foresee for financial and technological reasons.

Certainly, in the industrialized countries of the OECD, a noticeable decline in the prospects for economic growth over the middle term is generally forecast. However, these forecasts are not unanimous either regarding the duration of the decline nor on the level of the recession in these countries.

According to certain sources, an average annual growth of 2 to 3 percent per year could be reached in the course of the next 5 to 7 years in the OECD countries as a whole, which is incompatible with the thesis of stagnation and even of regression in the rates of growth advanced in all studies undertaken recently.

These rates of growth constitute a minimum, in the absence of which an expansion in the unemployment rate would make the social balance very problematical.

The resumption of economic activity which would follow these growth rates would sustain much more substantial demand for energy than is generally forecast.

## Energy Savings

Two kinds of energy savings are mentioned in these studies:

--Energy savings which would involve "less consumption" per unit of marginal GNP.

This is based on the dissociation which would appear between economic growth and the increase in energy consumption. In short, this idea signifies that the relationship between the two variables--economic growth and the increase in energy consumption (the energy coefficient)--is no longer either proportionate or stable.

Thus, contrary to past development, when the principal variable influencing energy demand was GNP, which was reflected by very high energy consumption, more and more the behavior of the energy coefficient indicates a much smaller energy component. Quite clearly, the increase in prices, by constraining consumers to follow an active policy of energy conservation and by ending the constraints which used to weigh on the development of new forms of energy, is responsible for this change.

Consequently, the petroleum price has become a strategic determinant of demand, which could oscillate toward an increase or toward a decrease, depending on the system of proposed prices.

In reality the level of energy demand is pre-determined in large measure by the existing technical system. Unless there is a decisive change in the latter, which is hardly likely by the end of the next 2 decades, the level of energy demand cannot drop below a level which the specialists estimate at 10 percent at most of present consumption. The efficiency of conservation measures undertaken in the last few years has been achieved in large part because of higher taxation of energy consumption, which could not be continued without danger of disarranging the economic and social mechanisms of production. If their application was easy at the beginning, they will begin to encounter, in the course of their development, social and technical obstacles which will mark their limits. To tell the truth, the majority of the serious forecasts (of the study of the IIASA [International Institute for the Analysis of Applied Systems]) are based on stable or larger energy coefficients.

--Energy savings which would be the result of a kind of specific economic restructuring in the industrialized countries. According to these studies, the high level of industrial maturity achieved in the developed Western countries leads to a sectoral rearrangement within the local economy, dominated by the expansion of the services sector (considered to consume less energy), at the expense of the productive sectors, essentially agriculture and industry. This change in the type of economic activity would have positive economic implications over the long term for energy consumption. A progressive reduction of the latter is expected, along with the consolidation of this tendency.

This reasoning requires at least two remarks:

--On the one hand the degree of intensity in the use of energy by the new lines of economic activity by comparison with the older lines is far from evident;

--On the other hand this new economic balance to the benefit of the services sector is not without serious economic and social risks. Its role will have an impact on the present inflation, which no industrialized country has escaped, although some of them (those whose services sector is less developed) have been less affected than others. Moreover, its development could not be seriously envisaged on the scale predicted, without a decisive increase in labor productivity. In present circumstances of actual stagnation, nothing makes it possible to predict this development.

To all intents and purposes a massive transfer of productive activity toward areas outside the OECD countries, through a new kind of international division of labor, could, in effect, give the services sector a new thrust in the Western countries. However, this prospect is unlikely in a decade or two and, for all of that, is much debated in the industrialized countries themselves.

--Recourse to substitute sources of energy. According to these studies, the overall demand for OPEC petroleum will be noticeably affected by substitutes, beginning with coal and primary electricity (generated by nuclear plants), and, toward the end of the century, by other substitutes, beginning with other sources of energy (especially synthetic petroleum).

It is predicted that the role of coal in total primary energy by 1985 will reach the level of 19 percent (or the same level as in 1980), that it will increase to 21 percent in 1990 and to 23.7 percent by the year 2000.

Moreover, it is predicted that 75 percent of the electricity by the year 2000 will come from coal and nuclear energy.

#### The Role of Synthetic Products

The increase in the role of synthetic petroleum and gas (compared to their present, very marginal levels) will supposedly reach a level of 4 to 11 percent of world petroleum production by the years 1990 and 2000, respectively.

There is no doubt that these programs represent very ambitious objectives. However, it is possible to have grave doubts about their credibility.

In order to make these substitute sources of energy available within the terms and periods of time forecast, it will be necessary, not only to conquer the technological, social, and ecological obstacles involved, which have hampered their development in the past (only 40 percent of the nuclear program provided for in all of the OECD countries between 1974 and 1980 has been achieved), but also to be able to be in a position to mobilize the enormous credits necessary for their financing.

Just to take up the case of synthetic petroleum (the only alternative energy source really equivalent to crude oil in its "major" uses), it is estimated that \$2 to \$3 billion (in terms of 1980 dollars) would be needed to construct a synthetic petroleum plant capable of producing 50,000 barrels per day, or 2.5 million tons per year in petroleum equivalent. A supply on the world scale of 7 million barrels per day by the year 2000 would require financing in the order of \$400 to \$500 billion. That is to say that the commercial competitiveness of these energy sources is far from being certain in the next 15 to 20 years. Inflation and the high cost of credit, the accumulation of prohibitive regulations, and technological difficulties do not by themselves explain the delays that have occurred in the achievement of programs for the development of alternative energies. In fact it is the low cost, in real terms, of crude oil which has been the decisive element in the stabilization of the relative contributions of the various energy sources during recent years. A recent study on the future of the world energy system, carried out by the International Institute for the Analysis of Applied Systems (IIASA), ended with this same conclusion. In this imposing study, whose object was to analyze the world economy as a whole and bearing

on the very long term (1980-2030), the IIASA (which should not be suspected of partiality, as it is exclusively composed of high-ranking scientists from all regions of the world) concluded that the only substitute for petroleum in the next 25 to 30 years is petroleum itself.

Regarding prices, according to the same institute, these should continue their regular growth over the course of the next 2 decades, under the effects of two tendencies: an increase in energy demand, itself linked to a very rapid growth in world population, on the one hand, and the absence of a really competitive new energy source, on the other hand.

To these economic arguments are added technical and political motivations which could strongly moderate petroleum supply.

The decline of petroleum reserves discovered each year throughout the world over the past 20 years or so does not make it possible to hope for a growth in world productive capacities of much more than 1 percent per year, in the absence of discoveries --considered unlikely--of a series of very large deposits comparable to those found in the Middle East between 1945 and 1960 .

#### Reducing Production

Parallel to these developments, the governments of the producing countries which are members of OPEC have been urged to reduce the rate of exploitation of their petroleum deposits in order to adjust the rate to needs which are often moderate, to avoid social disturbances and pressure on very limited construction capacities, and to save fossil resource capital which increases in value each year while inflation eats away the value of the money paid for petroleum and the financial surpluses accumulated by certain producing countries.

A policy of limitation of petroleum production to the level of consumption could be adopted. Such a policy could be particularly attractive to the states with the lowest population which are large producers, like those of the Arabian Peninsula. In these countries a substantial part of production should be considered "undesirable." Hence, a permanent temptation to accompany any decline in world demand with a reduction of production, to prevent a lowering of the prices.

Beyond their allegedly scientific character, the alarmist forecasts in vogue today should be interpreted for what they are, a supplementary instrument of pressure at the service of a strategy whose objective is the reduction of petroleum prices.

It is significant that the flowering of these forecasts coincides with the preparation, within OPEC, of the first elements of a long term strategy for production and sales with a view to the protection of the petroleum price from monetary erosion and inflation and the improvement of OPEC's purchasing power in real terms.

The artificial surplus of petroleum, created by the present overproduction by Saudi Arabia, which constitutes the point of departure and the justification for all the forecasts of a decline in demand, is too problematical to justify long term deductions to be made. In effect, however long it takes until Saudi Arabia ends by accepting the evidence that its present policy is causing serious damage to the producing countries and when it adopts the measures required by reducing its production and by raising its prices toward levels in harmony with the prices charged by the other producing countries, the market situation will become less artificial, and the petroleum surplus will disappear.

The principle of a respite on the prices front, in the name of which Saudi Arabia has been conducting this policy for 2 years, is without foundation with regard to the impact of previous readjustments of petroleum prices on inflation in the industrialized countries and on the real evolution of their purchasing power. It is well established now that the readjustments of petroleum prices in the past--as attested by the official reports of the OECD, the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] and the World Bank--only played a marginal role in an inflation which is reaching an average level of 15 percent per year. Without going into the traditional battle of indices and figures, it should be recalled that, according to the index of export prices of OECD itself (which in large part underestimates the inflation in the prices of imported goods and services), the index of the petroleum price has gone from \$3.03 in 1974 to \$14.73 per barrel in 1980 (in current dollar terms the price has gone up from \$3.03 to \$34 per barrel during this period). This indicates, despite the reservations noted, the extent of erosion of the purchasing power of petroleum prices (according to the OPEC index, the price went up from \$3.03 in 1973 to \$4.89 per barrel in 1980). The question of the defense of the purchasing power of a barrel of petroleum therefore remains a permanent objective in the face of the galloping inflation in the prices of imported goods. The partial and temporary recovery of purchasing power in 1973, 1974, and 1979-1980 was of short duration and was followed by longer periods of decline between 1975 and 1978. The readjustments in the prices which took place in 1979-1980 certainly gave the producing countries a temporary advantage, but the latter has been very rapidly eaten away following the freezing of the prices decided on by the last ordinary meeting of the OPEC countries. For the rest, the increase in prices to the consumers is not the fault (it should be recalled) of the producing countries.

#### Who Profits from the Crisis

The evolution between 1973 and 1978 of price composition at the pump of an OPEC standard barrel of petroleum products in Western Europe makes it possible to note a very clear improvement in the receipts of the consuming countries and the achievement of a very consistent profit margin by the petroleum companies.

Thus, in 1978 the sales price of a standard barrel of petroleum products in Western Europe was \$33.80 per barrel. Out of this total the governments of the European consuming countries took \$13.40 per barrel, whereas the producing countries received \$13.00 per barrel. The former increased their receipts per barrel of OPEC products by 70.7 percent between 1974 and 1978, whereas the latter only increased their receipts by 23.3 percent.

The sales price only increased by 49.9 percent in the course of the period under consideration, or \$11.25 per barrel. According to a study made by the Shell Company, this increase was 49.3 percent attributable to the governments of the consuming countries and 21.2 percent to the governments of the producing countries. The refining and distribution companies had 18.2 percent and 8.9 percent of the increase, respectively.

The evolution of the petroleum industry which has taken place over the last few years raises in an urgent way the imperative need for regulation of the market by an adequate production policy. Any discussion on the levels of production over the medium term should proceed first from taking into account the vital interests of the member countries.

Having done this, the OPEC countries would cease to be residual sources of supply as a function of market fluctuations only. This policy would bring about more favorable conditions for making the consuming countries appreciate that any supplementary pressure on finite reserves must result in equivalent concessions on their part. Over the short term a policy of systematic adaptation of production to demand is essential. The experience of the last few months has demonstrated that this operation posed no major problem in technical terms.

One should not conclude here without recalling that, for many years the OPEC conferences have been the occasion for denouncing the waste which the policy of "everything by oil" involves. The conferences have continued to call for a policy of conservation which has become all the more urgent since the ratio of proved reserves to production shows a clear tendency toward the exhaustion of the OPEC countries' reserves. This ratio (expressed in terms of production years) was at the level of 85 years in 1957. In 1981 it was no more than 44 years, after having declined to 61 years in 1960 and 48 years in 1970. At the present rate of petroleum extraction, the tendency toward decline should accelerate, to reach 32 years in 1990 and less than 20 years by the year 2000.

It is in the latter framework that it is necessary to place the view that one can take of the decline in petroleum demand forecast in the consuming countries. If this were the case, this decline would constitute a first, decisive step on the path of conserving the value of the world energy patrimony, and that could only make us rejoice. However, that is unfortunately not the dominant concern of some of our partners in the industrialized countries, whose principal objective remains the effective devaluation of petroleum prices. The refusal to advance durable solutions to the problems of prices and their cyclical freezing at insufficient levels which no economic argument justifies can only end in much sharper increases in price. New "petroleum shocks" are included in this logic of denial of the fundamental interests of the producing countries.

5170

CSO: 4519/24

## VOCATIONAL TRAINING, INSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS EXAMINED

Algiers REVOLUTION AFRICAINE in French No 919, 2-8 Oct 81 pp 9-18

[Article by Kamal Zemouri]

[Text] One of contemporary Algeria's most crucial problems is youth, particularly the segment aged 14-17 who cannot find their niche, who idly await their tour of national service, which will rescue them from their general apathy. The reasons why this precious national resource is being wasted are well known: the country's academic and vocational training establishment is not able to keep up with the country's demographic growth. Some time ago the deficit was in teaching personnel; today, it is more in infrastructure. Teacher training, fortunately, has finally gotten up to speed, particularly with respect to elementary, middle, secondary and technical education. Nevertheless, there is a weak point in our armor, and that is in vocational training, even though this type of schooling is more and more becoming part of the mainstream. In this field, however, the shortage is considerable, and one finds it at all levels. As the short history of vocational training in Algeria will make apparent, it is still in an embryonic state. Despite its recent institutional expansion, vocational training is still far from being able to meet the demand--both economic and social--for training. Now that the cause is understood, ambitious and laudable efforts are under way. The system is in the process of adapting itself to today's requirements, and also to the future's, which means first priority will be given to economic demand, and second to social demand.

Before 1962 and during the post-independence period in Algeria, vocational training played an extremely marginal role, and was confined to accelerated vocational training (FPA) activities, which were on a limited scale quantitatively, qualitatively and geographically. FPA was basically a training service intended to provide the colonial economy in a very short time and at very low cost with a "core" of qualified lower-level personnel, primarily in the fields of construction, bridge-building and roadwork and basic maintenance. We do not have precise figures on FPA's output, but it was negligible. The legacy from the time of independence, then, was from every point of view extremely modest.

To give the devil his due: it is necessary to train professionals. Algeria has an urgent need for them. The planners, in the preamble to the first quadrennial plan, set out this need clearly. Moreover, 1969, the year when the first national development plan was launched, was to coincide with the first efforts to promote vocational training in Algeria. That anemic structure must be transformed into a revitalized and revalorized institution.

Among the first measures taken can be pointed out the recruitment of training personnel and Algerian management "to enable FPA and other institutions to participate in the national task of raising the general educational level of the citizens." A whole gamut of activities "set off" in the field. The two imperatives of quality and rapidity had to be reconciled: two needs which we will be able to combine. Beginning with that basic idea, two types of training were considered: the first--long-term--is technical education in the traditional academic system. The other was a reinvigorated vocational training, which went through a number of changes of direction, including:

--Some branches of vocational training, especially public works and construction, would be redesigned to benefit other sectors where at the time the pressure was greater.

--The linkage between training and users, or between training and development, was achieved through agreements defining the rights and obligations of each partner.

--The existing system was designed to have excess capacity, in order to resorb academic drop-outs. However, it became increasingly apparent that vocational training was not being carried out on a scale adequate even to meet the economic demand, much less the social.

The gap to be filled, resulting from the country's insufficient vocational training capacity, would have repercussions on the capacity and maintenance of industrial plants. In the ministry of industry, in 1975, only 1,426 employees were in training at the centers under the sponsorship of state-owned companies. However, more and more production units were established around the country, and this could help fill the national shortage of qualified and expert manpower. Efforts were made here and there, in agriculture and the steel industry. Nevertheless, these efforts were not enough, in the face of needs which escalated vertiginously from one year to the next.

Also deserving of mention in our little history is the quite positive experiment of the Technology Institutes, which proved to more of a palliative than a comprehensive solution. The concept was original, but its circumstantial aspect limited its objectives, which were the production of the mid- and upper-level cadres called for by the plan. In that particular context the dynamic relationship between training and development had a brief, glorious moment, only to sink into oblivion, the victim of antagonisms and inconsistencies.

The second quadrennial plan was to be no more generous than the first in regard to vocational training, which still remained the poor cousins of the national academic and training system. On the other hand, the contradictions became even more exacerbated, and new constraints were added to the old. It must be borne in mind that the industrial options of the day did not encourage the training of people in the manual trades.

The gap continued to grow between the academic system, which was introducing innovations on a wide front, and vocational training, which was stagnating and still tainted with the obsolete concepts of the FPA. The overall record of development would highlight the serious shortage of vocational training and underline the consequences of that gap. Thus, on the eve of the 5-year plan, which was to be focused on the development of small and medium-sized industries, vocational training was put in the hands of a secretary of state [a cabinet-level official]. Really, it was high time. The economic need for vocational training reinforced the social necessity. The National Charter, as the written expression of the people's will, did not merely enunciate worn-out principles; it went further, by proposing a program: "vocational training carried out on a vast scale in the country, and action to continuously raise the qualification level of the workers, to enable them over time to become better and better adapted to the demands of modern technology." Elsewhere it said, "neither the needed training for the qualified manpower that is indispensable to the management of big industries, nor creative initiative and innovative boldness, nor the entrepreneurial spirit can flourish unless such opportunities are created by the progress of the industrial revolution itself." And the Charter announced the launching of an ambitious worker training program on a scale to provide the labor market with a minimum of 100,000 skilled workers per year.

Another document discusses vocational training, namely the General Labor Statute [SGT], which introduced some new methodological elements. Article 171 of the SGT stipulates that "training provides for the social and occupational advancement of the worker, and assures the economic development of the country. Therefore such activity must be elaborated and implemented with the participation of the workers." Article 178 of the SGT states that "the employing agency may require workers whose qualifications or skills permit, to contribute actively to training and refresher activities he undertakes."

To exhumate another text, the "education and training" resolution adopted at the conclusion of the Fourth Congress of the FLN [National Liberation Front] Party diagnosed and proposed a comprehensive remedy which showed a complete understanding of the situation. Thus, the objectives of the quadrennial plan are perceived as an "overall concept for a training institution integrated into the sectors of general and technical education, university education and vocational training which would be the point of departure for a radical reform putting an end to the contradictions, conflicting goals, and poor planning which have become sources of waste and inefficiency." The resolution nicely summarizes the situation which had prevailed until then, the consequences of which we are still paying for. To look at the record is to compare the realities to the ideal. In the case which concerns us, what is important is to understand the relationships that link the three following factors:

1) the nation's training capability (all institutions combined); 2) the overall demand; and 3) the degree to which the nation's potential is being channeled to meet the unfilled needs. The study of these parameters is the foundation for the whole national vocational training strategy.

#### Radical Solutions

The 5-year plan was to create a very large demand for medium and upper-level cadres and above all--for the small and medium-sized industries--to give impetus to the building of a labor force still seriously deficient. At present, therefore, we find

ourselves not, as we were some time ago, at an impasse, but rather at a turning point, with respect to vocational training. We can even say that the critical decision has already been made. And of course we find ourselves once more confronted with cold and pitiless statistics: the manpower deficit now predicted for the 5-year planning period breaks down this way: 43 percent for industrial workers, 72 percent for technicians and 85 percent for highly skilled technicians.

So necessity forces us to adopt radical solutions, such as the mobilization into the national effort of all human and material potential, all the skilled personnel that are needed, wherever they may be found.

The numbers can also help us assess the progress of vocational training. In 1962, there are a grand total of 5,000 training positions, which did not begin to correspond to the needs of the country, either in terms of quality, or the location of centers, or the substance of the programs. The efforts put forth during the triennial plan, and later the first quadrennial plan, gave the system larger scope. By the end of 1973, the overall productive capacity of the system was 9,000, which was encouraging but still inadequate in terms of the ever-growing need.

The second quadrennial plan embraced even larger needs, and in its preamble it described vocational training as "the basic instrument for satisfying the demand for skilled manpower." As a crowning indignity, that demand had to be met by manpower that was imported at a very high cost and paid for in precious foreign currency. Implementation followed the decision without further delay. Results were not long in coming. The number of training positions went to 17,000 and later to 26,000. To accomplish this, doubled training shifts were set up, on the model of the double sittings in primary school. The expansion of capacity also shows how the system became more aligned with the country's economic and technological demands. Thus, we will see the appearance of technical-industrial chains. The sectors of mechanical engineering and metalwork will show a growth rate in excess of 100 percent.

Demand never stops ballooning. The relative shortage of vocational training is most keenly felt at the level of school dropouts. In 1981, the gap between supply and demand persists. Over and above the chronic shortfalls, certain dangerous contradictions can be noted. We have a tendency to train more technicians than skilled workers: this results in under-utilization of the cadres, who are confined to less exalted tasks in the absence of qualified manpower.

The national vocational training policy has the heavy responsibility now of putting an end to the dysfunctions which were responsible for the disorder that impeded vocational training and the various development plans. We still recall the disparity that prevailed then and which resulted, among other things, in:

--a variety of different pedagogical programs, going from excessively specialized training to overly general, and not conducive to rapid preparation for employment.

--a diversity of pedagogical methods, going from traditional to modern, some of which are still in an experimental stage in the industrialized countries.

--extremely varied study conditions and training time, even in some cases for the same kind of training.

--extremely diverse standards for the levels, status, and general outline of the training.

--finally, training costs that varied according to the wildest whims of the institutions providing it.


The new initiative falls like a guillotine blade on the incoherence which characterized the sector. Things are much clearer. Better yet, now there is only one state institution responsible for carrying out this difficult mission. Some time ago, (see REVOLUTION AFRICAINE of February 1981) Mr Mohammed Nabi, secretary of state for vocational training, confided to us that three parameters define the problem with precision: its scope, its diversity and its urgency. The task, he said, is to figure out "how to transform a congeries of disparate training resources into one coherent system with clear objectives and an effective organization, and to standardize the conditions and modalities of training."

The answers to those questions can be seen today in light of the coordination of activities, the ambitious projects written into the 4-year plan, the impetus given to training in industry and the innovative system called apprenticeship (see separate articles). By the end of the quadrennial plan, vocational training will without a doubt be in a position to fulfill its economic and social contracts.


Key: 1. Number of Training Positions  
2. (5-Year Plan Targets)  
3. Number of Vocational Training Centers  
4. \*urgent need

# 1 NOMBRE DE POSTES DE FORMATION

2 (Prévisions du Plan quinquennal)



## 3 NOMBRE DE CENTRES DE FORMATION PROFESSIONNELLE



Branches professionnelles <sup>1</sup>	<sup>13</sup> Fin 1973	<sup>14</sup> Fin 1977	<sup>15</sup> Fin 1979
BTP <sup>2</sup>	208	320	310
Métaux <sup>3</sup>	105	227	362
Electricité-electronique <sup>4</sup>	57	79	74
Textile-confection <sup>5</sup>	30	41	66
Machinisme-agricole <sup>6</sup>	6	27	23
Emplois de bureaux <sup>7</sup>	55	110	148
Chimie <sup>8</sup>	3	10	13
Industrie graphique <sup>9</sup>	3	3	6
Divers <sup>10</sup>	22	21	6
Entretien électro-mécanique <sup>11</sup>	29	29	43
TOTAL <sup>12</sup>	513	867	1061

Increase in Vocational Training Capacity (by occupational category) During the Second Quadrennial Plan

- Key:
1. Occupational Category
  2. Construction and public works
  3. Metalwork
  4. Electrical and electronics
  5. Textiles-clothing manufacture
  6. Agricultural engineering
  7. Office workers
  8. Chemicals
  9. Graphics industries
  10. Miscellaneous
  11. Maintenance of electrical machinery
  12. Total
  13. End of 1973
  14. End of 1977
  15. End of 1979

9516

CSO: 4519/25

SAUDI DAILY INTERVIEWS FOREIGN MINISTER

GF081020 Manama Gulf News Agency in Arabic 0730 GMT 8 Nov 81

[Text] Dammam, 8 Nov (GNA)--Bahraini Foreign Minister Shaykh Muhammad ibn Mubarak al Khalifah has expressed the hope that all Arab states will support the Saudi peace initiative and that Israel will submit to world pressure and implement the ideas included in the peace plan in order to achieve peace and stability in the region and in order to grant the Palestinian people their legitimate rights.

In a statement made to the Saudi newspaper AL-YAWM today, the Bahraini minister said that the next Gulf summit conference will be a step toward bolstering cooperation among the peoples of the region and toward transferring the Gulf region from the stage of laying foundations and proposals to the stage of implementation.

Shaykh Muhammad ibn Mubarak al Khalifah denied that the Gulf summit conference will discuss establishing relations with the eastern bloc states. He also stressed that Gulf security is now the responsibility of the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC], which must arrive at a joint cooperation plan in this field.

He added that the principle of defense should be collective because none of the region's states can achieve it singularly. He explained that the method of achieving this is left for the military personnel to decide because it is a technical issue.

The Bahraini foreign minister denied that there is a plan to add new states to the GCC. Commenting on this issue he said that a possibility of expansion does exist but expansion right now, while the council is still not fully established, is premature. He also stressed the GCC states' anxiousness to resolve the Omani-PDRY dispute and put an end to the Iraqi-Iranian war because only the enemies benefit from these conflicts.

The Bahraini foreign minister praised his country's relations with the kingdom of Saudi Arabia and said: Our friends are the friends of the kingdom and our enemies are her enemies too.

He expressed his country's satisfaction over the approval of the AWACS deal with Saudi Arabia and stressed that the kingdom's military strength is a reinforcement to the Gulf and the Arab nation.

CSO: 4404/110

## IRAN

### KHOMAYNI REPORTEDLY LOOKING FOR SOLUTION TO WAR WITH IRAQ

LD011812 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1611 GMT 1 Nov 81

[Text] Tehran, 1 Nov (TANJUG)--Iran's religious leader, Khomeyni, has ordered the military and political leaders to look into possibilities for either a military or a political solution for the armed conflict with Iraq, unconfirmed information says.

In unofficial talks, however, Iran's official figures still reject any possibility for a peaceful settlement of the conflict since, being prepared for victory, their people could hardly consent to any compromise. Publicly, it is still claimed that the war would end soon in victory for Iran as Iran counts on its superiority in manpower. Priests appeal to the young to get enlisted for war and, for the time being, in addition to the two classes serving their military terms, another four classes who served their terms before have been mobilized.

Judging by everything, many worries--the latest fuel shortage among them--are pressing down heavily on Iran at present. In Tehran and in other cities as well, eyewitnesses say the crisis in petrol and other fuel supplies is harder than at the war start. The fuel shortage is seen as a consequence of successful Iraqi air raids on Iran's oil installations as well as of Iran's being compelled to raise its oil exports at the expense of oil consumption at home. Strikes in oil refineries are also a cause of this shortage, it is heard here.

Habib Chatti, secretary general of the Islamic conference, is informally claimed to have offered 10,000 million dollars in the name of Saudi Arabia in compensation for war damage to Iranian foreign minister (now premier) Musavi. This damage runs considerably higher, according to Iranian estimates, between 50,000 and 55,000 million dollars.

CSO: 4600/114

## IRAN

### MILITARY SAID UNHAPPY OVER CHOICE OF NEW PREMIER

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 45, 5 Nov 81 pp 4-5

[Text] Iran's top military brass are reported to be uneasy at the choice of Mir Hossain Mussavi as prime minister because he is held by them responsible for the regime's very poor performance in foreign relations. The military have a direct interest in the regime's foreign policy because it has a direct bearing on the mullahs' ability to buy arms from reliable suppliers. As it is, over the last three months that Mussavi has been running Iran's Foreign Ministry, the country has been steadily forced into international isolation.

Ironically, during the same period, many people point out, the Iraqis whom Iran is fighting expanded their international relations, established more respectability and managed to grab the presidency of the U.N. General Assembly for their envoy to the world body. As a result of such diplomatic inroads the Iraqis have been able to obtain sophisticated military hardware from France, West Germany, Britain and even the United States via Jordan, some military sources have been pointing out. According to some reports the Soviets have also resumed shipment of arms to Iraq despite their new moves to get closer to Khomeini.

All these new developments are a source of anxiety to the Iranian military, who see their own stock of arms diminishing rapidly with no replacements available.

Indeed, the mullahs' policy of arms purchases is being taken as a yardstick of the regime's inefficiency and, worse still, corruption. According to reports in the British press the Khomeini regime is sending buyers who are so inexperienced that "they break all the rules and endanger others." The daily Guardian reported that "legitimate arms dealers and more experienced among the less orthodox dealers are now steering clear of dealing with Iran." Even an attempt by Libya to use former CIA agent Edwin Wilson, who runs a military hardware supply service to get aircraft parts for Iran fell through, the Guardian pointed out.

Meanwhile, three diplomats sent by the regime to buy military hardware in London were involved in dubious contacts which have resulted in criminal proceedings. As a result the three diplomats failed to accomplish their mission.

These instances, the military feel, are typical of the way the mullahs are handling the country's vital job of arms purchases, and the new premier is seen as directly responsible. He had assured the government that he would get help

from Libya's Gaddafi. Instead he upset the Libyan leader and other Arabs by his tactlessness. Annoying the military, too, is the fact that the mullahs do not include army officers in missions sent abroad for arms purchases. They usually send ignorant relatives of top mullahs instead.

As foreign minister, Mussavi has spent more time and energy on imaginary schemes to liberate Palestine, to fight imperialism and to sponsor terrorist groups abroad than in serving Iran's genuine interests, the critics point out. His record, compared with the highly significant achievements of his Iraqi rival Sadoun Hammadi, is pathetic, they feel. Yet now he has been rewarded for his failures by being promoted to the premiership.

The military is also suspicious of the new president Khamenei, who as deputy defence minister was responsible for weakening of the army and the execution of scores of officers and other ranks. Realising this, Khomeini last month delegated more powers to the new chief of staff, General Zahir-Nejad, and politely barred Khamenei from interfering in army affairs.

CSO: 4600/118

## IRAN

### INSIDE OPPOSITION GROUPS ADOPT NEW TACTICS AGAINST REGIME

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 45, 5 Nov 81 p 5

[Text] Armed opposition forces inside Iran seem to have adopted a new tactic in their continued campaign against the regime of Ayatollah Khomeini. Rather than directing their guns at prominent figures of the regime they are now eliminating middle rank functionaries, especially ideological commissars, informers and the so-called rally organisers.

Last week unidentified gunmen stopped the director of the Ideological Office in East Azarbaijan and killed him, together with two of his armed companions. The victim, identified as Javad Hossainkhah, was driving from Tehran to Tabriz. His car was chased by a jeep near Takestan, and forced to stop. Hosseinkhah and his companions were unable to use their guns. Their attackers ordered them out of their vehicle, took them to a quiet spot nearby and shot them. Their bodies were found later.

Shortly afterwards came the assassination of a hardline supporter of the regime in the headmaster of the secondary school in Tavalesh. His name has not been given. Two other new recruits to the staff of the Qazvin Secondary School named Azizi and Eshavari were also killed by unknown gunmen. Leaflets distributed at the scene claimed that the killings were intended to serve notice to so-called teachers who had been infiltrated by the regime.

In Tehran a city bus driver said to be a leading member of the hezbollahis--members of the fanatical "Party of God"--and also an informer, was shot dead. The shops of two South Tehran mobsters, identified as Hassan Mardani and Gholam Hossain Seyyed-Hossaini, were set on fire. They were alleged to be both informers and organisers of mobs to take part in pro-regime rallies and Friday prayer gatherings.

Similarly, in Kermanshah, Mashad, Tabriz and Isfahan well-known supporters of Khomeini who act as informers and mob organisers have been attacked by the opponents of the regime or their houses and shops set on fire.

Analysts in Tehran believe that the opposition's new tactic in switching from high ranking officials to the middle rank supporters of the regime is intended to weaken the pillars on which the regime's strength lies. Gunning down of middle rank supporters of Khomeini is also a less risky operation because, unlike

the prominent mullahs, the second rank ones are not protected by a dozen or so bodyguards and they do not move about in bulletproof cars. Because of the nature of their work the middle rankers are also readily approachable.

Yet they perform a highly vital service to the regime, both in its spying network as well as in herding crowds to swell the attendance at Friday prayers or funeral processions. The Khomeini regime is highly sensitive to the size of the turnout at these public functions because it owed its initial success in ousting the Shah, and later in intimidating other rivals, by relying on well-organised rallies. Even today when a major decision is to be taken which may bring about popular outcry, the method used is to send a crowd in front of the Majlis to demand that that particular decision be adopted. Then the Majlis brands the rally as "the popular will" and subsequently agrees to the demands.

Now, by turning their guns against rally organisers the opponents of the regime expect to deny the mullahs that particular advantage.

Analysts believe the opposition elements who initially took such a heavy toll of the lives of the regime's leadership and who are now eliminating middle rank supporters of the mullahs belong to a highly efficient and professional organisation. They may well be members of a centrist group, and not members of the Mojahedin-e-Khalq, they suggest.

CSO: 4600/118

## MOJAHEDIN-E KHALQ REPRIMANDED FOR PLOTS, ASSASSINATIONS

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 3 Oct 81 pp 1, 11

[Text] On the eve of the elections, Rajavi--this fugitive from the wrath of the people--called upon supporters of his anti-peoples' organization to plot against these elections as extensively as possible. He was hoping that with this anti-people request's appearance in the imperialist, fear-generating press, the turnout for the elections of millions of revolution-loving masses would be reduced, and that 3 million votes would be realized. However, the "people," even more full of love than before, took up the standard for their relentless struggle against the world-devourers, and fearlessly, paying no heed to the hypocrites' "heroic"! protection of them, sent their true defenders to the barricades of the defense of the interests of the deprived. The people's active and zealous turnout shows once again that the Islamic Republic of Iran, as one of the world's most stable countries, decisively carries on with its revolution while struggling against internal and external plots. This stability, whose only guarantor is the people's unsparing protection of the revolution, has always been a thorn in the side of America and its cohorts, and they have wanted to refute it on every pretext so as to always have a justification for plotting against the Islamic Republic. Yet the people have always shamed these pretexts, while blackening the faces of those who have buried their heads in the sand and shamelessly equated the killing of innocent people with defense of the people.

These same people, on the day the leader of their clan despicably fled to Paris with Bani-Sadr hiding in the airplane's restroom; stupidly said that in another week the people would bring him back with greetings, praise, whistles and cheers and make him Prime Minister. In the course of filling the shoes of Bakhtiar, Oveysi, Amini, Ariana, and others, the "people"! who are their supporters came together and tried as much as they were able to martyr the nation's officials in order that perhaps the way would be opened for them to come here, but the nation's closing more tightly of ranks in its enmity of them showed them who their true enemies are. Yesterday they mobilized in order to break the ranks of the people.

Who did the purposeless agents of the central cadres abroad martyr in the streets, supporters of dependent capitalism, or representatives of the nation's capitalists?

If their enemies are these people, then why are they hiding from the wrath of the people? Why don't they demonstrate once in Shush Square, Nazi Abad, or the Seh Rah-e Azari? Is it not because there are more people in these areas?

Ask them what class Raja'i came from. At what luxury-laden table did he sit? Don't they know how he lived and what long years he suffered in prison? Ask them how much wealth the martyred Beheshti had, and who swallowed the poison of accusation to obtain a moment's ease for the people in the villages. How many times did Hasheminezhad go to prison, and how many times did those connected with the Mojahedin betray him?

Ask them who the people voted for in the elections, and why?

Who among your comrades-in-arms are enemies of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and what is the American connection with your enmity with the Islamic Republic? Who were you supporting and who were you attacking in your disruption of the elections? Did you get the message in Paris? What percentage of the people in the poor neighborhoods participated in the elections, and how many of the people in the wealthy neighborhoods? What about the villagers?

They know all the answers to these questions. If they didn't know they wouldn't just demonstrate in front of the classy boutiques.

Oh you who have never been able to get the people to turn out whenever you have come out of your fearsome houses against the people who have firmly dedicated their pain, suffering, and deprivation against the superpowers, and even America's henchmen who are your leaders have not been able to disperse the people. Open your eyes and see how the people, in defiance of all your scientific analyses, have solidly participated in the elections and given expression to their rancour against the dastradly assassination of their dear ones.

Those who have thus far been martyred at your treasonous hands were the true supporters of these people and spokesmen for their deprivations. This is why the nation employed them, and you treasonously martyred them. Oh deceived ones! Just once, ask your leaders what is the social class of those they call thugs, Partisans of God, and Phalangists, and how is it that this time the thugs are not capitalists? Ask the leader of your group to plan a demonstration once in the poor neighborhoods so that his voice can reach the ears of the poor people. The deprived ones have certainly heard your entire pitch, and yet you demonstrate in order to bring out the capitalists in the upper part of the city! Are you afraid those calloused hands will tear you to pieces?

Truly, what percentage of the membership of the organization is composed of people who have tasted hunger? On what side of town are your homes? Ask your team leader sometime why all the team leaders' houses are located in places where there are no poor people within forty lots in four directions. Ask them what neighborhoods the team leaders' houses were in for the armed groups and organizations before the revolution, and where the organization's slogans were most often heard, and for which group of people these slogans were most interesting.

You who have taken daggers in hand to kill the people's dear ones, what people are you defending? The people are those who turned out 100 percent for the elections in the Southern part of the city and the villages, and this firmly establishes their strength of purpose in defending the revolution.

# IRANIANS' RESENTMENT TURNS AGAINST LEFTIST LEADERS

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 45, 5 Nov 81 pp 6-8

[Text] A steadily growing feeling of resentment against the Mojahedin-e-Khalq and its allied leftist group leaders over their responsibility for sending so many young people onto the streets to be slaughtered by Khomeini's thugs is reported from Tehran. The public's first reaction when the wave of murders began three months ago was one of severe shock. There was severe criticism even of Khomeini, who was openly called "the most bloodthirsty tyrant Iran has ever seen."

"But with Bani-Sadr and Rajavi in the safety of Paris while their misled and openhearted supporters were being killed like flies, it was only natural that with their initial fury dissipated people should begin to blame Rajavi and his colleagues for leaving their supporters to face the music," a Tehran observer pointed out. "The two fugitives in Paris were likened to commanders who had deserted their men in the battle."

As the mullahs intensified their bloody campaign of murder and execution the popular backlash against the Mojahedin leaders grew. Iranians who invariably believe that there must be a sinister hand behind any event even suggested that Khomeini and his henchmen were right in accusing the Mojahedin leaders of being American agents. "Apparently, this is a clever device through which the Americans are eliminating the true leftists by using the mullahs," was a theory constantly aired.

Other Iranians who also look for hidden hands behind every political move suggested that the wave of the murders had something to do with the Russians and the Tudeh. They maintained that the Tudeh party, which follows the Moscow line so faithfully, had triggered the recent showdown between the Mojahedin and the Khomeini group in an effort to break up the country's largest leftist organisation. In doing this, the theory went on, the Tudeh would weaken and effectively eliminate a heretical rival, and thus would emerge as the sole standard-bearer of the left.

Advocates of this theory held that the Russians had two political surrogates in Iran. The first, known to everyone, was the Tudeh party, which because of its record of blind obedience to Moscow, was very much discredited in the country. The second was, they argue, the Mojahedin-e-Khalq, which had a kind of national and religious cover and because of that could attract many genuine leftists who had no love for Moscow.

The advocates of this theory argue that the enormous funds at the disposal of the Mojahedin and their outside contacts prove the point that they were supported by a foreign power. And the fact that they only attacked the U.S. and even tried to hand over U.S. Embassy documents to Russian agents showed their real orientation.

They claim that after the quarrel between Bani-Sadr and the hardliners came into the open Moscow tried to persuade the Mojahedin leadership to maintain neutrality and keep some place on the Iranian political scene. But either because of the personal ambitions of its leaders, or other factors, the organisation decided to throw in its lot with Bani-Sadr.

Factors which might have encouraged the Mojahedin to join Bani-Sadr, it is suggested, were:

1. The Tudeh leadership was possibly worried that their party might once again be sacrificed by Moscow if the Soviets decided to put its chips on the Mojahedin number. So they pushed Rajavi into Bani-Sadr's arms to obviate this.
2. It is also possible that the Tudeh leadership managed to convince their Soviet overlords that the excesses of the Khomeini regime had turned the popular tide in favour of a secular system in preference to a religious one; thus, a pure socialist-Leninist set-up was preferable to an Islamic marxist one.
3. Finally, it was suggested that independent factions within the Mojahedin decided to make a clean break from Khomeini and the Russians, and so they saw in Bani-Sadr and his foreign backers, presumably the European left, a good vehicle on which to ride to an independent course.

What is certain is that all the leading players in the political scene, such as the Tudeh, Mojahedin, the Islamic Republic party, the independent leftists including the National Democratic Front, and finally the remainder of the supporters of Bazargan and the National Front, are peripheral groups. Certainly none of them could claim with any confidence they would win a free election, nor form a strong government, Iranian observers contend. Indeed, many people believe that after the overthrow of Shahpour Bakhtiar, the only form of credible government which Iran has witnessed was that of Bazargan's provisional administration in 1979; that government's popularity began to wane after only one month in office, when the atrocities of the revolutionary courts and their refusal to give a fair and open trial to the leading figures of the monarchical regime became clear. Later, the high-handed manner in which the referendum of April 1, 1979 was conducted effectively put an end to the solid public backing for Bazargan, too.

Thus, from a strictly political viewpoint, the bloody fight between the mullahs and the Mojahedin is a factional war between two extremist and by now unrepresentative groups, many Iranian observers point out.

It is inevitable too, that people will note that the victims of today were themselves the killers of yesterday. Now that the dust has settled over the early period of the revolution people can look back to the events of February 1979 and see that it was the combined forces of the Mojahedin and Fedayeen-e-Khalq

which raided army barracks soon after the then chief of staff General Gharabaghi called the army off the streets and back to their barracks. On those fateful days of February 10 and 11, 1979 many unarmed soldiers and officers were mercilessly killed by Mojahedin and Fedayeen gunmen.

The same groups were also responsible for helping the young and socially frustrated mullahs to set up Islamic tribunals to dispense summary justice. Not that the mullahs needed much encouragement to resort to violence. But the Mojahedin and their allies provided the mullahs with their technical support and taught them how to be ruthless. The Mojahedin's record, therefore, leaves their main activists with little popular sympathy. Added to that is the group's ambiguous political platform. According to most political analysts in Iran with whom it is possible to keep in touch, the Mojahedin have always said "what they are not, but they are yet to say what they are."

"They say they are not marxists," one analyst points out. "They also say that they are not theocrats. They are neither liberals, nor nationalists, because in early 1979 they openly attacked the National Front and other followers of the well-known nationalist leader, the late Dr Mossadegh. But when you ask them about their political, social and economic programmes they usually dodge the issue and resort to bland and generalised statements."

In today's political climate in Iran two other factors work against the Mojahedin. One is the obscure background of their leaders. Two of their best-known figures--Massoud Rajavi and Moussa Khiabani--were not even born when Iranians nationalised their oil industry. It has taken a bloody revolution and a massive dose of economic chaos and misery for Iranians for them to appreciate the value of "the devil they knew." Indeed, the inexperienced ministers of the successive cabinets after the revolution have left a feeling among Iranians that an obscure young man like Rajavi is hardly a better bet than the untested Velayati or Mir-Hossain Mussavi.

Also haunting the minds of much of the professional and clerical classes is the ferocity with which members and supporters of the Mojahedin and fedayeen, as well as the Tudeh party, whipped up campaigns against all moderate officials in the administration and industry to force them from their jobs after the revolution. They were to blame for destroying the lives of thousands of ordinary officials, it is alleged, and it was they who at that time invoked Islam as their reason.

Thus, along with the callous way the Mojahedin leaders sent young people onto the streets to get killed, many people look at their earlier ruthlessness and wonder what sort of life the Mojahedin might provide if they did take power for a period in Iran. Would it be more murder, purges, confiscations and hardship? Few people would give a firm negative on that, independent observers feel.

CSO: 4600/118

# OPPOSITION GROUPS' COALITION REPORTED PROGRESSING

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 45, 5 Nov 81 pp 1-3

[Text] Reports from a number of exile opposition groups in Paris have hinted that current moves to form a loose coalition among them to present a united front with the aim of getting rid of the Khomeini regime in Iran have been progressing satisfactorily.

Efforts were continuing to bring in prominent military names who have both following among officers who are still in Iran and whose inclusion could influence opposition forces inside the country to take new heart and consider action.

There are already signs in Iran that nationalist groups now see the urgency of all opponents of the regime working together before it is too late. Open letters from professional and other groups now circulating in Tehran are pushing this theme vigorously. There is also a strong feeling among observers watching the exile groups that they themselves now feel there is sufficient animosity to the mullah's administration among both military and civilian groups inside Iran to encourage some concerted action.

Additionally the shows of open disgust from a number of foreign governments, as well as the world public at large, over the course of events in Iran have provided new incentives to come together to try to salvage something from the wreck of their country. Fears that Western governments would stamp on any embryonic united opposition front because of their commercial hopes in Iran have dissipated with the signs of a spreading realisation among the industrial countries that unless some change occurs in Iran shortly it "won't be worth a penny to any would-be trader," as one exile put it.

First reports on the new coalition plan said Shahpour Bakhtiar, who heads the most powerful opposition group, the National Iranian Resistance Movement, veteran statesman Ali Amini, who has been working to build up a united front for many months, Admiral Ahmad Madani, and Hassan Nazih, both officials who worked initially for the post-Shah regime and have been sent as anti-monarchist, and several other opposition figures had agreed to work together without sacrificing their own freedom of action.

Reports that overtures were being made to have monarchist leaders join them have since been confirmed by sources close to the groups. Reservations expressed at the outset by Madani over the inclusion of a man like General Gholam Ali Oveissi, the Shah's former strongman, who rightly or wrongly has been blamed for some of the violence in Tehran during the unrest there, are said to have been overruled.

Amini is said to have expressed the view that the people of Iran are so desperate to return to some semblance of normal life, and restore some sanity to their existence, that they are no longer concerned over who comes to save them. Others are said to have supported this view. Oveissi is known to enjoy a strong following among some sections of the military and many exiles.

Some observers also saw the silence of the new Shah on the anniversary of his accession to the throne as a possible reflection of a desire on his and his advisers' part to play as diplomatic a role while the coalition negotiations are going on as possible. "If he does see his role as a constitutional one it stands to sense that while the politicians are negotiating he should be seen as awaiting their recommendations without trying to influence them at this stage," a veteran Iranian official commented to IPS. "Especially when the tide is steadily turning in the favour of monarchy once more."

Observers say the noticeable mellowing of former republicans in their attitude to the monarchy in recent weeks reflects their awareness that insistence of any particular system of government or ideology can only be disruptive rather than help unite Iranians to save their country.

The philosophy of the new coalition is that the groups all work together to topple Khomeini, then guarantee a free plebiscite among Iranians to decide the system under which they want to live. Afterwards, the groups will go their own ways and conduct their political campaigns within the system people decide upon, and under the general principles of the 1907 constitution. That constitution does provide for a mechanism for change in the system, Iranian experts say.

Another factor cited by some observers as bringing about a more practical attitude to the centrist forces are the signs that rightist forces are steadily organising and drawing growing support. There is a natural fear among republicans, the commentators say, that if some effective political organisation to "supervise" the move to topple Khomeini and any return to Iran by exile forces is not set up, then more extremist rightists could impose another oppressive regime and thus spark off new strife.

Some sources close to the new coalition activities say the question of approaching Mojahedin-e-Khalq leader Massoud Rajavi and former president Bani-Sadr to join them had been discussed. But this could not be confirmed.

There are now signs of a growing movement inside Iran to organise popular opposition to Khomeini's rule into an institutional framework. Reports indicate that a number of civil servants, oil company employees, educationalists, lawyers, physicians and businessmen are at work trying to shape up a massive resistance movement.

One indicator of such a move has come in the form of an announcement by the hitherto unknown group calling itself the Association of the Civil Servants of Iran. In a leaflet the founders of the association have announced their readiness to provide civilian back-up to any military move to topple the present-day rulers of Iran.

The association has called on all the Iranians to be ready to play their due role in the movement, which it says is bound to put an end to the rule of the mullahs. However, it has cautioned the people not to take rash decisions, not to endanger lives unnecessarily and not to act alone. It believes that all the opposition groups at home and abroad, military and civilian, must narrow down their objection to the single act of saving the homeland.

The association has specifically called on all opposition groups to leave aside ideological differences, party loyalties and sectarian considerations in favour of the all important task of saving the national identity and territorial integrity of Iran.

It warns various political and ideological groups that what is in danger is the very existence of Iran, "our very nationhood and our Iranian identity, because the present-day usurpers of power in Iran are blatantly and shamelessly bent on destruction of everything which has an Iranian identity."

The association goes on to state: "Nothing else is in immediate danger; neither Islam, any particular ideology, nor any kind of regional rights. We stress that what is in real danger is the very basis of our nationhood. If we lose that we will lose everything else. There will be no use for any ideology, faith or creed if we lose our homeland and identity."

It stresses that only Khomeini is gaining from the present obsession of "certain political groups in the opposition camp with ideological considerations or personal ambitions." It sets out its plan for unity of all opposition groups as follows:

1. Regard Khomeini and his regime as an army of occupation who must be evicted from Iran by a well-planned military operation.
2. Organise civilian back-up to make the liberation move as smooth and as bloodless and painless as possible, because during the past few years too much Iranian blood has been spilled and too much pain suffered.
3. All Iranians have a right and duty to participate in the war of liberation but there must be a clear-cut command structure with the military wing in the lead.
4. Avoid popularist slogans, especially those which--while desirable under ideal conditions--are meaningless at present.
5. Always remember that our immediate task is to evict an occupation army so as to reinstate national and constitutional institutions which have been destroyed or usurped by the army of occupation.

OPPOSITION SUPPORT OF MILITARY REVIEWED

NC301846 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian to Iran 1330 GMT 30 Oct 81

[Text] The morale of Iran's soldiers has always been high, which is something that cannot be (?ignored). After 3 1/2 years of treason, Khomeyni and his associates are (?still) trying to (?weaken) the army. After all the executions of the brave men of the armed forces, gendarmerie and police force and after all the pressure imposed on the armed forces (?as a result of which) many personnel had to leave the country, (?we continue) to see that wherever an Iranian soldier is, he feels the pains suffered by his homeland with all his being and conveys the feeling of patriotism (?to the people around him). [passage indistinct] This feeling of responsibility, this continuous thought about the destiny of Iran and of Iranians is (?a flame burning) within the soldiers and something that has been displayed time and again (?on various occasions and places).

(?The feeling of patriotism is so strong in the soldiers) that the calamity stricken people of Iran have attached all their hopes to this devoted force. With each passing day, the Iranian people's expectations on the Iranian army increase. And with each day, the burden on the shoulders of the military personnel becomes heavier. Their duty becomes (?more important) and their mission more (?specific). The truth is that the Iranian armed forces and military personnel--from ordinary soldiers, gendarmes and policemen up to the higher ranks--have never had a confrontation with the Iranian people. From the very first days of their service, they have used their weapons to confront foreign enemies and to preserve Iran's territorial integrity. The two things of importance to them are the preservation of Iranian thought and keeping Iran (?safe) from foreign aggression.

From the very start, Khomeyni and his associates regarded the Iranian army as a force confronting them. They knew that if they did not destroy the organizational (?bases) of the army and did not weaken the patriotic (?feeling) and dignity of the soldiers it would be impossible to place the army at their own disposal.

(?From the very first days), the first step taken was to mislead a number of military commanders with the help of Huyser's sinister mission and, by using the hireling Palestinians and the pro-Palestinian Mojahedin, they pillaged the garrisons as best they could. Khomeyni [word indistinct] in the sense that

in the beginning he praised and eulogized the armed forces and he ordered his devotees to place flowers in the barrels of the soldiers' guns during demonstrations. When (?he achieved what he wanted, he approached) the soldiers in the name of Islam and (?by infiltrating the army with his officials) and revolution guard tried to place religious (?beliefs) within the army vis-a-vis the firm determination of patriotic commanders.

The tragedy brought about by Khomeyni (?was very clearly) aimed at the officers and NCO's of the armed forces. (?However) he could not pass (?certain limits).

The second stage of Khomeyni's deceit became obvious when the patriotic Kurdish, Torkaman and Baluchi rose to confront the religious dictatorship of the (?Shi'ite bigots). By sending the armed forces to fight the Kurds, Khomeyni was trying to hit two birds with one stone. In other words, he intended to destroy the Kurds and to decrease, as much as possible, the popularity of an army that had never raised a weapon against a compatriot. Both of these plots failed because the Kurds alertly refrained from confronting the armed forces and [words indistinct] treated their military captives very respectfully and the armed forces treated the Kurds with the highest spirit of patriotism, so much so that Khomeyni was enraged and Khalkhali was sent on a mission to massacre the Kurdish captives. At any rate, Khomeyni's plans failed and Khalkhali's massacres only increased national and world aversion toward Khomeyni.

At this stage in Iran's history no one is as heavily burdened with treason as Bani-Sadr. He, too, was confronted with the healthy morale of the armed forces personnel and with the depth of their patriotism.

The third stage of Khomeyni's deceit in the armed forces was implemented during the war with Iraq. Khomeyni tried, by using (?the wretched) Bani-Sadr, to belittle the commanders. He appointed Bani-Sadr commander in chief to tell the armed forces personnel that "the post to which all of you attach such great importance can be filled by any ruffian if I wish." But we all know that Khomeyni and Bani-Sadr were both defeated at this stage too, so much so that today when reviewing the Iran-Iraq war, everyone praises the armed forces and its personnel and denounces Khomeyni and Bani-Sadr.

The Iranian armed forces have special characteristics, the first of which is their patriotism and the fact that they are nationalists, either knowingly or unknowingly. The second is that the army has gained great experience from the incidents and the historic experience of the past 3 years and has (?displayed) an extremely [word indistinct] and praiseworthy behavior. The third is that it believes in its military (?know-how). The fourth is that the army is disgusted with the fundamentalist nature and bigotry of the regime. And finally, the army is composed of constructive men and not destructive and fatalist elements. It is because of these inherent (?values) that the Iranian armed forces have stayed completely (?untouched) and each and every one of its personnel is (?worthy of praise).

(?Iran's salvation) depends on the heavy mission that all (?army) personnel shoulder. There is no doubt that with the first opportunity all of them will unite to save Iran in a humanitarian but powerful way. Today, the military

in Iran and abroad are all thinking of the homeland's salvation. This is why they enjoy the support of all the groups opposed to Khomeyni and his destructive regime. Iranians respect and attach hopes to the armed forces and will never forget that in these past 3 years of calamity, the armed forces have truly struggled and showed (?their devotion) both at home and abroad.

Neither intrigues by the left nor deceit by the clergy can mislead our armed forces. The armed forces is a manifestation of patriotism that is aware of its mission [word indistinct]. The armed forces [words indistinct] and do not harass compatriots. The armed forces have shown that they are the spirit of Iran.

CSO: 4640/48

MEASURES TAKEN TO IMPROVE SECTORS OF ECONOMY

Electricity Output

Tehran BURS in Persian 13 Sep 81 p 7

[Text] The Ministry of Energy announced its most important activities concerning electricity and energy in the course of the past year as follows:

Electricity Affairs

The main goal of the Ministry of Energy in the area of electricity is to produce electricity for various uses throughout the country. Obviously, the electrical industry made some progress in the past, but this progress was achieved at a very high cost and the expansion and rate of production were coupled with faulty policies (which were a part of the general policies of the country). Presently, the policy of the Ministry of Energy is primarily focussed on the quantitative expansion of this industry. For instance, providing power for 5 million consumers with probable power outages (a total of 5 days per year) and providing power for 4 million consumers with probable power outages (a total of 2 days per year) will be given priority. In addition to accomplishing the main goal and the quantitative expansion of the network, especially in villages and agricultural and industrial regions, difficulty lies in the demand for electricity for the coming years, which requires that steps be taken from now for more production (qualitative expansion). For this purpose, as well as to take the place of the nuclear power plants, which for political, economic, [technical], and security reasons have been eliminated from the program, the Ministry of Energy has prepared an expansive plan to establish hydroelectric and steam power plants. Hydroelectric power plants, which from every standpoint are the most valuable power plants, are being studied by the specialists of this Ministry. At the present time, with the cooperation of the universities, they are studying appropriate places to build dams. Also, the necessary planning for steam power plants (with a 5,000 megawatt capacity), which are necessary because of the increased electrical consumption and the elimination of the nuclear power plants, has begun.

Another goal of the Ministry of Energy is to create self-sufficiency in the electricity industry in order to free this industry from dependency, which concerns, directly or indirectly, all the industrial and agricultural institutions as well as the daily life of the people.

A brief summary of the activities and the steps taken regarding electrical power follows.

#### A. Installed Power

At the end of 1359 [21 Mar 80-20 Mar 81], the installed electrical power in the power stations managed by the Ministry of Energy reached 9,553 kilowatts, which shows an increase of 1,622 kilowatts (20.5 percent) compared to the end of the previous year (7,931 kilowatts).

#### B. Production of Electrical Energy

Between 21 Mar 80-20 Mar 81, the electrical energy produced by power facilities managed by the Ministry of Energy reached 19,869 million kilowatt hours, which shows an increase of 428 million kilowatt hours (2.2 percent) compared to the previous year (19,441 million kilowatt hours). Of the total electricity produced between 21 Mar 80-20 Mar 81, about 13,143 million kilowatt hours were produced by Tavanir Company, 1,107 million kilowatt hours by regional electricity companies, and 5,619 million kilowatt hours by the country's hydroelectric power stations. The electricity produced by hydroelectric stations (4,042 million kilowatt hours) of Tavanir Company was transmitted and sold to various parts of the country.

#### C. Electrical Outreach to Villages

Before the revolution, the number of villages with electricity was 4,186 throughout the country, which, compared to the total number of Iranian villages (66,000 villages), was insignificant and its annual expansion was quite poor (an average of 200 villages per year).

After the Islamic revolution, this important matter was noted and especially emphasized. After studies were made, a comprehensive plan to bring electricity to the villages was ratified. With this plan, an average of 2,000 villages will be electrified annually, which shows the comprehensiveness of the plan and the persistence of the authorities from the very beginning of their work.

During this same year, the regional electric companies continued their efforts in this regard. During this time, the regional electric company of Isfahan brought electricity to 279 villages, the regional electric company of Mazandaran to 267 villages, and the regional electric company of Gilan to 53 villages.

#### D. The Expansion of Power Stations

1. Work on the construction of [Naka] power stations, including 4 units of 440 megawatts each, of which 2 units are operational and a third is being tested before becoming temporarily operational.
2. Work on the construction of a 320 megawatt power station in Isfahan, which was completed this year and will become operational in 1360 [21 Mar 81-20 Mar 82].
3. Work on the installation of a large, 800 megawatt power station in Isfahan, the first unit of which will begin operation in Dey '61 [22 Dec 82-20 Jan 83].
4. Work on the construction of a 1,280 megawatt power station in Bandar 'Abbas, of which [3]20 megawatts were operational in the spring of 1980, and the installation of the second and third units are being completed.
5. Work on the construction of the gas power station of Orumiye, with a 60 megawatt capacity, which will be operational in the spring of 1981.
6. Work on the construction of the thermodynamic power station of Tus-Mashhad. During the year in question, most of the activities concentrated on building facilities and lodging for the employees. The main work on the power station itself will be followed up during the next year.
7. Work on the construction of a new power station in Tabriz, of which 2 units of 387 Megawatts each are being installed by Tavanir experts and technicians since the dismissal of foreign contractors.
8. Work on the construction of the 1,360 megawatt Ramin power station in Ahvaz, of which a 315 megawatt unit was operational in the fall.
9. Constructing a power station in south Tehran.  
  
This power station will be built to handle the future needs of the nationwide network with a 1,500 megawatt capacity in the vicinity of Tehran.
10. Work on the construction of the reserve pump power station of Siah Bisheh, which will store the energy produced by the thermodynamic power station as a backup during times of heavy load demand.
11. Several diesel power stations of small capacity in different cities have been or are being installed by regional electric companies.

## E. The Expansion of Distribution Lines and Stations

1. The completion of the 230 kilovolt Tehran-Isfahan lines between 21 Apr-21 May 80 and the completion of the preliminary operations for the temporary operation of the 230 kilovolt Tehran-Isfahan and Ziaran stations.
2. The necessary steps for the completion of the Najafabad-steel mill power transmitting lines and operations concerning the 230 kilovolt input of the steel mill, which became temporarily operational in the spring.
3. The transmitting lines of the 400 kilovolt Isfahan-Arak-Tehran project have been completed except for parts of the south Rudshur line.
4. The 230 kilovolt Naka-Sari-Kaghazsazi-Qayemshahr unit, in consultation with the Tavanir Company, is being built.
5. The margin of the operations of the second Tehran-Manjil circuit [as published].
6. Work on the preparation and installation of equipment to bring electricity to the national defense industries in Isfahan was begun temporarily in Khordad [22 May-21 Jun].
7. The 400 kilovolt eastern lines of Naka-Tehran, which became operational in Esfand [20 Feb-20 Mar].
8. The 400 kilovolt western lines of Neka-Tehran, which have made 20 percent progress and the operations of the project are continuing.
9. The 400 kilovolt project of Ziaran-Tabriz, which had made five percent progress at the end of winter.
10. The Tabriz-Mahabad-Orumiyeh lines, which have made five percent progress.
11. The 63 kilovolt Gilan lines project, which will be created to strengthen the connection between central and eastern Gilan.
12. The 66 kilovolt Fars lines project. The goal of this project is to transmit electricity from the natural gas power station of Shiraz to a number of cities of this province. Activities in all areas of the project continue.
13. The stations of the project for the expansion of the 132 kilovolt Azarbaijan electrical unit, all of the lines of which have been completed and have made 50 percent progress during this year.

14. The project of the 400 kilovolt transmitting line of Shiraz-Fasa-Sirjan.

The project is in progress and its goal is to connect the two main lines of (Tehran-Isfahan-Bandar 'Abbas) and (Ahvaz-Omidiyeh-Shiraz).

15. The comprehensive distribution project for Tehran.

This project is very actively being implemented and its goal is to cover the city of Tehran and its close suburbs.

16. The 63 kilovolt transmitting lines project of Khorasan, which made very good progress during the year in question.

#### Animal Husbandry

Tehran BURS in Persian 14 Sep 81 p 2

[Text] According to a PARS NEWS AGENCY report, the seminar on studying the resources for national self-sufficiency in animal husbandry products, which began on 23 Aug, completed its work with the issuance of a resolution.

The text of this resolution, consisting of 10 articles, is as follows:

1. Speedy determination of ownership on the basis of Islamic guidelines.
2. Considering the importance of the role of studying and treating animals and poultry in order to attain self-sufficiency, the veterinarian organization is to prepare a plan for providing and justly distributing vital medicine and to establish centers for the production of needed vaccines, under the supervision of the Razi institution of Hesarak.
3. In order to better control the diseases that humans and animals share in common, and to support the producers of the company for Iranian dairy industries, steps must be taken to create the necessary centers to collect the milk produced by small cattle raisers.
4. To provide and distribute thoroughbred hybrid milk cows needed by cattle raisers who meet the requirements, the organization of animal husbandry must take advantage of all the resources for raising hybrid thoroughbred cattle.
5. Considering the necessity of improving the condition of fishermen and the vital need to protect and preserve the aquatic resources as well as accelerate the construction of the southern shores, fisherman service centers must be established by the northern fishery company

to devise the necessary regulations to preserve water resources and to increase the stock of fish in water reservoirs, lakes, and behind dams. Also, a council made up of the members of the general assemblies and the general directors of the northern and southern fisheries must be formed and the authority of the general assemblies and the board of directors of the two fisheries must be conferred on the above-mentioned council.

6. Believing in the major share of the tribes in the production of non-dependent animal husbandry products and the particular social life of this stratum of our fellow citizens, it is necessary that the affairs of tribes be centered in one unit. Also, since the tribes make up a significant percentage of the national population, from now on, the nation's population must be divided under the headings of urban, rural, and tribal.

7. In order to coordinate the development of planting feed, a headquarters consisting of the regional representatives of the offices of forests and pastures, animal husbandry, agriculture, research, sowing, and industries of the foundation of the oppressed, the reconstruction crusade and the land distribution boards in the regional office of agricultural affairs is to be established and given the necessary responsibilities.

8. Considering the special importance of corn in feeding humans, animals, and poultry, encouragement should be given to the planting of this grain.

9. The affairs of the preservation, correct operation, reformation, and revitalization of pastures, with the technical supervision of the national organization of forests and pastures, are to be implemented through pasture upkeep projects through self-help and the direct participation of rural and tribal cattle raisers as well as the establishment of rural and tribal Islamic cooperative councils.

10. In order to precisely and completely implement the above items, it is necessary to establish centers for rural services, to combine and reconstruct organizations in the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, to train the existing cadre, to make organizational plans based on accurate statistical information to ensure cooperation and coordination between all the organizations in implementing the items of the resolution, to provide the required funds for implementing the related plans, and to eliminate troublesome financial and other regulations. Also, the animal husbandry unit of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs will be responsible for the implementation of the items of the resolution.

## Tehran Water Works

Tehran BURS in Persian 22 Sep 81 p 3

[Text] The Ministry of Energy announced the activities of the Tehran regional water organization as follows.

### 1. Operations

#### Untreated Water

The untreated water to be purified from the water resources, including the Jajrud and Karaj rivers and the semi-deep wells, is transferred through the water works facilities to the water treatment facilities of Tehran. From 21 Mar 80-20 Mar 81, about 222.52 million cubic meters of untreated water was transported from the above-mentioned sources to Tehran and 38.29 million cubic meters of it were used for planting forests in the east and west of Tehran and for the industrial factories around Tehran as well as for washing pipelines. The remaining 404.23 million cubic meters were sent to the Tehran treatment facilities. Treatment facilities used 7.14 cubic meters and 397.09 cubic meters, after treatment, were put at the disposal of 565,614 Tehran consumers.

#### Laboratories

The laboratories, through checking samples and making various biological, bacteriological, and chemical tests, control the water from its source to its ultimate delivery to the consumer. If the water is polluted or impure, they determine the reasons and eliminate them. During the year in question, 10,574 tests were carried out on water samples in various laboratories of the organization as follows:

Chemistry laboratory, 906 samples

Bacteriology laboratory, 6,333 samples

Biology laboratory, 2,438 samples

Laboratory for the study of water resources, 563 samples

Sewage laboratory, 188 samples

#### Karaj Drinking Water

In 1342 [21 Mar 63-20 Mar 64], the Tehran regional water organization began to implement the first stage of the plan to install drinking water pipelines for the city of Karaj. In 1344 [21 Mar 65-20 Mar 66], in accordance with an agreement, the operation of the water facilities of the city of Karaj was conferred on the Tehran regional water

organization. From 21 Mar 80-20 Mar 81, 3,614,599 cubic meters of treated water was put at the disposal of the consumers.

### 3. Development Projects

#### Project for Building Lar Dam

Operations of the implementation of this project until the end of winter, 1980, has been as follows.

Building the dam and tunnel of Lar and related facilities, 92 percent progress.

The tunnel to reach the Lavarak power station, 45 percent progress.

Installation of the Kalan power station generator, 75 percent progress.

#### Project for the Irrigation of Dasht-e Qazvin

The goal of this plan is to provide the necessary water for the region of Dasht-e Qazvin, including that required for agriculture, industry, and drinking. During this year, the activities in all areas of this project have continued in a remarkable manner.

#### Project for the Irrigation Network of Varamin and Garmsar

The percentage of accomplishments at the end of winter, 1980, are as follows:

Building a diverting dyke and the first section of the Varamin irrigation network, 60 percent.

The main building of the Varamin network, 51 percent.

Section three of the Varamin irrigation network, nine percent.

Building the Tehran-Varamin canal, 75 percent.

Digging operational wells, 75 percent.

Building the diverting dyke and irrigation network of Garmsar, 65 percent.

#### Project for Studying the Building of the Saveh Dam

The goals of this study project are to irrigate, build dams and water resources for the Saveh region, to make use of surface and underground waters, to build dams on the Forqan and Mazlaqan rivers in order to collect the flood waters, and to prepare an irrigation project which

would benefit agriculture, in addition to producing electrical power up to about 10 megawatts.

The studies for the first and second stages have been completed and from 21 Mar 80-20 Mar 81, the consulting engineers were selected and the necessary contracts have been signed and exchanged.

Project to Study the Reservoir Dam of Taleqan and the Long-Term Plan for Tehran Water

Excavation and exploratory operations restarted from 22 May 80 and on 8 Mar 81 became temporarily operational.

Mapping and sample taking operations have continued in the course of the past year.

The Project to Build the Sewage System for the City of Tehran

Restudying the project for the network and the sewage treatment facilities of Zargandeh and Qeytariyeh by consulting engineers.

Preparations for the project to create the network and the sewage treatment center of Gisha as well as the sewage pipelines of Shahrara and emptying the water works wells with two muck vacuuming tankers.

The continuation of the covered Yakhchiabad canal to a length of 840 meters.

Mapping the bed of Firuzabad River and 43 side streets of Gisha region and the mapping for the project of Qeytariyeh and Gisha streets.

9593

CSO: 4640/12

REPORTER IN TEHRAN LOOKS AT EVIN PRISON, EXECUTIONS

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 18 Oct 81 p 6

[Text] A few dozen kilometers south of Tehran lies the enormous cemetery of Behesht Zahre. In the cemetery of the martyrs are all those who died as heroes of the Islamic republic. There are the tombstones of Ayatollah Taleghani and Ayatollah Beheshti, President Raja'i, Prime Minister Bahonar and Commander-in-chief Fallahi.

But only a few hundred meters away is a place no true Islamic revolutionary will visit. There "the condemned" have been thrown into their mass graves. They are young people of the leftist-Muslim Mojahedin organization who after their executions rapidly have been brought to Behesht Zahre. The few tombstones which were erected by relatives have been crushed by the revolutionary guard.

The Mojahedin youths do, however, profess themselves to Islam and have, therefore, earlier barely been allowed burial at Behesht Zahre. Executed marxists have been thrown into mass graves in secret places. According to reliable sources, executed Mojahedin adherents are no longer brought to Behesht Zahre, and the parents are no longer told where their children are buried.

At Behesht Zahre hardly anyone condescends to glance at the littered cemetery of the Mojahedin youths. The tombstones have been crushed to pebbles, which have been scattered over the whole area. Parents naturally do not know exactly where their children are buried, and those who visit are harassed by young revolutionary guards.

Before President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr fled to France, the Mojahedin was not officially prohibited, and it even happened that members were buried in the cemetery of the martyrs. But the stones have now been removed and so have probably also the bodies.

Relatives Wait

Practically all executions in Tehran take place at Evin prison. Outside, people gather every day to gain some information, if possible, about their relatives. But information is only given when the execution has already taken place.

"It has also become usual to allow the condemned to call his relatives a short moment before the execution to tell them that he or she is about to be shot," says a well informed source.

At best, the relatives are also told where the body will be brought. The return of bodies is now a rarity. The bodies are instead transported in trucks and in buses with the curtains drawn to the secret burial places.

#### Bill for the Execution

After a while it often happens that the relatives receive a bill for the ammunition used at the execution. It can involve unreasonable amounts of up to the equivalent of 4,000 Finnish marks. Parents can also be requested to pay for their children's stay at Evin prison.

Information about what happens inside the walls of Evin prison is scarce. The few people who are released will, from fear of reprisals, not talk about their experiences. It is, however, commonly known in Tehran that torture occurs.

Evin prison is now completely overcrowded, even the washrooms are used as cells.

The officials do not try to cover up that youngsters are executed. The religious head of Evin prison has said that he himself has condemned 14-year-olds to death.

"But generally we do not execute children," Chief Public Prosecutor Musavi Arbedili recently explained.

"Instead we have them classified as insane," he said.

No Iranian boy or girl over 16 years of age can, however, criticize the regime without risking execution. They are considered adults and fully capable to answer for their own actions.

But not even executed members of the leftist-Muslim Mojahedin will in the future be buried in sanctified earth. They will probably be thrown into a mass grave which their parents will never be able to find.

9843

CSO: 3109/21

# ECONOMIC DISASTER LOOMS CLOSER

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 45, 5 Nov 81 pp 9-10

[Text] Signs that Iranians face a winter of discontent, with drastic fuel and food shortages, became clearer this week.

Oil sources said there were signs Iran was struggling to keep its oil exports up to between 300,000 and 400,000 barrels a day following the damage inflicted by Iraqi bombing raids on the Gurreh station which pumps the crude across to the country's main terminal at Kharg island.

And a government announcement over Tehran radio on Tuesday morning ordered that the capital's petrol stations should suspend all sales. A government spokesman tried to explain this by saying that other Central province towns had had their ration of petrol increased, so Tehran's deliveries were late coming in.

Both Iran's two main meat suppliers, new Zealand and Australia, are no longer delivering following non-payment of outstanding bills. New Zealand is owed, it is claimed, \$30 million. Last year New Zealand supplied 30,000 tons of lamb worth 70 million NZ dollars. Tehran has begun talks with Turkey to increase lamb imports from there, meanwhile hinting that the shortage is due to butchers selling more than the ration to some customers, leaving none for some cardholders.

The Italian firm of Condotte d'Acqua is also said to have withdrawn from the Bandar Abbas port development project, for which agreement on resumption of work was finalised not long ago. Sources say Iran has not come up with the \$30 million it was due to pay the Italian company.

The Japanese Mitsui group have already warned that their withdrawal from the 3.6 million joint venture petro-chemicals project at Bandar Shahpur was also imminent if Iran did not put up additional cash. Sources say the decision has now been made. Economic sources say that this could only mean that Japanese experts and officials agreed the project could not be saved.

Problems over currency transfers are also believed behind the decision of the Spanish airline Iberia to halt its flights to Tehran, and Lufthansa to reduce its service to a single flight weekly. Air France cut off its own flights in August.

Even when Iran was exporting 500,000 barrels of oil a day in September the income from it was only around \$550 million a month, sufficient to cover only about 40 percent of the officially estimated monthly import bill of \$1.3 billion.

Economic sources calculate that Iran's foreign exchange reserves are now below the \$3 billion level--some say they are no more than \$2 billion already. This would mean Iran has imports coverage for only two months more.

Shortages of foodstuffs are already leading to long queues at shops in the cities of Iran. In spite of widespread claims of bumper rice and wheat harvests rice is hardly to be found in the shops and bread prices have soared. In Tehran the popular lavash bread now costs 20 rials, compared to 5 rials not long ago. When it can be found, rice costs 360 rials a kilo (nearly five dollars at the official rate of exchange).

People contacted by phone also reported they were paying 120 rials for a single egg. There were long waits for chicken available at very high prices, too.

The Ministry of Agriculture said this week that the bumper wheat crop meant Iran would buy 1.4 million tons less from abroad during the current year. It also announced that private enterprise was being called in to help unload ships which have been waiting for up to 50 days to get into Bandar Abbas. This would save extra payment for waiting time, and help to speed up distribution. Until now all the signs had suggested the regime planned to nationalise all its trucking firms.

Government spokesman Behzad Nabavi tried to explain the rice shortage in a recent interview with the Ettelaat daily in Tehran. He said this was the first time the government had bought rice and "money reached the centres slowly so that buying slowed down." They hoped to overcome that problem soon.

"Our other problem was that as soon as we announced that we planned to buy rice and cut the flow of rice from the Caspian provinces (where it is grown) those who had rice left over from last year immediately hoarded it away," Nabavi said. "These ungodly people, whom Mr Rafsanjani calls economic terrorists, immediately raised the price of their rice and since the government had not made any rice available on the market they were able to sell the rice at an exorbitant price."

Rice rationing, Nabavi explained, meant that each province had a share, not each individual, and so each province was responsible for distributing its own share to cooperatives and small shopkeepers.

Nabavi said the government was controlling the distribution and sale of rice for the public good and promised the best quality rice would soon be available at 210 rials a kilo. The government would also pay higher prices for lower grade rice to encourage more planting of the lower quality product since there was only limited land available for the first grade crop. He also contended that by the time rice reached the shops in Iran under the old system 200 people had had a cut out of it and 20 million tomans worth of profit were made.

CSO: 4600/118

# NEW SPLIT IN KURDISH RANKS

London IRAN PRESS SERVICE in English No 45, 5 Nov 81 pp 10-11

[Text] The dictatorial, strongly communistic line of Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran leader Abdolrahman Ghassemloo has led to a split in his party ranks, according to Kurdish sources in Paris.

Ghassemloo's decision to embrace the cause of former president Bani-Sadr and Mojahedin-e-Khalq leader Massoud Rajavi and to join their National Resistance Council has brought protests that Bani-Sadr was the man who launched the war against the Kurds when president and commander-in-chief of the armed forces.

Following the disclosure of Ghassemloo's pledge to Bani-Sadr, a number of leading figures in the party have resigned and formed their own breakaway party under the same name.

The dissident group wants the party to play more national a role and they accuse Ghassemloo of deliberately limiting his activities to Kurdistan when there should be wider concern for the national situation. They also accuse him of pursuing a strict communist line, along with treating his opponents with brutal justice similar to that of Khomeini.

Pro-Ghassemloo sources in Paris were not contactable to confirm news of this split.

Meanwhile, continued heavy fighting is reported between various Kurdish forces and revolutionary guards in areas near the Turkish and Iraqi borders. Reports suggest the guards are trying to cut off arms supply routes to the Kurdish areas. Significantly, official reports from Tehran on the fighting to not mention the army, only the guards, for the first time.

Tehran claims that the guards have cleared 31 villages of "outlawed armed groups," a term usually applied to the Kurdish and other guerrillas. Boukan, Marivan, Bahen, Naghadeh, and the Mahabad areas have seen the fiercest clashes. Heavy casualties are reported on both sides from Ravansar; while in Kurdish attacks on revolutionary guards headquarters and other key points in Mahabad a number of guards were killed. Later the guards claimed to have executed four captured attackers.

Tehran radio has also accused Kurds of burning to death captured officials and guards.

CSO: 4600/118

# FUTURE OF MULTIMILLION-DOLLAR PETROCHEMICAL COMPLEX UNCERTAIN

Tehran SOBH-E AZADEGAN in Persian 24 Oct 81 p 2

[Text] The 3.6-billion dollar Iran-Japan petrochemical complex on the Persian Gulf that has remained incomplete on account of the Iran Islamic revolution and of the war in the Persian Gulf, is now bringing relations between the countries to the danger point.

The Japanese Mitsui group, the largest Japanese investor in the complex--which is the largest Japanese commercial venture in a foreign country--has said that it is ready to withdraw within the next 10-day period.

Sources at the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated: "The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs is seriously concerned about the impact of Mitsui's withdrawal from this project on the relations between Japan and Iran, a country that for a time used to fill the major part of Japan's oil needs."

The Mitsui group says that in case Iran does not agree to provide another 652 million dollars for the completion of the project, it will withdraw from the petrochemical venture at the port of Imam Khomeyni.

A Mitsui spokesman stated to REUTER: "We cannot wait indefinitely, and it is possible that within the next 10 days we shall withdraw from the project, unless Iran should give a serious response to our proposal (which was presented last April)." Mitsui's withdrawal from the petrochemical project--which is 85 percent completed--is not a sudden shock for the Japanese. Informed sources said that many Japanese bankers and investors support Mitsui's withdrawal from the venture because of the Islamic revolution in 1979 and especially the bombing of the complex by the Iraqi air force. The last Iraqi attack on Monday, during which a bomb damaged the power lines between the two complexes, was the cause for Mitsui's issuing its final statement.

Relations between Iran and Japan are already at a low point. Last year, Japan applied economic sanctions against Iran over the issue of the U.S. hostages in Iran, and is now importing an insignificant amount of oil from Iran.

Mitsui says that if it withdraws from this project, which has the backing of both the Japanese and Iranian governments, according to the insurance act on Japanese government exports, it will request an indemnification of 870 million dollars from the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry. Mitsui has invested an amount of 300 billion yen (1.3 billion dollars) and starting next month, when the due date

arrives, payments on heavy interest and on the principal will begin to accumulate. The petrochemical project was started in 1971, when 5 Japanese firms, among them the Mitsui company and the Petrochemical Mitsui company--an Iran-Japan firm--formed a joint investment partnership on a fifty-fifty basis.

Construction activities have thus far cost 1.17 billion dollars. Construction work on the project, which was supposed to produce 350,000 tons of ethylene per year, did not start until 1976, and at that time, the increase in the price of oil resulted in a large-scale rise of expenses.

In 1978 Takeo Fukuda, the then prime minister of Japan, visited Tehran to strengthen the already close relations between Japan and Iran and to firm up Iran's oil exports to Japan. One year later, the shah was overthrown and the government of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni inherited the half-finished complex. The chaos that occurred as a result of the Islamic revolution stopped all construction work at the Imam Khomeyni port, and with the exception of a short period in the middle of 1980, construction activities did not take off again.

Last September, the first Iraqi air attack caused damages amounting to 800 million dollars to the petrochemical complex. Mitsui says that Japanese workers will not get back to their jobs as long as the war continues.

Iranian authorities say that perhaps they will have recourse to East European countries to complete the project. Although Mitsui says that the Japanese government, which is a financial backer of the project, respects Mitsui's decision to withdraw from it, informed sources state that Mitsui's request for indemnification on loss of exports may meet with difficulties. They add that it is possible that Mitsui may be faced with a court claim by Iran in the event Iran takes legal action against Mitsui for non-fulfillment of its obligations in accordance with a 30-year agreement.

While Mitsui is talking about withdrawing from the venture at the port of Imam Khomeyni, another large Japanese company, Mitsubishi, together with the Dow Chemical firm and Saudi Arabia are investing capital in the construction of a huge petrochemical complex at Al-Jabil. Analysts say that this plan is important, because within the last 10 years, Saudi Arabia has replaced Iran as the largest provider of oil to Japan.

CSO: 4640/47

## SKIRMISHES BETWEEN IRANIAN PILGRIMS, SAUDI POLICE REPORTED

### Anti-Zionist March in Mecca

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 5 Oct 81 p 15

[Text] Mecca, PARS NEWS AGENCY. Yesterday, at 4 pm at the invitation of the responsible officials and the pilgrims to the House of God a magnificent march took place from the great square of "Mo'abedeh" in the city of Mecca to the House of God. In it nearly one million Muslims from around the world participated, and the length of the lines of march reached several kilometers.

According to this report the self-sacrificers of the Islamic revolution were riding bicycles in front of the demonstrators. They carried flags of the Islamic Republic of Iran, placards in Arabic and pictures of Imam Khomeyni. In this march, the Muslims of the countries of Kuwait, Pakistan, Indonesia, Turkey and several African countries were present. They played an active role in the matter of keeping discipline and encouraging the people situated at the sides of the street and watching the magnificent march. According to the report, a group of Muslims from Kuwait shouted slogans in Arabic to the following effect:

"Military aggression against Kuwaiti soil was accomplished by America and its lackeys, not by Iran." In the same way, the slogans repeated in Arabic during these demonstrations were as follows: "America is the enemy of the Muslims," "Death to Israel," "God is great."

This march continued until 7 pm Mecca time yesterday. It was stopped several times by police and security agents of the Saudi regime, who were stationed at various places in the streets. But the unanimous roaring of the Muslims of the world prevented the stopping of this tremendous movement and the marchers continued their demonstrations.

### The Death of an Iranian Pilgrim

Mecca. While driving in one of the crowded streets of Mecca a Saudi officer struck an Iranian pilgrim named Qebleh-'Ali Hatemi, who died after being taken to the hospital. According to the report, the Saudi government, which has repeatedly criticized Iranian pilgrims in the news media and accused them of disorderliness and failure to observe the law, has itself ignored this matter and until now has not taken any steps to detain the accused.

## Financial Aid

Mecca. The Organization for the Hajj and Pilgrimage situated in Mecca has announced: Those pilgrims who have recently had their money stolen or who have lost it will be paid the sum necessary for the purchase of a sheep for sacrifice.

## Interview with the Minister of Guidance

Mecca. Yesterday morning after entering Mecca, in an interview with the PARS NEWS AGENCY, Mr Ma'adikhah, the minister of Islamic guidance, announced the viewpoints of the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran concerning the problems and difficulties of the Iranian pilgrims and the restraints brought into existence for them by the Saudi government.

Concerning the political positions of the government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, he said: Certainly the political positions of the government of Arabia do not coincide with those of the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, but the decision in this respect is related to the Foreign Ministry.

Concerning the behavior of the government officials of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia with the Iranian pilgrims, he said: Of course this kind of behavior cannot be unaffected by Arabia's political positions. Naturally Arabia's behavior with the Iranian pilgrims does not follow a desirable or ideal form. But it must be said that they are imposing restraints more than the amount that we had thought, and this problem is in need of profound study. He continued: The Arabian officials imagine that since the key to the Sacred House of God is in their hands, all Muslims must imitate them, but this is an undue expectation. However, if we should want to come to the Hijaz in other than the season of the hajj, then we must follow international regulations. But the question of the hajj does not fit into these sterile international regulations; and the Kaaba, according to the clear text of the Koran, belongs to all Muslims, even if the worst relationships prevail between us and Arabia.

In another part of the interview Hojjatoleslam Ma'adikhah said: Amir Nayif and other Arab officials emphasize that the hajj is a place solely for humility and worship, and only this idea is taken into account by them. Of course, with respect and while accepting the question of worship in every instance, it is still not necessary for all Muslims to think like them. We consider the holiness of the hajj a volcano against world-wide arrogance and a death to America and Israel. We believe that were a reasonable hajj to take place on the part of the Muslims, Israel would no longer remain; and were the Muslims to perform the pilgrimage in a manner which would satisfy the Prophet, this shameful stain of the occupation of dear Jerusalem would be cleansed from the Muslims' robes.

In another part of his words he said: On the basis of the way of thinking which rules Arabia, if a single "Death to Israel" should be said out loud, they intervene. In many cases it has been observed that they have insulted and arrested an Iranian pilgrim for possessing a few coins on the back of which is the picture of Jerusalem. I am sorry that the Arab officials do not encounter cases realistically and that they want everyone to think like them. Of course, since according to the Koranic verse the hajj is not the place of dispute and conflict, this problem must be solved after the rites of the hajj.

At the end the minister of Islamic guidance hoped that the Muslims would be wary of becoming the puppets of imperialism and make the most of these ceremonies.

#### The Surrounding of the House of the Kaaba

Mecca. Last night, as a result of the mourning ceremonies of the Iranian pilgrims to the House of God in the courtyard of the Kaaba, which led to their being joined by one-third of the pilgrims from other countries, the agents of the special police of the Sausi kingdom surrounded the house of the Kaaba.

According to the report of the PARS NEWS AGENCY, in spite of a divine custom that the pilgrims enter the house of the Kaaba without shoes and barefoot, the government agents of the Sausi kingdom established themselves within the courtyard of God's House wearing boots, helmets and masks in order to prevent the mourning ceremonies of the Iranian pilgrims in this sacred place.

According to his same report, by reason of the great coming and going and the crowding of Iranian and foreign pilgrims, the general headquarters of the Imam's representatives was also put under the control of the agents of the security police. Yesterday the agents of the Saudi kingdom rented a room in the general headquarters for the sake of this task and moved into it.

The transport of the great load of Iranian and foreign pilgrims to the House of God is the responsibility of buses which were rented by the Iranian government at great expense and which take all the pilgrims from place to place free of charge.

At the outset it was agreed that in exchange for free service the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran would display the flag of Iran and the picture of the Imam on the buses; and to ease the activities of the pilgrims, Iranian assistants would be employed to help the drivers. But it did not take long before the government of the Arabian kingdom could no longer tolerate the display of the flag of the Iranian government, so it ordered that the flags of Iran be removed from the buses. In this connection three Iranian assistants were arrested and imprisoned.

According to another report, on Friday the imams of the mosques of Mecca and Medina counseled the Muslims in their sermons to refrain from making use of the ceremonies of the hajj for worldly and political ends. While asking the pilgrims to perform the hajj like the Prophet, they asked them to be aware and to avoid performing acts which would invalidate the pilgrimage. The imams of the mosques, who are appointed by the Saudi kingdom, claimed in addressing the pilgrims that paying attention to political and worldly affairs and mixing religious slogans with political matters are actions which strike a blow at the good name of the Islamic community in its most sacred land and cause this divinely instituted duty to deviate from its proper course. As a result, Muslims would return to their homelands carrying a burden of sin. The Friday imam of the Mosque of the Prophet also said to the pilgrims: Pay attention only to the works which Abraham accomplished during the pilgrimage. He also advised the pilgrims not to distribute political announcements.

## Letter of Protest to Interior Minister

Tehran ETTELA'AT in Persian 5 Oct 81 p 15

[Text] Glorious Mecca. According to the report of the reporter of the PARS NEWS AGENCY sent to Glorious Mecca, after entering Mecca Hojjatoleslam Ma'adikhah, the minister of Islamic guidance, issued an announcement in answer to the declarations of the Minister of the Interior of Saudi Arabia. The complete text of the announcement is as follows:

In His name -- exalted is He!

His honor Amir Nayif ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz Al-Sa'ud, president of the Supreme Council of the Hajj and interior minister of Saudi Arabia!

Pursuant to announcements of the Ministry of the Interior in which were observed certain subject matters:

As the minister of Islamic guidance and the president of the Supreme Council of the Hajj of the Islamic Republic of Iran, I have met with certain obscurities. As a result I am forced to present certain questions as follows:

Is it possible for there to be Muslims in Iran and other countries of the world who might come to conclusions concerning the hajj and the duties of the pilgrims different from your statements?

It is conceivable for a large group of Muslims to believe that the hajj also possesses, in addition to the humility and worship in the sense that you have taken into account, important social aspects -- just as can be deduced from such blessed verses as "God has appointed the Kaaba, the Sacred House, as an uprising for men"?

Do you not think that great numbers of Muslims, with inspiration from Koranic verses and the Sunnah of the Prophet, might consider, along with the slogan "God is greatest," the cries "Death to Israel," "Death to Israel-nourishing America" and "Death to the anti-Islamic superpowers" their religious duty and God-given responsibility in the hajj? And that the rites of the hajj, from the "sacred robe" to "throwing the pebbles" and other acts might remind them of their duties, which are precisely the rejection of the followers of Satan? In your view is it correct for Muslims who like yourself do not think about the hajj to be forced to put aside all of their beliefs without any objections and to abandon their religious duties? But Noble Mecca belongs to all Muslims and is not the fief of a special group, just as the Lord of the world's inhabitants declares: "[The Holy Mosque that We have appointed equal unto men,] alike him who dwells therein and the nomad."

Mr Amir Nayif! You have accused the revolutionary Muslim nation of Iran in your declaration. It is necessary for me to emphasize once again that during this year's hajj the most difficult constraints were placed by your officials upon this nation which carries on its shoulders in front of all Islamic movements the flag of the struggle with unbelief and world-wide arrogance and which has become surrounded by the plots of East and West. But in order to perform the divinely-instituted duty, all of these constraints have been borne, to the extent that, right now, according

to the statements of the responsible officials of the hajj, a number of brothers are in prison on various pretexts. Some of them have suffered losses for the crime of carrying a few one-rial coins upon which is impressed the picture of dear Jerusalem, and some of them have been deprived of performing their religious duty, the hajj. Mr Amir Nayif! The revolutionary Muslims of Iran, like all the revolutionary Muslims of the world, consider shouting against the pillaging arrogant ones one of the greatest acts of worship. They consider the hajj, at the same time that it is an act of worship, the basis for struggle with unbelief, idolatry and injustice; and they do not think that this struggle contradicts humility. It will not be possible to struggle against their beliefs with force forever.

At this point I do not mean to deal with this problem any further, since we are in the atmosphere of the hajj, and "There is no disputing during the hajj." With the above allusions I felt that it was my duty at least to defend the nation of Iran. In conclusion I propose that the government of Saudi Arabia allow the viewpoints of the Ministry of Islamic Guidance concerning the hajj, along with detailed arguments, to be presented in the publications and the radio and television of your country.

The government of the Islamic Republic of Iran is also willing to publish your viewpoints concerning the hajj and its publications and its radio-television without cutting even a single word.

In the same way we are prepared to sit with you in free discussion in this area, at any time you consider proper, so that the public opinions of the Muslims of the world may find the opportunity to judge us impartially.

9831

CSO: 4640/23

PURGES, EXECUTIONS IN ARMY DISCUSSED

NC291510 (Clandestine) Voice of Iran in Persian 1805 GMT 28 Oct 81

[Text] Several more patriots have been executed and many other military personnel have been thrown into the regime's dungeons. Sheykh Reyshahri has once again uncovered a wave of dismissals and purges in the Iranian armed forces. Sheykh Reyshahri has said that purges have started and that the dossiers of hundreds of military personnel are being studied by the "Islamic military courts."

This is neither the first nor the last blow being inflicted on the already disintegrated Iranian armed forces. In the turbulent days when the propagandists of the Islamic Republic had started the sinister slogan of "an army so impotent" they were actually revealing their filthy intentions to destroy the indivisible Iranian army. In the days of terror when the most outstanding commanders and soldiers of the Iranian armed forces were executed [words indistinct] (?in Tehran), the enemies of Iran were uncovering their treacherous plan to destroy the powerful Iranian army. In the flaming days of (?July) 1980, when patriotic officers, NCO's and other military personnel were being executed or thrown into Khomeyni's dungeons on charges of attempting a coup, the enemies of Iran were showing signs of their hostility against the zealous Iranian army. Throughout the entire period when personnel of the armed forces which was against the regime of mullahs and reactionaries and when (?heroes) of Iran and (?descendants) of Kaveh the ironmonger [a hero in Persian mythology] were being hunted down and hundreds were being dismissed and "purged," the only objective was to destroy the main weapon in the hands of the Iranian people and the manifestation of national dignity and the guardians of Iran's sovereignty and independence. In doing so, each and every one of the persons reared by Khomeyni and his masters (?played his part) in a great treason. From the satanic imam to the slain Beheshti, from Ebrahim Yazdi to Bani-Sadr, and all the toadie who played or are playing a role in destroying Iran, each inflicted a blow on the power of the Iranian armed forces so that they could weaken it as much as possible and so that the most determining factor for the salvation of the enslaved homeland would be finally removed.

Now the treacherous regime wants to (?clandestinely) put an end to the war with Iraq. It no longer needs the armed forces. Therefore, it is better to immediately start breaking the remaining links in the strong chain of the armed forces in order to prevent it from rising to destroy the domestic enemies once (?it has

peace of mind) from the foreign enemy. So, it is better to recommence, as soon as possible, the play of purges, to execute, imprison and dismiss. But how long can this (?wretched) play continue? Can many thousands of officers, NCO's and other personnel of the armed forces be purged and dismissed? Can the dismissal of (?groups and groups) force the thousands of military personnel to obey, stay quiet and calm? What an empty thought!

Even if the regime finds new excuses each day to implement its treacherous plans and to "purge" hundreds of army personnel each day, the Iranian armed forces will still continue to live. It will breathe until the day it stifles the traitors. The Iranian armed forces, as weak and disintegrated as it is now, continues to live and to be awake. It is supported by millions of (?Iranian patriots) and enemy-breakers--a young and alert force that is shouting "goodbye Islamic Republic!"

CSO: 4640/49

IRAN

REPORT ON EXECUTIONS, DOMESTIC UNREST

NC291718 Paris AFP in English 1700 GMT 29 Oct 81

[Text] Tehran, 29 Oct (AFP)--A further 41 executions were announced here today, with the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC newspaper reporting 22 armed opponents of the regime and two "corruptors" executed yesterday and the revolutionary prosecutor revealing 19 other executions, but giving no dates.

The newspaper, organ of the ruling paper, said six leftist people's Mojahedin were executed in Tehran's Evin prison.

The state news agency PARS added that one man, identified as Mehdi Ta'fari, was found guilty of participating in the bombing of the Islamic Republic party headquarters last June, which left 74 dead. The remaining executions took place in various provincial towns.

The 19 were executed in the Gulf town of Busheir, at Nahavand in the western province of Hamadan, and at Ghaem Shahr, in Mazandaran Province, Iranian television reported, quoting the revolutionary prosecutor.

Violence was reported elsewhere in Iran yesterday.

An unidentified motorcyclist fired shots at the home of Iranian executive affairs minister Behzad Nabavi, then escaped through the return fire of revolutionary guards, Azadegan newspaper reported, adding that the minister was not hit.

At Qasvin, 300 km (200 miles) west of here, a clash between bodyguards of religious official Hojjat Ol-Eslam Lashekari and Mojahedin reportedly resulted in one dead and two injured.

Also the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC newspaper reported that Mojahedin fired at four school children in a store in the city of Bojnurd, killing one and injuring two.

In central Tehran a grenade was thrown at the car of a Hezbollahi (fundamentalist), while in the western city of Kermanshah a grenade explosion caused heavy damage to the home of religious official Hojjat Ol-Eslam Reza Kazemi, but no casualties, the paper reported.

CSO: 4600/114

## BRIEFS

TEA PRODUCTION--Tehran, 28 Oct (PARS News Agency)--The production of tea rose 15 percent in this Iranian year compared to the same period last year, and an amount totalling 10 billion rials has been paid to the farmers, according to 'Ali Sa'id-lu, the head of the state-owned tea organization of the country. Sa'id-lu, who was speaking at news conference, said that in this Iranian year 32,000 hectares were under tea plantation and about 26,000 farmers are in the tea production business. Concerning the reasons for this increase, he said that wages had been increased in the tea factories, price of tea leaves increased, more chemical fertilizers were distributed, more loans were extended to farmers and there was more money given to the factory owners for equipment and expansion. In relation to the amount and distribution of the imported tea, he said that the importation of tea must be approved by the tea organization of the country according to its quality and quantity, and this organization has taken over the distribution of imported tea for supporting domestic production. Therefore, the price of tea has decreased. [Text] [GF281558 Tehran PARS in English 1525 GMT 28 Oct 81]

LABOR-INTENSIVE PROJECTS--Tehran, 28 Oct (OPECNA)--Economic independence and the basic needs of the people are stressed by the provisions of Iran's national budget for 1982-83. Mohammad Taqi Banki, minister of state in charge of the Plan and Budget Organization, told a press conference Saturday that emphasis would be placed on projects giving quicker returns and the expansion of labor-intensive industries. Governmental institutions and executive organizations would work toward filling gaps in domestic production by expanding small units more suited to the economic conditions of the country, Banki said. Banki also referred to the potential of the country's dams, saying that about 500,000 hectares had been added to land already under cultivation by the expansion of irrigation canals. [Text] [LD281206 Vienna OPECNA in English 1057 GMT 28 Oct 81]

NEW DEPUTY MINISTER--According to a report by the Central News Unit, the secretariat of the Supreme Judicial Council announced that the bill on the state inspection organization, approved on 11 October by the Islamic Consultative Assembly, was conveyed to the government. With the implementation of this bill the former state inspection organization will be disbanded and a new organization with legal powers will be formed and will start to function. On this occasion, the Supreme Judicial Council appointed Mr Seyyed Mostafa Mohaqqueq-Damad as deputy justice minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran and chief of the inspection organization. [Excerpt] [Tehran Domestic Service in Persian 1030 GMT 25 Oct 81 LD]

BAZAARIS REPORTEDLY ARRESTED--A report by a Free Voice of Iran correspondent states that Khomeyni's revolution guards have recently started arresting Tehran bazaaris. According to the report, in the past 2 days 15 famous Tehran merchants have been arrested on charges of cooperating with opponents of Khomeyni's regime. It is said that during the next few days a larger number of Tehran bazaaris will be arrested and imprisoned on charges of cooperating with the Mojahedin-e Khalq. [Text] [NC291704 (Clandestine) Free Voice of Iran in Persian to Iran 1500 GMT 29 Oct 81]

PRAISE FOR KHOMEYNI--A Voice of Iran correspondent has reported that during a recent private meeting of the Tudeh Party, Manuchehr Behzadi--famous member of the Central Committee of the Tudeh Party--stated that the services offered by Khomeyni for the propagation of the Tudeh Party's objectives and extremely noteworthy and praiseworthy. Member of the Tudeh Party Central Committee Manuchehr Behzadi said: Khomeyni brought to fruition our party's long-term 20-year program within a 3-month period. Therefore, he is respected by us from all aspects. Our correspondent has added that in the same meeting Manuchehr Behzadi said in connection with Iran's future condition: If we gain power after Khomeyni, about 2 million who are potential enemies of the Tudeh Party should be destroyed so that there will be no obstacle facing us in the continuation of the political life of the Tudeh Party. [Text] [NC301343 (Clandestine) Voice of Iran in Persian 1805 GMT 29 Oct 81]

ARDAKAN FRIDAY IMAM--In accordance with a decree issued by Imam Khomeyni's office, Aqa Bozorg Bonyadi has been appointed Ardakan Friday Imam. [GF291721 Shiraz Domestic Service in Persian 1500 GMT 29 Oct 81 GF]

MOTOR OIL ALLOCATION--In a recent meeting of provincial officials, an official from the Khuzestan governor general's office announced that each farm machine has been allocated 33 liters of engine oil for every 1,000 liters of fuel that are used. [GF281352 Ahvaz Domestic Service in Persian 1330 GMT 27 Oct 81 GF]

CSO: 4640/49

OPPOSITION LEADER CALLS ON ARMY TO DEFECT

JN082050 (Clandestine) Voice of Iraqi Kurdistan in Arabic 1630 GMT 8 Nov 81

[Appeal by Staff Maj Gen Hasan Mustafa al-Naqib, commander in chief of the Iraqi Revolution Forces, to the Iraqi armed forces to "leave their units and join the ranks of the Iraqi Revolution Forces"--live or recorded]

[Excerpts] In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate: O you who believe, if you help Allah, he will help you and make firm your feet. [Koranic verse]

My brothers and sons officers, NCO's and soldiers of the valiant Iraqi armed forces: (?Inspired by the teachings) of the revolution, from Iraq's liberate land and from the stronghold of revolutionaries and heroic strugglers I greet you with greetings of arms and the revolution. In this appeal, I call on you in my name and on behalf of the Iraqi revolutionaries and strugglers--Arabs and Kurds; ethnic groups; movements and parties; religious, patriotic and nationalist figures--[words indistinct] our country which is suffering at the hands of the tribal and fascist authorities; to carry out your patriotic duty alongside your brother revolutionaries to overthrow the dictatorship and end the injustice, oppression and humiliation which our people are suffering at the hands of Saddam at-Tikriti [words indistinct] and his hirelings; to erect a democratic system that gives freedom to all the members of the people and brings about genuine autonomy in Iraqi Kurdistan; and to build a strong homeland that can defend the nation's dignity and holy places.

My brothers and sons officers, NCO's and soldiers of the brave Iraqi army: The only way to put an end to this dirty [Iraqi-Iranian] war and deliver the people and army from it is to join the ranks of the Iraqi revolution that is raging on every single inch of cherished Iraqi soil and by [words indistinct] your brother revolutionaries in order to end the war and deliver the people from Saddam's injustice and tyranny. [words indistinct] The revolution cries out to you to assume your heroic role in the ranks of the strugglers and Mujahidin, both Arabs and Kurds, to overthrow the regime of the tyrant. The Iraqi army's real battle is not against [words indistinct] but against Israel, world imperialism and [words indistinct].

CSO: 4404/108

OFFICIAL REBUKES BRIGHT STAR MANEUVERS

JN151609 Baghdad INA in English 1540 GMT 15 Nov 81

[Text] Baghdad, 15 Nov (INA)--A high ranking Iraqi official described U.S. military exercises, Bright Star 82, as the peak of the policy of intimidating the Arabs whether being moderates or progressives. Secretary general of the Revolution Command Council, the highest legislative body, Tariq Hamad al-'Abdallah in an article published in AL-THAWRAH daily Sunday said the U.S. is practicing the iron rod policy against the Arabs.

The U.S. military exercises fall within the framework of the semi-war policy adopted by America towards the Arab region and are merely a show of force to intimidate and frighten the Arab people, he explained.

Mr al-'Abdallah said the U.S.A. endeavours in increase [as printed] tension and accelerate the plans set for its rapid deployment force within the semi-war strategy which calls for a military build up aimed at confronting the possibility of any national uprising that might take place and disturb the balance of U.S. interests in the region.

He stressed the fact that the Middle East region saw a great deal of American explicit interference since U.S. failure in Vietnam and Southeast Asia in general. The U.S. semi-war strategy, he said, is based on three principles: consolidating of the Zionist entity in the Arab region by any means, keeping the Arab region as a source for cheap energy and to drag the region into the U.S. sphere as part of the process of undermining the non-aligned principles and breaching national sovereignty, he added.

Any attempt to include an Arab party into the big powers rivalry to side with any of them means a call for the other power to interfere, thus the international situation will be more deteriorated and trends of dependency are created in the Arab region, Mr al-'Abdallah said.

Detailing further aims behind the U.S. exercises, he said the U.S. wanted to imply to the Arabs that Israel's security is a part of America's national security... it is unacceptable to oppose the Camp David accords..Arabs have to stand idle vis-a-vis the Iraq-Iran war.

The U.S. wants to say to the Arabs, he added, increase your oil production; but not the prices...nourish us so that we may send you our jets, armies and fleets as quick as possible to defend you against a don quixote fear.

BACKGROUND OF CABINET MINISTERS DISCUSSED

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 6 Aug 81 pp 18-19

Menahem Begin -- Prime Minister

[Article by Ilan Kefir]

[Text] For 29 years Menahem Begin would deliver the second speech on the day of the presentation of the new cabinet--the speech of the opposition. Yesterday for the second time in his life, Begin delivered the opening address. He presented to the Knesset his new Cabinet which he had formed after 21 days of exhausting coalition negotiations which left more than a little bitterness.

Menahem Begin, 68, reached this moment after an enervating, extremely bitter, and stubbornly-fought election campaign. His election victory was a personal achievement. The Likud's election battle was first and foremost a one-man campaign by a man who stood virtually alone in the glare of the spotlights. Western diplomats who observed him in the election campaign described him as the best competitor today in any political arena in the free world.

Begin's main accomplishment in the election campaign was his success in convincing many that the "bunglings" of his outgoing Cabinet were a non-recurring, transitory phenomenon and that the galloping inflation is also a temporary phenomenon with which his next Cabinet will be able to cope successfully.

Yesterday he stood on the dais of the Knesset as the leader of the 48-member ruling party and a coalition government dependent upon a majority of one member of Knesset. The Menahem Begin of yesterday was different than the man who announced about one-half year ago the advancement of the election as an honorable way out designed to prevent his going to the president. At that time the achievement of the signing of the peace agreement with Egypt was swallowed up by 150 percent inflation and the shattered relations between Cabinet ministers.

From an almost hopeless situation when many were predicting the end of the political road for him and at a time when the members of his party were behaving as if their ship were sinking, Begin succeeded in reviving and breathing new fighting spirit into his camp.

His personal biography is replete with struggles, hardships, a war for political existence, more than a few disappointments, and anguish. For 29 years during which he was defeated in eight election campaigns, Menahem Begin displayed remarkable survivability.

He was born in Brisk to a Zionist family. His father, Ze'ev, was the secretary of the community in the city. In his childhood he was a member of Hashomer Hatza'ir, however this was a passing episode and he joined Betar. In his twenties he completed law school at Warsaw University.

At 18 he began Zionist activity and was selected as a Betar representative in Poland. Seven years later he was appointed the representative of the movement in Poland after having served as the Betar representative in Czechoslovakia.

With the Nazi conquest of Poland he fled from Warsaw to Vilna. Most of his family who remained in Poland were killed in the Holocaust.

In September 1940 he was arrested by the Soviet authorities for Zionist activity and sentenced to 8 years imprisonment at hard labor. He described the period of his incarceration and exile which lasted more than a year in his book "Lailot Levanim" [White Nights].

In 1942 he immigrated to the Land of Israel as a volunteer in the army of the Polish General Anders. A year later he took command of the Irgun Tzvai Leumi, and in 1944 he announced a revolt against Britain. During the entire period of the struggle against the British, which lasted 4 years, Begin was sought by the British who put a price of 5,000 pounds sterling on his head.

After the establishment of the state, Begin founded the Herut Movement against the background of a troubled relationship with the ruling party, Mapai, and its leader, Ben-Gurion, because of [Operation] Season and the Altalena affair.

Ben-Gurion coined the expression "without Herut and Maqi [acronym for the Israeli Communist Party]", but the taboo was broken when Begin joined the government of national unity headed by Levi Eshkol on the eve of the Six-Day War.

In 1977 the upheaval occurred which brought Begin to the seat of leadership. Last month Begin succeeded in keeping the seat.

#### Ariel Sharon--Minister of Defense

[Article by Ya'akov Erez]

[Text] This morning when Ariel Sharon, 53, reviews the IDF honor guard, composed of representatives of the arms and services, in the Ministry of Defense square, it will be for him not only a moment of the realization of aspirations but also a novelty in a long road of military and security activity which he set out upon when he enlisted in the army in the War of Independence and became a commander who made a deep impression on the IDF combat tactics.

Sharon's record is marked by milestones which influenced not only the units which he commanded but also the entire IDF. From the time when he was the commander of Unit 101 and later a paratroopers unit, Sharon distinguished himself with the originality of his military thinking, his combat tactics, and the manner in which he led his forces. Among his milestones are wars and periods of confrontation. In the Six-Day War he was a division commander and launched a daring strike in the Egyptians' rear at Umm Qatf. When he was commanding general of the Southern

Command during the War of Attrition, the Gaza Strip was cleaned out of terrorists and attacks were carried out against the Egyptian side of the Canal. In the Yom Kippur War when he was a major general in the reserves, he commanded the division which was the first to cross the Canal and caused the turning point in the war.

Arik Sharon is considered an outstanding field commander, a combat tactician, one who knows how to achieve his objectives by the concentration of effort and the application of the principle of surprise. These qualities have helped him on more than one occasion in his military career. However, in public life he has not always been successful in applying his military doctrines.

Prior to the previous election Sharon headed the Shlomzion list which won only two seats in the Knesset. Afterwards he joined the Likud and was appointed the minister of agriculture where he concentrated his maximum effort in Judea and Samaria. He established there an extensive system of settlements, however, he angered many farmers who criticized his method of operating as minister of agriculture.

In the Ministry of Defense Sharon is treading on firm ground. Here he will be aided by his military knowledge and experience in defense matters, which are far greater than that of any other minister in Menahem Begin's Cabinet. In his new position he is faced with difficult tasks. On the one hand, completing the evacuation of the Sinai, including the settlements of Pithat Rafish, and on the other hand, the terrorist threats in the north, the Syrian intervention in Lebanon, and the possibility that the eastern front will be reestablished. On the one hand, his past promises to bring about changes in the IDF without hurting its military strength. The essentials of Arik Sharon's policy are still unknown. Today in his meetings with the senior cadre of the civilian system and the general staff, he will present the tasks toward which he wants to move the defense system as the eighth minister who has headed it.

#### Yoram Aridor--Minister of Finance

[Article by Shraga Maqel]

[Text] It is difficult to compare the meteoric rise of Yoram Aridor to another case in the political arena. In a few months he went from an obscure deputy minister in the Office of the Prime Minister to the man who did more than anyone else for the rejuvenation of the Likud and its victory in the election, as the minister of finance whose policy gained the sympathy of broad sections of the public despite its being criticized by many.

Public opinion polls forecast a very gloomy future for the Likud government at the beginning of 1981. Yitzhaq Moda'i decided at that time to leave the Ministry of Communications. Prime Minister Menahem Begin gave the position to the deputy in his office who had already become accustomed to filling vacant positions. Aridor once filled no less than five portfolios: Justice, Transportation, Labor and Social Betterment, and Communications were all entrusted to him with the rise of the Likud to power until the DMC ministers joined the government. Whoever followed Aridor closely could already at that time detect his qualities in that to everyone's great surprise all five ministries were directed properly.

However, Aridor waited more than 3 years before his talents were actually discovered. Immediately upon entering the Ministry of Communications he announced the introduction

of color television broadcasts, and the public opinion polls immediately began to improve from the viewpoint of the Likud. Then Minister of Finance Yigael Hurwitz left the Cabinet because of its decision to increase the salaries of the teachers, and Yoram Aridor was again called to the flag. Then the great upheaval began. Elimination of the property tax, reduction of income tax, and reduction of sales taxes on automobiles and television sets. The atmosphere among the public changed as if by a magic wand the atmosphere in the state, and the closer it came to election day the more the Likud improved its position in the eyes of the voter, until the victory on 31 June.

At a relatively young age, 48, Yoram Aridor sits solidly in the position of minister of finance and conducts the coalition negotiations on behalf of the prime minister.

This success was preceded by years of activity in the Herut Movement. Aridor has a social attitude (he supports full cost-of-living increase payments and income tax relief). He headed the "Blue-White [group] in the Histadrut. He first entered the Knesset in 1969, and 10 years later he was elected chairman of the secretariat of the Herut Movement.

He calls his policy a "correct economy" and at times a "policy of the mind and the heart." Even his opponents do not deny his ability for analysis and quick thinking. He is an economist and a lawyer by education. He maintains that the policy which he adopted before the election will be continued in the future. Indeed, this policy has so far been significantly successful in reducing inflation. Economists today have differences of opinion regarding the policy. Some contend that the massive printing of money which he has used to subsidize the food commodities will take its toll, and it is therefore necessary to take sharp restraining measures. Others praise him for having brought calm to the economy, and in their opinion, more moderate measures in the area of credit and the reduction of government spending will be sufficient.

He is married and has three children.

Simha Ehrlich--Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Agriculture

[Article by Aharon Periel]

[Text] Simha Ehrlich began his agricultural career in Israel 45 years ago. At that time, when he immigrated to Israel in 1936, he worked as a farm worker in the groves of Nes Ziyona. Today he has "closed" the circle, with a small difference: Then [text missing] of Agriculture in addition to his position as deputy prime minister.

Simha Ehrlich was born in Poland in 1915. During the course of time he established an optical business. He has held various public positions in the Liberal Party, the "heir" of the General Zionists, first on the municipal level in Tel Aviv and afterwards on the national level as party chairman, after he was elected to this post in May 1980.

During the period of 1955-1969 Ehrlich was the head of the Gahal faction in the Tel Aviv municipal council, head of the water and lighting enterprises, head of the Department of Sanitation and Control, and head of the Bureau of Municipal Companies. He also served as deputy mayor during 1961-1965.

He has been a member of Knesset since 1969, serving as a member of the Interior Committee (Seventh Knesset) and a member of the Finance Committee (Seventh and Eighth Knessets). After the Likud came to power, Ehrlich served as the finance minister in the Begin government during 1977-1979.

Ehrlich, a resident of Tel Aviv, has a son and a daughter, and his main hobbies are opera and theater.

Simha Ehrlich is known as a man "with whom one can work," who is prepared to delegate authority, and as one who seeks to work through cooperation. His intimate friends promised yesterday that he will not act impetuously even though as minister of agriculture, he wants to apply liberal ideas such as free competition and providing opportunity to free initiative. His friends assure that "everything that Mr Ehrlich does will be in cooperation and coordination with the settlement movements and the farmers' organizations."

#### Yitzhaq Shamir--Minister of Foreign Affairs

[Article by Ilan Kefir]

[Text] This morning Yitzhaq Shamir begins his second term as the minister of foreign affairs against the background of serious political problems:

\*The deployment of the terrorists in Lebanon and their being equipped while taking advantage of the cease-fire which, according to Israel, constitutes a violation of the agreement.

\*The suspension of the F-16 aircraft by the American administration.

\*The autonomy negotiations and the continuation of the peace process with Egypt.

\*The increasing isolation of Israel in the international community and the damage to its image in public opinion in the United States.

Shamir worked for many years in security activity in the Irgun Tzvai Leumi and the Lohamei Herut Yisrael, an organization in which he was the operations officer and responsible for special actions in Europe.

During the years of the struggle against the British foreign rule, he was arrested twice and in both cases managed to escape. The second time, in 1946, he came on a daring operation to Djibouti where he received political asylum.

After the establishment of the state, Yitzhaq Shamir was given a senior operational assignment in the Mosad which he completed in 1965.

In 1970 he joined the Herut Movement, and in 1973 he was elected to the Knesset and served on the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee.

In 1977 he was appointed speaker of the Knesset and in March 1980, after the resignation of Mashe Dayan, he became the foreign minister.

Within the framework of his position, Minister Shamir went abroad for diplomatic talks and met with heads of state, including the leaders of the American administration. Shamir was the first Israeli dignitary to meet with the President of the United States, Ronald Reagan, after his election.

He is 66, married and has three children.

Ya'aqov Meridor--Chairman of the Ministerial  
Committee on Economic Affairs

[Article by Shragi Maqel]

[Text] Ya'aqov Meridor, 68, will be forced to work hard during this term of the government in order to make people forget his hard "fall" in the revelation of the new way to produce energy. However, this will not be his only problem. It is still not clear how he will function as the chairman of the ministerial committee on the economy opposite Minister of Finance Yoram Aridor has had no intention of conceding any economic authority.

Ya'aqov Meridor's colorful image combines biographic details which could suffice for several persons: underground fighter, politician, and businessman who made many millions but also lost millions.

The beginning was in Poland: studies in a heder of the Mizrahi and a Hebrew gymnasium. Meridor was 16 at the time of the 1929 pogroms. He joined Betar and immigrated to Israel in 1932. Here he became the deputy to David Raziell in the Irgun Tzvai Leumi. Together with him, in 1940 he went to Iraq on a secret mission. After Raziell was killed in the bombing of a German aircraft, Meridor became the leader of the Irgun Tzvai Leumi and remained in that position until he turned over the command to Menahem Begin in 1942. His underground activity did not cease even when he was caught by the British and exiled to Africa. He recounts his exciting deeds in the camps of Sudan, Eritrea, Kenya, and Ethiopia in his book "Arukah Haderekh Leherut" (The Road to Freedom Is Long).

Meridor represented the Herut Movement, of which he was one of the founders, for about 20 years, however his activity in the Knesset did not excite him and he turned to the business world.

In the mid-fifties Meridor used his contacts in East Africa and established Incoda, a canned meat enterprise, in Eritrea for the purpose of selling his product in Israel, however the business failed, and the government had to acquire it in order to save it.

After his venture into fishing in the Red Sea failed, in the early sixties Meridor, together with his friend Captain Mila Brenner, established the Fruit Shipping Company. In less than 10 years this company became an amazing international success story when without significant venture capital and without real experience, it controlled a giant fleet and business estimated at almost a billion dollars. However, the success story was disrupted after the Yom Kippur War and the subsequent world oil crisis which damaged the shipping world. After months of litigation and effort to stay afloat, Meridor and Brenner were forced to sell the fleet at a loss in order to pay off the company's debts.

His close friends describe him as uneducated but imaginative, a man with personal charisma who abounds in great ideas but is not always careful about all the minor details.

One of his daughters is married to the businessman and former member of Knesset Yosef Kremerman, and the other, Miqa, is married to singer Yigael Bashan.

Back in 1977 Menahem Begin had requested Meridor to return to political activity and to "run" together with him, but Meridor refused. In 1981 Begin again asked the man whom he refers to as "my commander and friend," and this time Meridor acceded to his request.

#### Hayim Corfu--Minister of Transport

[Article by Shraga Maqel]

[Text] Hayim Corfu put in 4 years of work as chairman of the coalition leadership in the Ninth Knesset. Confronted with a diminishing coalition majority, splits, and rebellions of factions, he endeavored to assure victories in the votes.

Corfu is used to supporting his leader, Menahem Begin, in that for the 20 years that he headed a branch of the Herut Movement in Jerusalem, he backed him in all the political storms which plagued the Movement. Begin did not remain obligated. When Jayim Landau finally informed him that he did not want to continue as minister of transport, Begin decided to give the position to Corfu.

Corfu, a sixth generation sabra, was a yeshiva student in his youth. It was only later that he "fell into bad ways." He left the yeshiva, completed law school at Hebrew University, and even played soccer for Betar in Jerusalem and Netanya.

During the underground days, Hayim Corfu was a member of the Irgun Tzvai Leumi headquarters in Jerusalem from 1943, and he served as an expert in minelaying. In 1944 he was arrested by the British and remained in prison until 1948 in Latrun and 'Akko and later in Sudan, Kenya, and Eritrea (from where he escaped but was recaptured). Together with Meridor and Tzipori, Corfu completes the trio of "Kenya exile" ministers in the new government.

With the establishment of the Herut Movement in 1948, Corfu worked in the Jerusalem branch which he headed until 1977 when he was chosen to be the chairman of the coalition leadership. In this Knesset he was also a member of the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. In the two previous Knessets Corfu was a member of the Finance Committee.

As the minister of transport Hayim Corfu, 60, married and the father of two daughters, considers himself as having several major goals: renewal of the campaign against traffic accidents which are claiming victims day and night; improvement of public contact with the Bureaus of Licensing and Public Transport; and in the longer range, preparation for the development of airports and seaports.

His first battle in his new position is already "assured": El Al flights on the Sabbath. There was no avoiding the forcing of the suspension of the flights--Hayim Corfu will act in accordance with the decision. Nonetheless, he believes that El Al is in good hands; and if it continues in the way it began, it can even achieve a condition of profitability.

## Mordekhai Tzipori--Minister of Communications

[Article by Ya'akov Erez]

[Text] In his farewell remarks to the senior personnel of the Ministry of Defense, Mordekhai Tzipori mentioned two achievements which he considers to be supremely important: broadening the authorities of the civilian control system and increasing defense production and export. Tzipori devoted a special effort to these two areas in his 4 years as deputy minister of defense.

Mordekhai Tzipori is a firm believer in the selected echelon's control of the defense system, and he especially emphasizes the subordination of the military level to those of the civilian sector who are placed in charge of it. The deputy minister who "moved up a grade" and has now been appointed the minister of communications will try to apply these principles also in his new position.

He does not shrink from working in an inferior position. There is no doubt that for him, serving as a minister in the government of Menahem Begin--even as minister of communications, a post which he was not looking for--is the realization of a dream. Even if he is not the most fortunate of all the appointees in the government, he managed to keep himself in the line.

He wants to be involved with defense matters also in the future. He has been promised that in a few months the Ministry of Police will be reestablished and that he will be appointed the minister of police. In this position, Tzipori, 57, intends to make full use of the considerable experience which he has acquired in 43 years of defense service. He wants to continue as a member of the Ministerial Committee on Defense. Matters in this spirit have already been concluded with the prime minister. In the ministerial committee, he will seek to exert an influence--so he promised in his farewell remarks to the senior personnel in the Ministry of Defense--on the substantive matters that come up there for discussion.

A veteran of the Irgun Tzvai Leumi who because of his underground activity was arrested twice and exiled to Sudan, Eritrea, and Kenya, he began his career in the IDF in the Artillery, in a heavy mortar unit. He later served in the Infantry and at the end of the Kadesh campaign, he transferred to the Armor. In the Six-Day War he served as commander of the armored brigade in Major General Sharon's division. Afterwards, he was the commander of the Armor School, the executive officer of the Armored Corps, Commander of the Command and Staff College, and Assistant to the Chief of the Operations Branch. After his separation from the IDF, he joined the Herut Movement, and with the upheaval in June 1977, he returned to the defense system.

## Yitzhaq Moda'i--Minister Without Portfolio

[Article by Oded Shorer]

[Text] Yitzhaq Moda'i, 55, who directed the oil exploration branch as his private domain and organized a revolution on the map of the government companies subordinate to the Ministry of Energy, left the ministry this week claiming that this position is not appropriate for his status in the Liberal Party. Yitzhaq Moda'i has re-awakened the dispute surrounding his character--that human relations is not his forte.

The variety of opinions about him is surprising. An Israeli from a good family background, who took advantage of the "golden spoon" with which he was born, he is a member of one of the older families of Tel Aviv. He has studied in Israel and abroad and has earned an abundance of degrees, including chemical engineer and a master's degree in law and economics.

His military career included, among other things, service as a military attache in London. He was released from the IDF with the rank of lieutenant colonel.

In the sixties he joined the Liberal Party and proved to be a sheep among wolves. After many struggles from which he emerged the loser, he learned his political lesson and at the last convention of the Liberals, he proved to be an outstanding political butcher who has gained many sympathizers by means of countless appointments in the government companies subordinate to his ministry.

His service as minister of energy began on the right foot with the discovery of oil in the Alma field at the end of 1977. Throughout his period of service, he saw himself as fulfilling a mission in Israel's struggle for economic independence.

As such, he went abroad on more than one occasion on ministry business, in a search for sources of oil, he signed contracts for the supply of oil, and he even involved Israel in several troublesome affairs in his attempts to find investors for oil exploration in Israel and to join in oil exploration in foreign countries.

With his support the oil exploration branch was reorganized in a more effective form, and an effort was made to attract foreign professional parties who contributed from their rich knowledge. In contrast to this, he failed in other areas which required courageous decisions to which he was certainly accustomed in his position as director general of the Revlon Cosmetics Company.

Despite the warnings of his advisors in the Ministry of Energy, Minister Moda'i viewed the transition to the generation of electricity from coal as a problem-free process and ignored the human aspects involved in unloading coal in an overburdened port. His compromise position on an issue so important to the economic independence of the State of Israel led to the government's hasty decision regarding the unloading of the coal for a power plant in Hadera at the site of the plant and to the waste of hundreds of millions of dollars of the Treasury.

Moda'i managed to convince the government of the necessity of an agreement with Egypt on the supply of oil before the return of the oil field in the Gulf of Suez to the Egyptians. Had it not been for his stubborn stand on this issue, Prime Minister Menahem Begin would have signed the peace agreement without any agreement on assuring a supply of oil for Israel.

As minister he has on more than one occasion issued confusing statements and become involved in pointless disputes with his fellow Cabinet members, after which Minister Simha Ehrlich suggested that he go for a psychiatric examination. Now his activity will be concluded in the Office of the Prime Minister as a minister without portfolio, activity which will certainly not overcrowd his daily schedule. How will the implementer adjust to a position without real content? This will become evident in the coming months.

## Gideon Patt--Minister of Industry and Commerce

[Article by Yitzhaq Dayish]

[Text] During the period of his service in the outgoing government, Minister Gideon Patt was noted for his colorful language which from time to time managed to "anger" many people. For example, in reacting to a leak by a senior official, he said, "Every dog has his day."

When he was appointed minister of industry, commerce, and tourism in January 1979, the Herut people in the Likud demanded that Yoram Airdor, who was then a minister without portfolio in the Office of the Prime Minister, be appointed the deputy minister of industry, commerce, and tourism. However, Patt declared, "I have enough Yoram's in the ministry" (the director general is Yoram Ziv and the deputy director general is Yoram Balizovski).

Patt is one of the young members of the Cabinet, being 48. He was born in Jerusalem, graduated from the Ma'ala School, and served in the IDF as a member of Nahal. After his separation from the IDF, he served in 1952-1953 as the secretary of the then minister of transport, Yosef Sapir, of blessed memory, and the director of his office. Afterwards, he filled a long list of positions in the Zionist Organization of America and was also a delegate to the Zionist Congresses. He studied economics and international trade at a university in New York. When Yosef Sapir, of blessed memory, was appointed minister (1967-1969), Patt served as his assistant.

In 1970 he was elected a member of the Knesset from the Liberals in the Gahal. In the Knesset he served as a member of the Finance Committee and the Economic Committee. With the establishment of the Likud government in July 1977, he was appointed minister of construction and housing. He worked to calm the apartments market by putting apartments up for sale in the early stages of construction.

With the departure of Yigael Hurwitz from the Ministry of Industry, Commerce, and Tourism, Gideon Patt was appointed his replacement. He points to important achievements in export and industry. "Between the times," that is between the Knesset elections and the formation of the new government, he assured the approval of a major program to establish a new granary in Ashdod which would preclude the danger of a shortage of bread and food for animals in the event of a disaster. One must also cite the consumer protection law which was approved during the period of his service.

In the tourism "kingdom," despite its having lost the status of a special ministry and becoming an administration in Industry, Commerce, and Tourism, Patt was regarded one who represents it well. He worked especially for the benefit of tourism in Elat and was regarded there with special esteem. However, it is precisely from this branch of his ministry that he is now separated.

## Yitzhaq Berman--Minister of Energy

[Article by Oded Shorer]

[Text] The solid and respected image of the only bachelor in the Cabinet, Minister of Energy Yitzhaq Berman, "conceals" a colorful biography full of contradictions.

Yitzhaq Berman, 68, is the son of a rabbi who was one of the leaders of the Mizrahi. He abandoned religious observances in his youth, graduated from the Mizrahi Teachers Seminary, turned to Betar and then to the Irgun Tzvai Leumi, was a member of the Intelligence Department of the Irgun, was an officer in the British intelligence service which concentrated on acts of sabotage and espionage in the Balkans during World War II, and is a successful lawyer.

With the rise of the state, he served in the IDF, and after he was released, he turned to business. For 4 years he filled various positions, including the general manager of the first automobile enterprise in Israel, Kaiser-Frazer, in Haifa.

In 1954 he opened a law office which became very prosperous. When he was selected speaker of the Knesset in March 1980, he was forced to divest himself of his share of the firm and as such lost a high annual income.

His moderate image and his relatively late entrance into political life (64) helped him maintain neutrality in the Liberal Party and so made him a natural candidate for the position of speaker of the Knesset.

After his selection as speaker of the Knesset, he aspired to raise the prestige and increase the effectiveness of the legislative body. He suggested among other things that marginal issues and proposals be moved to the agenda of the committees and not be considered in plenary sessions, that a way be found to permit the speaker of the Knesset not to participate in the voting, and that an Ethics Committee be established to consider complaints against members of the Knesset.

With the end of the Ninth Knesset, he announced that he would no longer vie for the position of speaker of the Knesset, and as such, he became the Liberal Party's candidate for a ministerial position. Because of Minister Yitzhaq Moda'i's refusal to serve as minister of energy, Yitzhaq Berman, the man who directed British intelligence operations in World War II and was not accepted for service in the Intelligence Corps of the IDF because of his Irgun Tzvai Leumi past, became the minister in charge of directing the state's secret policy in the world oil market.

#### Avraham Sharir--Minister of Tourism

[Article by Yehoshua Kahana]

[Text] Four years after the Likud government ordered the disestablishment of the Ministry of Tourism and its attachment, as an administration, to the Ministry of Industry and Commerce, the ministry was reestablished under Minister Avraham Sharir.

Is Sharir fit to be minister of tourism? Time will tell. As of now, he can point to his closeness to the subject in that in November 1977 he demanded that the then Minister of Transport and Communications Meir Amit drastically reduce the air fares to Eilat and Sharm ash-Shaykh in order to encourage Israeli tourism to these places. In March 1978 he worked for the construction of a casino in Eilat in order to attract, according to him, wealthy tourists who would bring hundreds of millions of pounds annually into the Treasury.

The new minister who reflects in his statements private initiative and the idea of gambling as a source of income from tourism grew up in the working-class neighborhood of Morekhov, was educated in the Hanoar Haoved [Working Youth] Movement, and studied in the Tichon Hadash School, the school of many who set the tone in the Israeli leftist camp. Avraham Sharir is trying to remove the "stain": "From my early youth I was a member of the General Zionists Party, and I was attracted to its liberal ideology."

His initial activity in the party was in the early fifties when he was the secretary of the parliamentary faction while studying law at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. His close relations with Simha Ehrlich bore fruit in 1964 when he was sent to the United States as a representative of the [Jewish] Agency's Economic Department which was then under the control of the Liberals. Upon his return to Israel after 3 years, he was appointed secretary of the Coordinating Committee of the Economic Organizations in which the Liberal Party had substantial influence.

His big moment came in 1974 when he was called back to Israel by Simha Ehrlich to serve as secretary of the Liberal Party.

The basic surface work in the Liberal Party jumped Sharir, who was a virtually anonymous activist, to fifth place in the Party's list of candidates for Ninth Knesset and to twelfth place in the Likud list.

Avraham Sharir, father of four who lives in the Neve Avivim section of north Tel Aviv, continued to consolidate his position in the Party. In the Tenth Knesset he served as chairman of the Likud faction and as a member of the Finance Committee.

#### Moshe Nissim--Minister of Justice

[Article by Tzvi Singer]

[Text] Minister of Justice Moshe Nissim, one of the leaders of the Liberal Party, assumed his position in the Ministry of Justice in the previous term, after a lengthy period in which he served as a minister without portfolio and worked in coordinating actions between the Cabinet and the Knesset and in handling ad hoc "burning" issues. With the resignation of the previous minister of justice, Shmuel Tamir, Nissim was appointed as his successor.

Law and justice were not strange to him. He studied law at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, and after he was graduated as a lawyer, he opened a private office. Nissim was the youngest member of Knesset ever elected. He entered the Fourth Knesset at the age of 24.

Until the Likud came to power, Moshe Nissim was a member of the Education and Culture Committee, the Public Services Committee, the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, the Law, Constitution, and Justice Committee, and others.

He served as chairman of the Likud faction in the Eighth Knesset.

Nissim has published many articles on legal matters in the daily newspapers and in legal publications.

He has not served long in the Ministry of Justice, but his influence is already being felt in the ministry. One of the first tasks which he took upon himself was the continuation of his involvement in the enactment of legislation for the protection of privacy, a law which he considers to be very important.

Moshe Nissim is 46, married, and the father of three children.

#### Eliezer Shostak--Minister of Health

[Article by Yeshayahu Avi'am]

[Text] When the Health portfolio was offered 4 years ago to MK Eliezer Shostak, he had concerns about assuming the burden of directing a ministry at the age of 66. Today, 4 years later, he does not hesitate. In truth, he was the most certain minister in the second Begin government. Mr Shostak feels that in the first term, with the exception of several disappointments including the passing of a national health insurance law, he was successful in his position.

Eliezer Shostak, who will be 70 in 2 months, is a veteran parliamentarian. He has been a member of the Knesset since the Second Knesset when he was elected from the Herut Movement. He was defeated in the election for the First Knesset when he was on the list of the Revisionist Party.

Since then the minister of health has experienced several party crises. In 1967, together with Shmuel Tamir, he left the Herut Movement and established the Free Center. A few years later there was a split in the Free Center, and Shostak established the Independent Center which joined the Likud when the latter was formed in 1973. Afterward, together with Yigael Hurwitz, he formed the La'am Movement (this movement consisted of the Independent Center, Rafi, and people from the Greater Land of Israel). This movement also split. Today, Shostak and his friends are a group, La'am, in the Likud.

Eliezer Shostak was born in 1911 in Wladimirice, Poland. In 1929 he joined the Betar Movement. When he was given permission to immigrate to Israel in 1933, he married his girlfriend Mina. However, at the time of the Arlosoroff trial, members of Betar were denied immigration permits, and the immigration permit was not given to him until 1935.

Upon his arrival in Israel, he began to work in a Betar group in Herzliyya and later in the representation and leadership of Betar. He was one of the activists in the National Labor Federation which had just been formed and was appointed to serve as its secretary in Tel Aviv. A few years later he was appointed the general secretary of the National Labor Federation. He headed it for about 40 years, and he resigned from the position 4 years ago when he was appointed minister of health.

#### Zevulun Hammer--Minister of Education and Culture

[Article by Yosef Waxman]

[Text] MK Zevulun Hammer, who served in the outgoing Cabinet as the minister of education and culture, continues to work in this field which he loves and to which he devoted most of his time, energy, and ability in the outgoing Cabinet.

Zevulun Hammer is one of the youngest ministers in the new Cabinet. He was born 45 years ago in Haifa, studied at the religious high school Yavneh in his native city, and afterward was graduated from Bar Ilan University with his first degree in Judaic Studies and Education.

In his youth Zevulun Hammer was active in the Bnai Akiva Movement, and afterward he served as chairman of the Students Federation in Bar Ilan, as a member of the presidium of the Students Association, and in this capacity, he was responsible for the World Organization of Jewish Students.

He began his political and party activity as chairman of the Youth and Young Generation Authority of the NRP. He was one of the outstanding individuals among the NRP young guard which he formed into a group within the party which he headed. In NRP circles Zevulun Hammer is today considered also the eventual successor of Dr Burg, as leader of the party.

He was elected to the Seventh Knesset and served as deputy minister of education and culture. On the Eighth Knesset he was a member of the Education and Culture Committee and the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, and later served for a short time as minister of social betterment. His hope was to become the minister of education and culture--and he indeed realized it in the Likud Cabinet 4 years ago.

Yosef Burg--Minister of Interior, Police,  
and Religious Affairs

[Article by Yosef Waxman]

[Text] The minister of interior, police, and religious affairs is the senior member of Knesset and the senior member of the Cabinet. Dr Yosef Burg has been a member of the governments of Israel virtually continuously since 1951.

Dr Yosef Burg was born in 1909 in Dresden, Germany and immigrated to Israel in 1939 after a long period of studies during the course of which he received a PhD and rabbinical ordination. After his arrival, he served as a teacher in the Herzliyya gymnasium, however he soon became involved in political activity as a direct continuation of such activity in the diaspora. He represented the Mizrahi Movement in the Zionist Executive Committee and in the national institutions. After the establishment of the state, he was elected a member of the First Knesset in which he was selected as deputy speaker of the Knesset.

In 1951 he was appointed minister of health and after a year, minister of posts. He held this position for 6 years, and from there he went to the Ministry of Social Welfare and held this position for 11 years. In 1970 he was appointed minister of interior and in the outgoing Knesset, the Ministry of Police was attached to his ministry.

Now, as was stated, he will also serve as the minister of religious affairs and he will concurrently continue to serve as chairman of the Ministerial Committee for Autonomy Negotiations which is actually the main issue in which he has been involved for the past 2 years.

His abundant activity in governmental positions has not prevented Dr Burg from fulfilling his duties as the leader of the NRP, as the world president of Mizrahi, a member of the Board of Trustees of Bar Ilan University, and many other positions. In addition, he is one of the most sought after speakers by the fund-raising campaigns throughout the world and is regarded as an outstanding fundraiser for the [text missing] regarded as an outstanding fundraiser for the state.

Aharon Abu-Hatzeira--Minister of Labor,  
Social Betterment, and Absorption

[Article by Tali Bashan]

[Text] The capacity of Minister of Labor, Social Betterment, and Absorption Aharon Abu-Hatzeira is astounding. During the process of one term he managed to be the youngest minister in history, to be in the center of an unprecedented public storm and to emerge from it "standing tall" to a political struggle which virtually split the people, to strike a blow at his previous party, the NRP, to make his new faction, Tami, the steelyard in the new coalition, and to give himself new positions of power.

Aharon Abu-Hatzeira comes from a prestigious and large family of rabbis from Arford, Morocco (family prestige which has had great significance throughout his political career). He was born in Morocco and immigrated to Israel at the age of 11. After completing his schooling at the ueshiva high school of Kefar Haro'e, he worked as a history teacher in a high school in Ramla. When he joined the NRP, he became its candidate for mayor of Ramla. He served two terms in this position.

The turning point in his status came after an "upheaval" in which Yitzhaq Rafael was shunted aside by his associates in the NRP--the Lamifne faction and the party's Young Guard. At that time Abu-Hatzeira gained a new position of power in the party, and at the distribution of the portfolios in the fresh coalition of 1977, he demanded and even received a ministerial position. This is how Abu-Hatzeira, the nephew of the sainted Baba Sali and the son of Rabbi Abu-Hatzeira, of blessed memory, became a minister at 39.

A short time after he took office he encountered problems in the management of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. In the wake of severe disagreements on the method of managing the ministry and the degree of centralization which the minister took, the then director general of the ministry, Yisrael Lipal (a member of Yosef Burg's camp), resigned. Also, disclosures of irregularities in management began to slowly "trickle out," and criticism was heard of the allocation of funds to yeshivas and rabbis and about the existence of fictitious yeshivas receiving funds from the ministry.

The rest is known. The disclosures and the suspicions raised led to a thorough investigation which concluded with Abu-Hatzeira being brought to trial. "They are spilling my blood," the minister exclaimed at the time. He managed to maintain his composure throughout his trial which ended with his acquittal.

Some say that he destroyed the Ministry of Religious Affairs and left it completely paralyzed. He himself, in his lowkeyed manner, carefully paves his political road and says on the eve of his second trial, "Several months ago I decided to give up political activity, but I do not want to give this pleasure to those who want to see me leave."

5830

CSO: 4323/55

## APPOINTMENT OF SHARON ASSESSED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 4 Aug 81 p 11

[Article by Yoel Marcus: "A God Who Disappoints or a Devil Who Surprises?"]

[Text] Ariel Sharon's appointment to the post of defense minister will undoubtedly steal the show from the new government to be established today. There is some question as to whether this was a controversial appointment to such a sensitive post, one that affects the well being and physical health of the nation. The debate which occupies every citizen in the nation is not connected with Sharon's military expertise (few question that at all) but rather with his personality. As we know, the attitude towards his personality is ambivalent or polar, not unlike the one experienced by Moshe Dayan during his entire political career. No one is indifferent to Sharon. You either hate him and are suspicious of him or you respect and exalt him.

His close friends speak of him in Messianic terms and see him as a kind of savior for Israel. "He already saved you once (in the Yom Kippur War) and he will save you next time again," was the way one of his friends once put it to his opponents. In their eyes, his anticipated appointment as defense minister goes together with the salvation of the country. The same irrationality which characterizes his admirers also describes his opponents. Their major complaint is that he is a "dangerous man," an "opportunist," and that his main concern is Sharon. These opponents speak of him in terms of dictatorship, tanks, concentration camps and the like.

It is almost certain that there is no more validity to these fears than there is to the praises circulating about Sharon. The fact that in his youth he was a member of MAPAI and, according to Yomani Sharet, afraid of the fact that too many officers were joining the Unity of Labor Party, and that now he is the spearhead of Israel's settlement front, does not make him any more of an opportunist than many MAPAI people who today are members of the Labor Party and who think like him. He has expressed himself sharply about the media whose role in making him a national hero is unquestionable. "We have a unique democracy in which the most severe accusations leveled at the government come from television, and not a single newspaper supports the government," he once said in a newspaper interview. But his criticism does not really deviate from the generally accepted pattern of the Likud ministers who lay all the defects and omissions of the government at the feet of the media.

Sharon himself has expressed his opinion more than once about his public image. In a conversation I had with him when he stood at the head of the "Shalomtzion" list in 1977, he said on this subject, "They say of me that I am a warmonger. Far from

it. By my nature, I am an easy going man and not at all despotic, far from the qualities of a dictator that people attach to me." Even if we assume that we should not accept too easily the baker's testimony about his own dough, we can still assume that there is a lot of exaggeration in the notion that by handing over the defense portfolio to Sharon, he will be given dictatorial powers which could endanger the democracy.

He himself once reacted to the horror stories going on around him in an interview with MA'ARIV. "It would be impossible to carry out any campaign in Israel which was not completely subordinate to the law. In my opinion, this is unequivocal." It is also true that we have far too highly developed a system of "checks and balances," not only within the structure of the government but also in the internal structure of every citizen of the state, for us to fear that any defense minister could control this nation with tanks and prison camps. The only one who really has to fear Sharon's appointment to this key position is, perhaps, King Hussayn whom Sharon described as a foreign body in the region who is trying to prevent the establishment of a Palestinian State. We will come back to this in the second part of this article.

Whoever examines what Sharon has been saying for the past 5 years will find--for better or worse--a certain consistency in his approach to problems of security and problems of organizing the defense system as well as in his approach to the future of the settlements. Of all the people in the world, he was the one who strongly supported civilian control of the army. More than 4 years ago, he was already talking about "massive waste" and a "careless attitude towards money" in the defense establishment. Already then, he spoke of the need for a 20 percent reduction in the "inflated army command." He spoke of a lack of order and of the need for reorganization.

From the perspective of his military outlook, he is against the recent tendency to go for "quantity" instead of "quality." the IDF needs to return to the approach of quality which used to characterize it (that is also the reason that he opposed the absorption of marginal youth into the army. "This is an army and not a melting pot or a school." Meanwhile, I am told, he has changed his attitude on the subject, mainly because he is worried about the direction of the development of social divisions within the country). He has always been sensitive to the Syrian presence in Lebanon and to any kind of military preparations taking place on Israel's borders. His reactions to the decision to bomb Lebanon and later towards the cease fire attest to the fact that he is opposed to the strategic outlook which is likely to lead to a war whose consequences are a waste. A course like the one taken in Lebanon would not have happened under Sharon. The move would either have been more basic and comprehensive ("like in Gaza," says one of his friends) or it would not have taken place in the same place at the same time in relation to the same target.

Although his assistants assure us that Sharon will enter his office on tiptoes, and that perhaps a good deal of time will pass before he makes any kind of declarations ("unless the situation requires it"), we can assume that it will not be long before his imprint will be felt within the defense establishment, whether from an organizational point of view or with respect to the conception and suggestions which will be presented to the government for approval. Sharon, however, who has been working hard for weeks on a draft of an outline of his direction as defense minister, is likely to want to leave his mark on the peace process as well, a subject which will be central to political activity in the months and years to come. And in this area, too, there is a marked consistency in his statements.

The point of departure of his approach is very reminiscent of Moshe Dayan's namely, that there are no sacred historical boundaries. The people of Israel have rights "over" the land of Israel, whereas the Arabs have rights "in" Israel. There is, in his past statements, some deviation from the ideological position of Gush Emunim. "I don't agree with them on several issues, but one must accept them and work with them and keep them moderate. Like Dayan, he says, "It is unlikely that there will be a place in Israel where Jews will not be able to live." In contrast to the approaches of the Alignment and Likud, Sharon has said several times that peace without a solution to the Palestinian problem will keep us continually in our present situation. He has said more than once that we must arrive at a dialogue with the Palestinians and even with the PLO. "It is not important to whom we speak but about what." And his "what" is that a "second Palestinian State" should not be established.

According to him, a Palestinian State already exists--namely, Jordan--and the solution lies in the formation of a federation or confederation ("I am not afraid of these concepts," he once said) between the Palestinian State whose capitol is Rabat-Ammon and Israel and the residents of Judaea and Samaria. He is against too much U.S. involvement in the autonomy talks and believes that, in the final analysis, no true peace agreement can be achieved without Soviet cooperation. His statements indicate that security considerations are more important to him than adherence to ideology in so far as some possible order is concerned on the West Bank, an approach that smacks of pragmatism.

Last year, Sharon was prepared to move down to deputy minister as long as he would be appointed to defense. It is not surprising, then, that his anticipated appointment is the realization of a dream he does not want to see destroyed. His friends say that Sharon as defense minister is likely to do some surprising things--not in the sense that he will shake up the defense establishment in ways that some feel will not hurt it, but as the man who will bring about talks with the Palestinians. How he will do this--is he likely to propose to the Palestinians and the PLO a joint effort to bring about Husayn's downfall--that remains to be seen. In theory at least, there is no question that assured talks with the Palestinians by a man who stands at the head of the Israel front certainly contains elements of surprise. It is too early to say who will be most surprised--his friends, his opponents or Sharon himself.

Either way, he has wanted this position too much, and for too long has thought about what he would do with it, for him not to take advantage of the chance to prove himself. After the first 100 days of grace, we will be able to look back to determine if Sharon is the god who deceives, the Satan who surprises or simply mediocre like all the Likud ministers.

9348

OSD: 4323/56

## COMMENTARY ON DAVID LEVI

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 10 Aug 81 p 8

[Article by Gid'on Allon: "Absorption As a Secondary Matter"]

[Text] On Thursday morning, when Menahem Begin and the members of his government stood in the president's hall waiting to be presented to President Yitzhak Navon, Minister David Levi was among them. He had a reason for being pleased with himself. He had won (once again) in the struggle and had strengthened his position within the government. In place of the absorption portfolio which had been taken from him, he had been appointed deputy prime minister, chairman of the Ministers Committee on matters of social betterment and responsible for the housing plan--all this apart from his job as Housing Minister. Now that the transfer of the office of absorption has become definite, we can summarize his 4 years in this position.

Whoever has followed David Levi's progress since he joined Menahem Begin's first government in June 1977 as Absorption Minister, cannot help but admit that this position served him as a jumping off place for the advancement of his political career and for the strengthening of his position within the Herut movement and the government. During the first months of his tenure, he was full of ideas. He initiated a quiet revolution in the distribution of housing to immigrants. He supported the establishment of an authority for immigration and absorption which would work with the government and the Jewish Agency with him serving as its chairman. He developed a government program for the encouragement of those who left the country during the 30th anniversary of Israel (this was a complete failure). He committed himself to work towards encouraging immigration from the developed nations (particularly France) and to reduce the extent of defection (which did not bear fruit). But at the beginning of 1979, when he was appointed as Minister of Construction and Housing (instead of Gid'on Fass), in addition to his job as Minister of Immigrant Absorption, he began to relate to the subjects of immigration and absorption as to a secondary matter. He spent less time on the difficult problems of immigrants and delegated those to the director-general of his office, Azriel Waldeman, but he fought hard against every effort on the part of the Jewish Agency to do away with the Absorption Ministry and to transfer the dealings on the subjects of immigration and absorption into its hands. In the course of this struggle, he demonstrated his power and influence within the Herut movement. Furthermore, in June of 1979 he forced Prime Minister Menahem Begin to change his mind about doing away with the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption. At the same time, he launched a sharp critique on the prime minister and argued that the government could not divest itself of responsibility for action within the realm of absorption.

Employees in the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption pointed out that David Levi did not concern himself much with the absorption of immigrants once he was appointed Minister of Construction and Housing. He devoted all his time and energy to two main areas: the Ministry of Housing and the consolidation of his political power within the Herut movement. At the same time, he struggled with the Likud position in the Histadrut and established an image as the true representative of the Eastern community and of the lower classes, as someone who watched over the needs of low income people and who did battle in the government against the elimination of subsidies for basic necessities.

David Levi did not contribute anything to increasing the awareness of the government to the problems of immigration and absorption. This area was at the bottom of the list of priorities of the previous government. It did not carry on a single serious discussion about the severe drop in immigration, about the problem of the defection of Soviet immigrants to Vienna, and on the emigration of thousands of Israeli youths from the country each year.

Even when he established an institution for coordination between the government and the Zionist Federation, a special committee to consolidate practical suggestions to reduce emigration, David Levi did nothing to facilitate its discussions even though he was a member of the committee along with Deputy Prime Minister Simha Erlich. Neither did he take any action after the publication of the findings of the public opinion poll (conducted at the initiative of the Ministry of Absorption) about the positions of the Israeli public on the subject of immigration and absorption which indicated a significant worsening in the attitudes of the Israeli public towards the immigrants and a severe estrangement between the old-timers in Israel (especially the educated) and the immigrants.

David Levi was also not bothered by the fact that immigration to Israel had decreased noticeably. The fact that since the beginning of the year (January to July) there were only 6300 new immigrants and that seven absorption centers had closed while the others handled only 50 percent of the usual traffic did not arouse any response from the man who was responsible for dealing with the issue of immigration and absorption.

The appointment of Abu Hatzzeira over the issue of absorption in the new government alongside his major responsibility as Minister of Labor and Social Betterment suggests that the new minister is also likely to relate to the Ministry of Immigrant Absorption as to an incidental matter.

## MOSHE QATZAV, DEPUTY MINISTER FOR URBAN RENEWAL

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 7 Aug 81 p 25

[Interview by Talila Ben Zakai: "MK Moshe Qatzav: The City of Politics"]

[Text] Tuesday afternoon in the Knesset. MK Moshe Qatzav, deputy minister for urban renewal, has difficulty responding to the confusing situation he has been put into as a result of the composition of the government.

Earlier he was told that he would be appointed as deputy minister in the office of the prime minister, and he was pleased. Later it was decided that the project would be transferred to the Ministry of Housing and Construction in order to expand the part suggested for David Levi, and MK Qatzav agreed.

Meanwhile, David Levi played at being "angry" and left the game. Then they started over and returned MK Qatzav to his original post, namely, in the prime minister's office. For a full day he was in a state of anticipation. Next, Minister Levi became reconciled and became deputy prime minister. The result of all this is that MK Qatzav will serve as deputy to the minister who is deputy prime minister or something like that.

It appears that he is prepared for any arrangement. At any rate, in talking with me he seemed content and did not complain that the game going on over his head was upsetting him. No, he completely understands the situation. And, while he is aware of the bad impression which the extensive negotiations make on the public, he does not see in this situation in which small parties squeeze (appointments or changes in approach) and the party is squeezed enough reason to stop and say "no more" and to go back again to the voters. "It is not that one must maintain party rule at any cost. There is a limit to this too," he says and adds, "but the situation is not serious enough to warrant such an extreme step and such things happen."

Born in Iran (and chairman of the organization of Iranian immigrants in Israel), resident of Qiryat Malahi and chairman of the council (he plans to leave that post soon), 36 years old (married more than 5 years), MK Moshe Qatzav numbers among the young members in the 10th Knesset. "Most of them are from Likud," he says. "The young Alignment people are at least 40." But age apparently does not matter, and he sounds today like the old-timers who speak about every subject without saying anything new. "We are a reflection of the public;" "the patterns of the government are in the process of being crystallized;" "politics can be pure if everyone stays away from negative examples;" "I myself have not been involved in any illegal methods. I haven't even used my elbows, and my career has not been tainted."

To those youths who are sitting at home criticizing the political system, he proposes, "Get involved, enter the arena and be different from the old guard, and then, within a few years, everything will change."

The personal history of Deputy Minister Moshe Qatzav is a nice story of immigration--absorption--development and personal advancement.

He grew up in the transit camp of Qastina (the eldest of the 7 children in the Qatzav family). First, he lived in a tent, later in a bunk. And when the camp became a development town, the family got a real dwelling, a two room apartment--48 mm. square with running water, hook-up for electricity and utilities inside the apartment.

He completed elementary school in Qiryat-Malahi, high school in Ben-Shemen and Beer Tuviya. He finished his academic studies at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem where he also served as chairman of the student council of Gahal.

Since then, his path has been tied to the Herut movement and to a political career, as chairman of the local council at Qiryat Malahi since 1974 ("my most important accomplishment--the satisfaction of the residents with the town"), and since 1977 a member of the Knesset ("during my first term I was amazed at the complete dependence on the part of those elected on the media which determine the rules of the game").

During the past 4 years, he has served in two public posts. This has been hard, he says, but it has been very important. As a member of the Knesset, it is very important for him not to be too cut off from the people. And as head of the council, it is nice that he can bypass bureaucratic procedures and push for issues from a higher level.



Moshe Qatzav Deputy Minister

"This time" MK Qatzav, who is an avid stamp collector, says, "there are already council heads in the Knesset, and I think that this is very good." He himself intends to leave and to devote himself to the Knesset and to his new post as deputy minister for urban renewal. The subject is especially close to him. "It is still too soon to outline in detail my plans, but what I can say is that I would like to function in such a way that in 10 years, we will not have to go back and do any more renewal. I expect also that the young generation growing up in these reconstructed areas will be able to handle whatever problems arise on their own." And if he does not succeed in achieving these objectives, he feels it will not be because of conditions and institutions but because of his own limitations.

9348

OSD: 4323/56

MIRYAM GLAZER, DEPUTY MINISTER FOR EDUCATION, CULTURE

Tel Aviv MA'ARIV in Hebrew 7 Aug 81 p 25

[Interview by Talila Ben Zakai: "From the Fortress to the Knesset"]

[Text] At the beginning of the week, it appeared that the government (ministers and deputy ministers) would be composed only of men. And now--surprise. MK Miryam Glazer has been summoned to the post of Deputy Minister of Education and Culture. Now it can be said that 50 percent of the female members of Eikud in the Knesset have gotten select posts.

She does not yet know her way around the workings of the Knesset (nor the MKs' dining room), and even the ushers still have a hard time identifying her. A new face in the 10th Knesset. A student who "skipped" two grades at once--from her life in education to the Knesset and from there directly to the post of Deputy Minister.

It was not a complete surprise. The fact is that as early as the 7th Knesset, she was invited to join, but her children were still small and she did not feel ready for the job. Now with the encouragement of her husband and the agreement of the children (the oldest is married), she agreed to the invitation. She does not hide her excitement about the honor bestowed on her, but she admits that the opening ceremony at the Knesset was disappointing. "I was hoping for a more sensitive ceremony," says the MK who as a school director had lots of experience with setting up festive ceremonies.

"I will do my best," she says again but has trouble at this stage saying anything more concrete. The prime minister suggested the position ("he was my son's godfather"). She does not know the minister of education personally, and although it is clear that the appointment was made with his approval, he has not yet invited her nor has she sought him out, and she has no idea what he intends for her or how the system of work relations between them will be set up.

But these unknowns do not cloud over, at this first stage, the excitement of this dizzying pace of personal advancement which goes along with the anxiety about being able to fit into a system which demands that you not always say what you think and that you not always fight for what you believe in, but that you quickly develop a control mechanism which forces you to weigh every word and every hand raising against party and coalition considerations. And for her, all this is new.

Miryam (at home it is T'assa) was born in Yemen in 1929. When she was 5 years old, her family migrated to Israel and joined her grandfather (who had come in 1882) in Tel Aviv's Neve-Tsedek. She went from the local elementary school (where the "actors' theater" now stands) to the seminary "Talpiyot" ("I left because I refused to tell on girls who belonged to dissident organizations") and Levinsky ("they threw me out on the grounds that I had missed too much school"). Then she began her career as an uncertified teacher and only later completed her exams and received her teaching certificate (she later completed her education at the university).

Now she is leaving teaching at the seminary as well as at the school in the youth farm of Beitar (sports and youth organization) named after Johanna Jabotinski in Beer Ya'acov, in which she served intermittently as teacher and headmistress since 1951.

"I went there for a year," she says, "and stayed for 30!" (with some breaks). There she married Haim Glazer (who came after her to run the farmstead). Their children were born there (25, 22, and 18). About 10 years ago, her husband left to attend to private business and the family moved to Holon. She continued to direct the school as an "outside resident." And from there, without any intermediate steps of public or political posts, she was established in the Knesset.

"I am used to learning new subjects slowly and thoroughly," says the teacher from the "fortress" (abbreviation for Jabotinski residence), who believes in the need to strengthen the ideological side of education and to emphasize the strengthening of national attitudes.



Miryam Glazer, Deputy Minister of Education and Culture

As a teacher and educator she can only be very critical of the manner of expression and the conduct of many Knesset members. "It is not enough to be chosen. One must behave as one who is chosen," she says, and promises that in this area she will not hesitate to continue to be a teacher and to call for order.

As for the rest--education, integration, reports, briefings, study programs and so forth--she is still keeping silent.

And yes, as for culture, it is apparently for her (as well as for the Minister himself) only an addendum to the main subject--education.

9348

CSO: 4323/56

## MINISTER EXPLAINS GCC ECONOMIC AGREEMENT

LD121340 Kuwait KUNA in English 1212 GMT 12 Nov 81

[Text] Kuwait, 12 Nov (KUNA)--The Kuwait Finance and Planning Minister 'Abd al-Latif al-Hamad said the economic unity agreement, which the heads of the six Gulf Cooperation Council member states signed in Riyadh last night, will provide a comprehensive framework for economic relations among the council members.

In a statement to KUNA, al-Hamad said the ministers in the economic, financial and planning sectors will meet shortly to lay down the bases for economic cooperation among Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman.

The agreement binds the six member-states in a parallel and complementary manner and automatically dissolves all bilateral agreements between the Gulf states while at the same time catering for the needs of the states which did not have such bilateral agreements, he said.

The economic unity agreement lays down the basic principles for economic relations among the six GCC member-states and regulates and fosters these relations with a view to achieving closer cooperation among their harmonious economies, al-Hamad added. The Kuwaiti minister said the agreement will lead to removal of inconsistency among the six Gulf states and formulates and coordinates the economies of these states and helps in creating the best integration amongst them.

The six-chapter agreement includes clauses which place a maximum of coordination in the economic, financial and monetary dealings among the Gulf states and calls for unification of commercial and industrial legislations and customs regulations.

The chapters of the agreement define the bases of trade exchange, tax levying and the encouragement of national products. It calls for equal treatment of the Gulf citizens in the movement of manpower, ownership of land and assets and the transfer of capital and economic activities.

The agreement calls for coordination of oil industry policies including refining, marketing, pricing and exploitation of natural gas and development of energy resources.

Cooperation in tapping scopes of joint technical endeavour with a view to establishing a firm Gulf base dependent on encouragement of research, applied sciences and technology are also included in the agreement.

Coordination of financial, monetary and banking policies and cooperation among the monetary agencies and central banks including unification of the currency constitute an integral part of the economic unity agreement.

CSO: 4400/50

GOALS OF BRIGHT STAR MANEUVERS CRITICIZED

GF091835 Kuwait AL-WATAN in Arabic 8 Nov 81 p 22

[From "Scenes" column by chief editor Jasim al-Mutawwa']

[Text] Observers say that the goals of the bright star maneuvers which the United States will carry out together with four Arab countries lie in the U.S. Government's desire to show its commitment to protect its friends and interests in the Middle East. The truth is that the maneuvers are designed to protect its interests and not its friends. Indications are that, despite close friendship with the United States, its friends began to fall one after another without any U.S. move to rescue them. The United States is concerned, before anything else, with protecting its interests because there is absolutely no such thing as "friend" in U.S. policy. The Arab countries that will participate in these maneuvers fully realize that their goal is the protection of U.S. interests.

We do not know why these four Arab countries insist on participating with the United States in these maneuvers, which will be interference [words indistinct] sister countries in the council in a difficult position as they try to find an explanation for Omani policy following the optimism that prevailed at the conclusion of latest meeting of the CGG foreign ministers in At-Ta'if.

In addition the U.S. maneuvers come at a critical time when the Arab nation is preparing for two summits. The first is for the Arab Gulf countries and the second is for all the Arab countries. How will these two summits deal with the U.S. maneuvers over Arab territories and shores--maneuvers which had been announced to be designed for U.S. interference in the area? Will the Gulf summit discuss the maneuvers to be carried out in the water of its countries? Will it announce its opinion frankly and loudly so that it will be heard in Oman? Oman indicated, just as the other Gulf countries did, that the security and protection of the Gulf is the responsibility of its countries--and as we know the United States is not one of the Gulf countries.

We, the people, do not know what is being planned against us, but we fully realize that it is not in our favor since our interests contradict completely U.S. interests. As long as the United States protects its interests, it will be threatening our interests. Will those who help the United States protect its interests one day defend our interests?

CSO: 4404/108

## BRIEFS

PUBLICATIONS, RALLIES LAWS--Kuwait, 9 Nov (KUNA)--In a statement to the newspaper AL-WATAN, published today, member of the Kuwaiti National Assembly Muhammad al-Barrak has stated that he and the other 15 assembly members who abstained from voting against the abrogation of Article 35 of the Publications Law, thereby supporting the government, will oppose the new law on publications and have already notified the government of their firm stand in support of retaining Article 35. As to the law on public assemblies and rallies, he said, he supports the deputies who favor retaining the law with the introduction of some amendments. But, he said, I say to the press that the well-known Kuwaiti proverb says: either hand over the fleece, or you will have to hand over the fleece and the lamb. [Text] [LD091202 Kuwait KUNA Diplomatic Information Service in Arabic 0950 GMT 9 Nov 81]

CSO: 4404/108

LIBYA

'VOAH' ATTACKS U.S. 'PLOTS' AGAINST AL-QADHDHAFI

LD070028 Tripoli Voice of the Arab Homeland in Arabic 1815 GMT 6 Nov 81

[Unattributed commentary]

[Excerpts] The challenge between the masses and revolutionary forces of our Arab nation, on the one hand, and the imperialist West headed by the United States, on the other, is both old and new at one and the same time. This is caused by many things which can be summed up briefly in one statement: The imperialist West insists on interfering in our nation's life in order to dominate its territories, exhaust its wealth, enslave its masses by using all means beginning with treachery and deception and ending with plotting, collusion and the use of force--a matter which our Arab masses have rejected and opposed in various ways and which they oppose and reject at present with all the force they can muster.

On 17 June this year, the DAILY NEWS quoted U.S. sources as saying that the Reagan administration was plotting to topple al-Qadhdhafi through some Arab countries friendly to the United States. This is the new scenario to which the Reagan administration has resorted after it failed to harm the revolution or find a trojan war which would realize its dream of toppling the revolution from within.

In view of this, the Reagan administration embarked on the current attempt, invented by its petrified mentality, to differentiate between the revolution and its commander, the brother al-Qadhdhafi, as though the conflict was solely between him and the United States. However, despite the fact that he is the commander of the revolution al-Qadhdhafi is, after all, only one of the masses of the struggling Arab nation and one of the free revolutionaries who have rejected the life of humiliation for their nation and dedicated themselves to securing an honorable life for their nation. Al-Qadhdhafi is only the symbol of the revolution and the cause of freedom not only in the Arab world but throughout the world.

The U.S. attempt to differentiate between the revolution and the commander is a naive one which cannot deceive our Libyan Arab people and our Arab nation. Yet, the United States persists with its deception, resorting at one time to using poison, a byproduct of the U.S. terrorist mentality and Reagan's talent.

This has been revealed by the WASHINGTON POST. Since then, the world has been scoffing at the revelations made by the WASHINGTON POST. But the reply of the revolution and its commander to these threats and aggressive attempts was that the commander does not fear death and that the Arab nation with its revolutionary living forces and the Libyan people do not fear the United States.

The unmasking of this U.S. farce and the revolutionary reply to it, as happened at the Gulf of Sidra, have failed to deter the United States, which embarked on a new attempt even more abominable than its previous attempts: to intercept the commander's plane in a terrorist act of piracy, using its bases all over Europe for the purpose. But as it failed in this too, it embarked on yet another attempt which was exposed by the news agencies and Arab and foreign press and radios this week: to launch an offensive against the life of the commander of the revolution from 10 to 15 November, dates which coincide with the provocative military maneuvers which the United States forces in Egypt will be staging.

Quoting U.S. diplomatic sources, these papers say that the plan is primarily directed against Colonel Mu'ammr al-Qadhafi. It is to be achieved through striking at all the places he is believed to frequent. According to confirmed information carried by the world news agencies during the past few days, the operation shall be preceded by camouflaging measures such as strategic B-52 bombers striking at some area inside the Jamahiriya. Speaking of the details of this criminal operation, the information media say that the U.S. CIA has been monitoring the movements of brother Colonel Mu'ammr al-Qadhafi and the places he frequents for months on orders from the Pentagon, as he is supposed to be the primary objective of a U.S. operation to be carried out shortly.

But we say to the U.S. that Mu'ammr al-Qadhafi, the symbol of the revolution, can only be reached by the United States over our dead bodies. This is a decision taken not only by our Libyan Arab people but also by the masses and living revolutionary forces of our Arab nation from the ocean to the gulf. This is because we know that our problem with the United States is one of our freedom and the freedom of our homeland and our right to a free and honourable life. It is not one between the United States and Mu'ammr al-Qadhafi personally. As al-Qadhafi is the symbol of all these objectives and as he is the commander of this revolution, it will be difficult for the United States to harm this continuous symbol of the revolution and its masses, so will achieve their objectives of freedom and complete emancipation and the expulsion of U.S. imperialism from every inch of the Arab land.

CSO: 4504/66

## LIBYA

### BRIEFS

POLISARIO DELEGATION--Tripoli, 11 Nov (JANA)--Mr. Mohamed Abdelaziz, secretary general of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Sagia Hamra and Rio de Oro--POLISARIO--and his delegation, has arrived in Tripoli yesterday. In a statement at [as received] his arrival he condemned the U.S. manoeuvres due to be conducted along the Egyptian-Libyan borders jointly with Egyptian, Sudanese, Somali and Omani forces. Mr Abdelaziz also praised in his statement the role of the great al-Fateh revolution in confronting the imperialist hostile schemes against the Arab nation. [Text] [LD111122 Tripoli JANA in English 0935 GMT 11 Nov 81]

BRIGHT STAR DANGER--Paris, 13 Nov (AFP)--American-Egyptian military manoeuvres "on Libya's borders "constitute a prelude to a military intervention in Libya," [quotation marks as received] said Hafiana, secretary of the Libyan People's Bureau (embassy) here, said today. The manoeuvres, which began on Saturday in Egypt and will involve Sudan, Somalia and Oman, are a direct threat to Libya, Mr. Hafiana said. "The American invasion of the four Arab countries" is part of "global American strategy" against Libya and to prepare for "direct action" against his country, he said. If attacked Libya "will use all means available to defend its integrity," he said. He also reiterated Libyan denial that his country was involved in an assassination attempt against acting American ambassador to France Christian Chapman here yesterday. U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig has said that Libya could have been involved in the shooting attack. But Mr. Hafiana said that the American accusations were aimed at "creating conditions of an aggression against Libya" and were part of "a global strategy by the United States to destabilize the regime of Colonel (Mu'amar) al-Qadhdhafi." [Text] [NC131652 Paris AFP in English 1629 GMT 13 Nov 81]

ENVOY MEET GREEK OFFICIAL--Athens, 14 Nov (JANA)--The secretary of the People's Committee for the Libyan Arab People's Bureau in Greece held a meeting yesterday with the Greek foreign minister. The meeting discussed aspects of bilateral relations and issues of common interests to the two countries. [Text] [LD141000 Tripoli JANA in English 0915 GMT 14 Nov 81]

PFLP CABLE--PFLP secretary general George Habash has sent a cable to the brother leader [Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi] in which he strongly denounced the U.S. maneuvers and aggressive provocations in the Arab area and its attack on the Arab steadfastness and confrontation forces with the aim of subjecting the whole area to the imperialist-reactionary influence. In his cable, George Habash declared that the PFLP is prepared to fight side-by-side with the people of the Jamahiriya in the forward trenches in defense of the honor and dignity of the Arab nation and to protect its glory and its liberation and progressive objectives. [Text] [NC160700 Tripoli Domestic Service in Arabic 0600 GMT 16 Nov 81]

MENGISTU SUPPORT CABLE--The brother leader of the revolution has received a cable from Mr Mengistu Haile Mariam, chairman of the Provisional Military Administrative Council of the Socialist Republic of Ethiopia, in which he strongly denounced the U.S. maneuvers in the Arab area and affirmed the Ethiopian people's support for the Libyan Arab people in their confrontation of the imperialist's aggressive designs. He pointed out that these maneuvers are not only directed against the Libyan Arab people, the Ethiopian people and the Yemeni people, but that they are also against all the progressive and peace-loving states and against all the liberation movements in the area. The brother leader of the revolution also received a cable from the Central Committee of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine in which it affirmed its support for the Jamahiriya people and its readiness to fight along side them to protect and safeguard the firm nationalist and revolutionary position of the great 1 September revolution vis-a-vis all the plots being hatched by imperialism and its agents in the area. [Text] [NC130945 Tripoli Domestic Service in Arabic 0900 GMT 13 Nov 81]

CSO: 4504/66

## OMAN FRONT RADIO SCORES MUSCAT CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY

EA061314 Aden Voice of PFLO in Arabic 1545 GMT 5 Nov 81

[Excerpt] The United States and the remaining imperialist forces in the world have begun to adopt a line different to that followed in past years, so that they can at least preserve their remaining agents and hirelings in this or that area.

At the present time, particularly after the killing of the traitor Anwar al-Sadat, calls are heard from this or that quarter saying that the United States and its allies should continue backing the regimes that support them in the Arab region, without those regimes remaining obviously under the umbrella of their protection in the eyes of their peoples.

On this basis, the United States has advised its agents in the region to carry out formal measures in the near future, such as the establishment of consultative assemblies with very limited powers and which, in the final analysis, are only formalities, of no consequence in the fundamental issues of the people, that is they are facades for (?beautifying) the existing regimes and a negation of the expression of democracy.

What the agent regime in Muscat has announced in this respect is proof of the adherence by that regime to the advice of its American and British masters. We will not be surprised if, in the near future the Qabus regime in Muscat presents us with a dramatic event connected with the military bases and facilities which he granted under the 4 July agreement because, if such event occurs, it will be part of the American imperialist design for the region which aims at creating regional alternatives for preserving the imperialist interests in this area.

The voices that have for some time been calling for the creation of a joint local military force are nothing but reliable alternatives for replacing the Americans and the British in the Arabian Gulf area. [sentence as heard] Among the first tasks of this military force would be to serve the imperialist interests in this area. Its work would include the suppression of the nationalist and democratic forces existing in this vital area and which express the interests of the peoples of the area.

CSO: 4404/108

PFL0 RADIO SAYS BRIGHT STAR EXERCISES 'DEMEAN' OMAN

EA072010 Aden Voice of PFL0 in Arabic 1545 GMT 7 Nov 81

[Text] News agencies have been reporting that American military exercises will be carried out throughout this month in some Arab countries. According to U.S. (?expectations), these exercises, in which the Sultanate of Oman is to participate, will cover Masirah Island and the beaches on the mainland opposite. [Words indistinct]

Eighteen hundred U.S. Marines will take part in these naval exercises. Qabus' regime asked the United States to reduce the number of marines to 1,000 so that the regime in Muscat would not be embarrassed in front of the other Arab regimes. This report was carried by American agencies.

We have explained before that Qabus' puppet regime, by signing a military pact with the United States on 4 July last year, pawned Oman, its people and territory to U.S. circles in Washington. This means that Qabus has distanced himself from the goal of preserving Oman's freedom, independence and honor. We have also explained that Qabus and his regime did not plan the exercises and had no say in them. Qabus did not know about the exercises until it was decided to carry them out. This was natural, of course, because the relationship is between a hirer and a hireling. This is how America treats its agents whenever it signs military pacts with them to acquire military facilities and bases.

Qabus is now asking the U.S. administration to reduce the size of its forces taking part in the exercises, allegedly because he does not want to be embarrassed in front of other Arab regimes. The question is: Will the embarrassment about which the agent regime is talking be avoided by the reduction of the American forces participating in the exercises in Omani territory? This is inverted logic on the part of the regime. [Sentence indistinct].

Even just 10 American or other foreign soldiers carrying out actions on Omani territory with the consent of the existing regime must be regarded as an act of betrayal against the masses of Oman. For this reason, the conducting of military exercises by the Americans, irrespective of whether there are 1,000 or more, must be regarded as an act of treachery against the Omani people. The condemnation of this treachery will not lessen simply because Qabus has asked his new American masters to reduce the number of those taking part in the exercises.

This request of Qabus reported by the news agencies, makes it clear that the pact of 4 July 1980 between the Sultanate and the United States has made the United States an overlord determining the fate of our Omani people, while the agent regime has been turned into a satellite of American imperialism in the Gulf and peninsula.

The fact that the United States has agreed to reduce the extent of the planned military exercises in Oman means nothing since the exercises will still be carried out, and that is the crux of the matter. Qabus has truly demeaned the independence and dignity of Oman.

CSO: 4404/111

PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

BRIEFS

U.S. MANEUVERS CONDEMNED--Arab national liberation movements and progressive parties represented in Aden have condemned U.S. aggressive military maneuvers which pose a threat to the security and interests of the Arab peoples and all the peoples of the region. In a statement issued today, they declared their solidarity with and support for Democratic Yemen, Libya, Socialist Ethiopia, the Omani, Somali and Egyptian peoples and the Sudanese Communist Party, led by their progressive forces. They pointed out that the situation in the Arab region is at its most delicate and dangerous stage with the conflict between American imperialism and Arab reaction on the one hand and the progressive groups of the Arab National Liberation Movement on the other. They stressed the great danger to our Arab peoples and all the peoples of the region caused by the aggressive policy of the American imperialists and their collusion with Arab reactionary forces. [Text] [EA121246 Aden Domestic Service in Arabic 1900 GMT 11 Nov 81]

TRADE UNIONS SUPPORT CUBA--The secretariat of the Confederation of Trade Unions of the republic has strongly condemned the threats and aggressive acts by American imperialism directed against the revolution and people in Cuba and which aim at harming the independence of the revolution of the heroic Cuban people. This came in a solidarity cable sent by Brother Sultan al-Dawsh, member of the Central Committee and secretary general of the Confederation of Trade Unions, to Comrade Roberto Veiga, secretary general of the Confederation of Workers of Socialist Cuba. It declared the trade union's (?absolute) and unqualified support for the revolution and people. It said: The Yemeni working class and its trade union movement declare their readiness to defend the revolution and independence of the Cuban people against the aggression of American imperialism and its threats. The cable asked all the forces of progress, democracy and peace in the world to stand against this aggressive policy of the United States and with the struggle of the friendly Cuban people to preserve their sovereignty and independence. The secretariat of the General Union of Women of the PDRY today also condemned American imperialist provocation against the Cuban revolution. In a cable of support it sent to the Cuban Women's Union, the secretariat expressed its full solidarity with the struggling people of Cuba. The cable hailed the just steadfastness of the Cuban people against these provocations. It asked the world public opinion to condemn these aggressive acts and put an end to them. [Text] [EA112038 Aden Domestic Service in Arabic 1630 GMT 11 Nov 81]

CSO: 4404/110

## BRIEFS

STAND AGAINST U.S.--Doha, 7 Nov (QNA)--The Qatari newspaper AL-RAYAH has called on the Arab countries to take a decisive stand on the repeated trickery of the United States regarding its intention to create the reality of the just Arab cause and the legitimate Arab objectives, while commenting on the statement that His Majesty King Husayn, the Jordanian monarch, made during his visit to Washington, in which he warned of a reckless hostile Israeli action against Jordan and Lebanon that would spark a war in the region. AL-RAYAH explains: King Husayn went to Washington with the hope of finding new American trends that he could convey to Arab leaders during their upcoming summit in Morocco. At the same time he wanted to convince Washington to answer Jordan's military needs for advanced weapons to confront the expected Israeli attack. The paper deduces: The Jordanian monarch's announcement, in the capital of the American nation, that his country will buy advanced weapons from the Soviet Union clearly shows that he did not [word indistinct] what he had expected from the Americans. It also affirms that the Arab-Israeli conflict has fallen to the bottom of the list of U.S. priorities. AL-RAYAH concludes: So long as the message is clear and America does not want to understand it, it is the Arab's duty to confront whoever does not understand their problems and take a decisive stand that would put an end to trickery and procrastination. [Text] [GF071750 Doha QNA in Arabic 1057 GMT 7 Nov 81]

CSO: 4404/108

MINISTER INTERVIEWED ON PEACE PLAN

JN101107 Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 10 Nov 81 p 15

[Dispatch by AL-DUSTUR correspondent Ahmad 'Ali]

[Excerpts] Baghdad--Saudi Information Minister Dr Muhammad 'Abduh Yamani has said that the Saudi peace plan is the outcome of the resolutions previously adopted by the Arab summit conference and the United Nations. He said that Saudi Arabia had not consulted anyone about this plan because it is not yet binding, but that it does consist of constructive ideas for those who want to make a step forward toward peace. He went on to say that the plan defines exactly what the Arabs want from the world and it has received positive reaction from many fair people in the world and from the Arab homeland as well as the PLO.

Mr Yamani said this in an exclusive statement to AL-DUSTUR during his visit to Baghdad last week.

Asked about the latest Saudi peace proposals on the Middle East problem, Dr Yamani said: In fact, the Saudi peace plan, which was announced by His Highness Prince Fahd, is the outcome of the resolutions previously adopted by the Arab summit conferences and the United Nations. Saudi Arabia announced this plan out of its awareness of the dimensions of its responsibilities but did not consult anyone about it because this plan is not yet binding and merely consists of constructive ideas for everyone who wants to make a sincere step toward a just peace.

He went on to say: We have accustomed the world to hearing only what we did not want. We never used logic and reason to explain what we wanted. The Saudi peace plan defines exactly what we want from the world. We want it to understand our fateful issue and realize that we have basic rights that have been violated and that there are people unjustly displaced from their homeland.

The Saudi information minister added: Israel's rejection of the Saudi peace plan was not a surprise to us but a confirmation of its desire and policy to impose capitulation and not peace. It is our duty at this stage to cooperate in order to further expose the Zionist plot, particularly as we see the beginning of a positive transformation in the world toward understanding our fateful issues. We must not expect a prompt and complete positive understanding, but we must continue to win further understanding and awareness of the dimensions of the Zionist plot, whose victims are the Palestinian people, who have been suffering from displacement and loss throughout the past few years.

He went on to say: Saudi Arabia has prepared a working paper about this plan to be submitted to the forthcoming Arab summit. He added: We were delighted by the positive reactions to the ideas contained in the Saudi plan by many fair people in the world and by many quarters inside our Arab homeland, particularly the PLO, represented by its chairman, Yasir 'Arafat, and his brothers in the resistance movement, whom we expect will adopt this plan and consider it a sound basis for movement in international fields and in gaining further support and effort for the establishment of an independent Palestinian state for the Palestinians on their territory and homeland as well as for the restoration of the occupied Arab territory, including Jerusalem. There is no doubt that the Palestinian brothers' attainment of their basic legitimate rights will enable them to gain more positive results and a greater ability to express themselves, exercise these legitimate rights of which they have been deprived and put an end to the Palestinian people's state of displacement and loss.

CSO: 4404/110

DEPUTY PREMIER PREVIEWS ARAB SUMMIT IN FES

LD071332 Riyadh SPA in English 1200 GMT 7 Nov 81

[Text] Riyadh, 7 Nov (SPA)--Second deputy premier and commander of National Guard, Prince 'Abdallah 'Ibn Abd al-Aziz has said the Saudi Arabian peace plan for establishing just and durable peace in the Middle East would ensure the Arab nation's rights and secure means of stability in the region.

In an interview with 'UKAZ newspaper, Prince 'Abdallah reaffirmed that Saudi Arabia is fully aware of its Arab and Islamic duties. "The eight-point blueprint introduced by Crown Prince Fahd is basically derived from the absolute faith in the right of the Arab nation, to lead an honourable life without any bargains on its legitimate rights," Prince 'Abdallah added.

Prince 'Abdallah said the Arab and Islamic nation should find out a right path from the available choices, in order to devise a unified stand, characterising reason, patience and farsightedness and omitting reactions, as it would pave way for the realisation of their best interests.

"The Arab and Islamic nation should be aware of its enemies in the next stage, so as to take a clear and sound stand, devoid of any aims, except the dignity and high place for the whole Islamic nation among the world-body," he added.

"Time is ripe to face ourselves with the reality and pledge not to commit the mistakes of the past and march forward with the pure noble Arab nature to achieve our aims and goals," Prince 'Abdallah said.

He noted the kingdom has been giving prime concern to Arab solidarity and strategic unanimity, that could determine the moves of every nation within the framework of this unity. "Absence of such a strategy will pave way for policies of trial and errors," (he said).

"The forthcoming Arab summit in Fes (Morocco) calls for a greater degree of frankness and clarity based on the confidence for devising action, on the problem and introducing viewpoints in a sincere brotherly spirit that could totally remove obstacles in the way of a unified Arab action," Prince 'Abdallah said.

He said a unified Arab action will create a favourable climate for a joint Arab and Islamic moves that could serve the prime goals and interests of the whole Islamic nation.

CSO: 4400/48

FOREIGN MINISTER INTERVIEWED BY BEIRUT TV ON PEACE PLAN

LD082320 Riyadh SPA in Arabic 2200 GMT 8 Nov 81

[Text] Beirut, 8 Nov (SPA)--His Royal Highness, Foreign Minister Sa'ud al-Faysal has stated that the first and the last word regarding the peace plan which the kingdom has presented will be from the Palestinians and the Arab countries during the 12th Arab summit in Morocco.

In a statement made to Lebanese television tonight, he said that the Gulf Cooperation Council supported the plan at its meeting in al-Ta'if and decided to put it before the Arab summit for discussion, scrutiny, and to arrive at a decision. He added that he has not observed any reservations among Arab states; on the contrary, he observed that there is increasing support for reaching a unified Arab stance toward the issue. If there are some states which have not yet expressed opinion, it is because they are waiting for (?the matter) to be decided at the summit and not by the information media. His royal highness expressed the hope that the Saudi peace plan would enjoy Arab unanimity at the conference.

The minister spoke about yesterday's meeting in Beirut of the Arab Follow-up Committee at ministerial level and he stressed that the Lebanese issue is one priority which the Arab world must tackle. He said that the Arab Follow-up Committee, thanks to efforts from all sides, reached agreement on the main elements which will pave and open the road for national accord. He added that yesterday the committee also reached agreement concerning the Supervision Commission. This [word garbled] important and fundamental door will open the road for national accord. He expressed pleasure that the cease-fire in Lebanon is continuing to hold, a matter which indicates all parties' awareness of the critical stage which requires self discipline. He also expressed hope that the parties concerned would accept and cooperate with what the committee achieved yesterday regarding the opening of passageways between the areas of Beirut. He stressed that this will create grounds for harmony.

The foreign minister stressed the kingdom's concern for Lebanon's interests at all levels, and said that the kingdom's participation in attempting to resolve the Lebanese problem is part of the joint Arab action. He added that the kingdom, through its participation in the Follow-up Committee, bears its responsibilities in full with regard to both the work of the committee or anything concerning other Arab actions so as to make available the suitable circumstances for national

concord. His Highness Prince Saud al-Faysal called upon the Lebanese to shoulder their responsibilities as there is a limit to Arab action toward Lebanon and any such action cannot be a substitute for Lebanese action. The minister referred to the efforts which the kingdom had exerted so as to achieve a cease-fire in the south of Lebanon, and said that this action showed the pivotal nature of the Palestinian issue and the importance of contacts with the PLO. He called on the United States in particular to appreciate the role of the organization and to contact it with regard to resolving the Palestinian issue.

CSO: 4404/110

NEW RULES RECOMMENDED CONCERNING GOVERNMENT-SUBSIDIZED STUDENTS ABROAD

Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 10 Aug 81 p 3

[Article by Hamad al-'Askari: "Fahd Agrees to the Decisions Made by the Committee for Government-Subsidized Students Abroad: Standardization of Stipend Payments in Saudi Riyals In Order to Bring About Equality"]

[Text] Payment of 50,000 Riyals to Each University Graduate Who Works for the Government. The Annual Total in Allowances Is 11,700 Riyals for Students in the First Category, and 9,200 Riyals for the Second Category.

Study Concerning Opening Saudi Schools for the Children of Government-Subsidized Students Abroad, and Organization of Special Study Programs for Them After They Return.

The decision of the committee which was formed to study the situation of government-subsidized students abroad include consolidation of the agency in the education offices which supervises them. This however does not apply to military students who are engaging in military studeis and taking military courses. It was decided to restrict government-subsidized education abroad to graduate level education, excluding students who are below this level. It was also decided not to send any government-subsidized student abroad before he has worked for the government for 2 years, and that after such a 2-year period it should be the job of the educational attache to get him accepted into a university. Another of the decisions was one which provides for the standardization of salary payments to employees who are government-subsidized students abroad. It was decided that all such employees, in all government bodies, should receive half of their salaries.

These were among the recommendations of the committee which were approved by His Royal Highness Prince Fahd ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, heir to the throne and deputy prime minister. The committee issued these recommendations after holding several meetings uder the chairmanship of His Royal Highness Prince Sultan ibn'Abd al-'Aziz, minister of defense and aviation. The members of the committee included His Royla Highness Prince Nayif ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, deputy commander of the National Guard; His Royal Highness Prince Salman ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, governor of Riyadh; His Royal Highness Prince Turki al-Faysal, chief of General Intelligence; his excellency the minister of higher education; and his excellency the minister of education.

The minutes of the committee meetings include the following recommendations:

## 1. Social and Administrative Problems

The committee feels that it is possible to attribute many of the problems, which are faced by government-subsidized students abroad, to the sudden changes in environment and culture which they encounter, and the committee feels that in order to put a halt to these problems it would be well to take the following steps:

- A. Preparation of awareness programs by the office which deals with government-subsidized education abroad, together with experts from universities and the informational media. These awareness programs would be in the form of short courses which would give to the students going abroad some idea about the type of society which they will be going to in order to lessen the element of surprise which they might be subjected to.
- B. Preparation of booklets and pamphlets which would help the students going abroad to learn about the social, economic, and legal situation of those countries in addition to some of the main issues which concern the lives of students there and which they can expect to be exposed to.
- C. Students going abroad are attached to their homeland, always feel a link to it, and wish to keep up with events there and with the achievements which are taking place in their homeland. Because of this, it is necessary for the Ministry of Information to have each student abroad subscribe to a newspaper or magazine of his choice which would then be sent directly to his address via the press organizations.
- D. As much as possible, one should benefit from the presence of official representatives [in the foreign countries] who meet with the students, examine their situation, and study their problems. This should be done in coordination with the education offices which, in turn, assume the task of making preparations for such meetings with the students.

In order that the students be carefully kept track of, it is necessary to fix the responsibility [for doing this job] by unifying the supervisory and stipend-paying agency in the Office for Government-Subsidized Education Abroad in the Ministry of Higher Education. This should apply to all government-subsidized students abroad with the exception of military people who are engaging in military studies and training. All government bodies which have government-subsidized students abroad should transfer the funds necessary for their students from their accounts to the account of the Ministry of Higher Education at the beginning of each fiscal year. Furthermore, the above-mentioned Office should keep these government bodies informed concerning their students abroad, and should do so in the form of periodic reports.

## 2. Principle of Government-Subsidized Education Abroad

In view of the fact that most of the problems of government-subsidized students abroad usually occur among younger students who have usually been sent to study at a level lower than that of graduate level education, and since universities in Saudi Arabia have the capability of providing all university courses, the committee recommends the following:

A. Restricting government-subsidized education abroad to graduate level education and not sending any students abroad to engage in studies below this level, whether the ones being sent are students or government employees.

B. Not sending any students abroad before they have worked for the government for at least 2 years. This condition should be adhered to except in exceptional cases. And in such exceptional cases the matter should be studied by the minister of higher education and the head of the Civil Service Bureau, and should require the approval of the Higher Commission.

C. Not sending any student abroad until the educational attache in the government body which will be sending him obtains admission for him to the university which he will be attending. Also, this university should be an acceptable university.

D. The universities, together with the government bodies which have the need, should make a study of this need and set up appropriate programs and courses of study which would make it unnecessary to send students abroad, particularly in the field of university studies.

### 3. Salaries, Stipend Payments, and Allowances

The committee also made a study of the salaries, stipend payments, and allowances which are being paid out to government-subsidized students abroad, and came to the following conclusion:

A. Salaries: A great many of the government-subsidized students abroad are basically government employees and receive their employees' salaries in addition to their stipends as students. The amount of the salaries paid out to these students at the present time differs from one government body to another. Some of the government bodies pay out the entire salary, whereas most of the government bodies pay only half of the salary. In view of this fact, and in order to adhere to the principle of equality, [all] government employees who are sent abroad to study should receive half of their salary.

B. The committee recommends that the stipend payments be established in terms of Saudi riyals in order to achieve equality in stipend payments without increasing them. This should be done in accordance with the following:

a. The countries which the students are sent to should be divided into two categories according to their economic situations. The first category should include the United States, Canada, Latin America, Europe, Japan, and China. The second category should include other Arab and Muslim countries as well as the other countries.

b. Stipends of students in countries in the first category should be set at 2,600 Saudi riyals, and the stipends of students in countries in the second category should be set at 1,600 Saudi riyals.

c. Students in countries in the first category should receive a one-time annual payment of 1,200 riyals for this purpose. These payments should be made only for the fixed period of government-subsidized study abroad and should not be paid for any period which exceeds this uniform established period of study.

- d. Students in countries in the first category should receive a clothing allowance of 4,000 riyals, and students in countries in the second category should receive a clothing allowance of 2,000 riyals. These should be annual one-time payments, and they should not be paid out for any years in excess of the years which have been established for study abroad and which are the same for everyone.
- e. For students in countries of both categories a sum of 3,000 riyals should be paid out to students in advanced applied studies as an allowance for buying scientific equipment and implements. This payment should be paid out one time for every stage of scientific education.
- f. The sum of 3,000 riyals should be paid out one time for every stage of scientific education as an allowance for students of high theoretical studies to buy source materials.
- g. Every student abroad should receive an annual payment of 3,000 riyals as an allowance for the typing of papers and reports.
- h. An incentive payment should be made to each student for every academic semester which he studies. But the academic load which each student has should be 15 semester hours in universities which follow the two-semester system and 18 semester hours in universities which follow the three-semester system. This applies to the undergraduate level. As for the graduate level, the student must take at least 12 semester hours in universities which follow two-semester system and 15 semester hours in universities which follow the three-semester system.
- i. The stipend payments should be paid out at the rate of full salary for students who have achieved a grade [average] of 4 points out of a possible 4, and should be paid out at a rate of half salary to students who have achieved a grade [average] of 3 points out of a possible 4. This should apply to the undergraduate level. Stipend payments should be paid out at the rate of full salary to graduate-level students who have shown their excellence by achieving a grade [average] of 3.5 points out of a possible 4. Incentive payments should be paid out to students who have not changed their field of specialization and whose university is one which is of a high level and which has been recommended by the Saudi education offices and universities
- j. Bachelor students should receive 4,00 riyals and married students, whose wives live with them, should receive 8,000 riyals every year as an allowance for medical expenses, and the Saudi government should assume the expenses of any surgical operations.
- k. Married students whose wives live with them should receive a monthly payment equal to 50 percent of their stipends. This should be paid out as long as their wives live with them in the countries where they are studying. Furthermore, a sum of money equivalent to 25 percent [of their stipend payments] should be paid out for each child of theirs living with them. However, the total of such payments should not exceed 50 percent of their stipend payments.
4. These rules should, without exception, apply to all government ministries and departments and public establishments. They should supersede all previous decisions or orders which conflict with them.

5. The committee feels that all government-subsidized students abroad should enjoy the benefits of this fiscal system. But students who have already started their study programs should not be affected. They should continue to receive their money in accordance with the benefits of systems of payment which precede any decisions taken on the basis of these recommendations in addition to the benefits of this system.

#### 6. General Recommendations

Students abroad encounter difficulties when faced with the problem of educating their children in accordance with the educational programs followed in Saudi Arabia. There are no schools abroad which follow curricula similar to those in Saudi Arabia, and this forces the students to either leave their children behind or to tutor them. In order to solve this problem the committee recommends the following:

A. The Ministry of Education and General Superintendency for the Education of Girls, in conjunction with the education offices, should be entrusted with the task of preparing studies which would result in an integrated plan to open schools for both the children of government-subsidized students abroad and the children of Saudi officials and those who are members of families of Muslim and Arab communities abroad.

B. The Ministry of Education and General Superintendency for the Education of Girls should undertake to create special educational programs for the children of government-subsidized students who have been abroad and who are returning. The task of such educational programs would be to qualify them for, and facilitate their reentry into, the normal educational program.

C. Most government-subsidized students abroad face the problem of finding housing when they have graduated. However, this problem is not solely one encountered by these students who have been abroad. It is also encountered to the same degree by those who have studied in universities in Saudi Arabia. As a means of solving this problem, some government agencies give housing or housing allowances to those who work for them. In view of this problem, the committee recommends that a sum of 50,000 riyals be paid to each graduate who becomes part of the government work force, on the condition that he was a regular full-time student and not just a part-time student.

D. The Civil Service Bureau should be entrusted with the task of making a study of the principle of having the government subsidize students who study at universities inside Saudi Arabia, especially when they are students who are pursuing graduate studies.

9486

CSO: 4304/143

TASK, OBJECTIVE OF INSTITUTE OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION DISCUSSED

Jiddah SAUDI BUSINESS in English No 24, 9 Oct 81 p 18

[Article by Habib Rahaman: "Keeping Pace With Administrative Needs"]

[Text]

AMONG THE MANY institutions set up by Saudi Arabia to lift performances in government offices, the Institute of Public Administration is doing a pioneer service. Training and retraining public servants are a continuing process to meet the challenges of industrial and technological advancements, on the one hand, and on the other, to keep pace with the progress made in social, behavioral and administrative research.

Muhammad Al Ateiq, acting director of the institute, Jeddah branch, defined a multitude of functions for the institute. One is to set up and execute educational and training programs for civil servants; a second, to conduct research in cooperation with government authorities; a third, to collect, classify and catalogue government administrative documents of the Kingdom. The institute's main office is in Riyadh and has a branch in Dammam.

The acting director also cited: holding conferences on development administration to be attended by top-level civil servants; calling for Arab regional and international conferences in the Kingdom and participating in similar conferences abroad; publishing research data and exchanging such within the Kingdom and with Arab and other countries. Also important is encouraging scientific administrative research by offering leave time and remuneration; offering

educational and training scholarships in various fields of administrative affairs; and accepting training from Arab countries as well as benefiting from technical and material assistance offered by international agencies and private institutions.

The institute, an autonomous body of the government, was constituted through a royal decree in 1961. Its affairs are managed by a board of directors constituting the minister of finance and national economy as its president, the deputy minister of education, the vice rector of the University of Riyadh, the vice president of the Civil Service Bureau, and the director general of the institute. The noteworthy factor of the institute is that it does not charge any fees from the trainees, and its financial obligations are met through the grants of the government.

Muhammad Al Ateiq said the institute has nine main departments, through which it imparts the required training. The department of in-service training is responsible for designing, organizing and executing training programs for different government employees who have already put in at least one year of service with the government and are exposed empirically to the problems of management. Programs have been held in the following areas: management, operations and management, personnel administration, financial

administration, planning and development, statistics, school administration, higher secretaryship, material administration, office work, typing (Arabic and English), and computers.

The department of pre-service training was created after the institute found that completely "ready trained and ready to work" persons cannot be generally found to fill vacant posts. Under this scheme, specialized education in various administrative and allied field is given to meet the manpower requirements of the government in the coming years. For these programs, fresh graduates are taken from high schools and universities, depending upon the level of future responsibilities of the trainees, for the training in various programs according to the interest and aptitude of the employees. Studies in legal affairs, finance, administration, customs, statistics, hospital administration, and citizenship all have been undertaken. A computer training program has also been added this year. The department of executive development organizes programs for top-level officers of the government. The objective of the program is to keep them abreast of the latest developments in their fields. Under the department of special programs, training for various governmental agencies whose needs are not met through the other programs is organized. Sometimes, the training needs are typical of an agency or a group of agencies warranting an exclusive special training.

The aim of the English language department is to develop in the selected government employees a degree of proficiency in English through an intensive or semi-intensive programs, so trainees are able to perform their professional duties more efficiently and more effec-

tively. The department of library and documentation collects books, periodicals, pamphlets, and all kinds of reports. Files of all newspapers and magazines published in Saudi Arabia are maintained. There is a special section for educational films. Microfilms of selected newspaper and periodicals are also available. The reference section of the library has the latest editions of encyclopedias, bibliographies, indices, almanacs, and atlases. Presently, the library holds over 50,000 volumes, mostly in Arabic and English, and receives more than 300 journals and periodicals. It also publishes a quarterly bulletin. Al Ateiq said that the department of consultations helps public agencies in solving their administrative, organizational and procedural problems. It conducts studies on specific problems and gives its recommendations. So far, it has conducted more than 300 studies.

Research is undertaken by its own department, too. It also cooperates with the concerned officials in the government agencies in directing and supervising their studies. Al Ateiq said that the institute's educational technology center produces and maintains audiovisual materials such as motion picture films, videotapes, slides and slide tapes, and other media which help promote the efficiency and effectiveness of the training. It also maintains a well-equipped auditorium and conference halls with facilities for simultaneous translations. The secretariat for administrative reforms' main function is to coordinate the work relating to the High Committee for Administrative Reforms and the Staff Committee for Administrative Reforms. It prepares agendas and drafts the minutes of meetings of the two committees.

RESULTS OF SURVEY MADE AMONG FEMALE LITERACY STUDENTS

Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 15 Aug 81 Supplement p 9

[Article by Susan Mustafa: "The Effect of Anti-Illiteracy Programs on the Saudi Home"]

[Text] The Anti-Illiteracy Campaign Is Moving in Two Directions:  
Expansion of Elementary Education, and Concentration on Adult  
Education. How Do Women and Mothers Utilize Their Education in  
Their Dealings With Others?

What do 200 illiterate women have to say about the effect which the elimination of illiteracy has had on both their private and public lives?

Have they changed their ways of dealing with their husbands, children, and neighbors? What changes have taken place in their homes and in their management of the household in accordance with available resources? What means have they followed to solve both their general and personal problems? Have they changed their ways of utilizing their spare time?

The answers to these questions are given in a scientific study which was done concerning the effect which the elimination of illiteracy has had on Saudi women in both their private and public lives. The research study was carried out by the [female] students of the Higher Institute of Social Service in Riyadh.

Scope of the Problem

Statistical estimates tell us that the rate of illiteracy in Saudi Arabia is between 70 and 75 percent, and that it is more widespread among older men, women, people in rural areas, and among the Bedouins who constantly migrate from place to place. In keeping with the overall advancement which is taking place in all areas of the country and which requires that human resources be appropriately trained in order to take over the reins of this movement of progress, legislation was enacted concerning the elimination of illiteracy and concerning adult education in Saudi Arabia on 9 Jumada II 1332 A.H., and a time-frame of not more than 20 years was set for the elimination of illiteracy and ridding the country of its effects. In order to arrive at an integral statistical picture concerning the efforts which have been made during the last 5 years to educate women and concerning the effect which this has had on their lives, the researchers undertook a comparative investigative study involving both literate and illiterate women.

## A Campaign in Two Directions

During the last 10 years, from 1385 A.H. to 1935 A.H. [as published], the campaign to eliminate illiteracy in Saudi Arabia has been moving in two directions. The first direction has been that of increasing facilities for elementary education in order to uproot illiteracy among the very young, and the second direction has been that of concentrated efforts made to bring literacy to adults. In addition to the Ministry of Education, [other bodies participating in the anti-illiteracy campaign have been] the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, the Public Security Policy Directorate, the General Superintendency for the Education of Girls, and national organizations.

During this period the number of adult education centers rose from 393 to 1,425. Also, the number of literacy students increased three-fold during this period, reaching a total of approximately 100,000 men and women.

The adult education system consists of a stage lasting 16 months during which time illiteracy is eliminated, followed by another stage of equal length which is devoted to further education. When a literacy student completes the first stage of elimination of illiteracy, his reading level is equal to that of a fourth-grade elementary school pupil.

### Elimination of Illiteracy Among Women in Saudi Arabia

The 20-year plan for elimination of illiteracy contains three stages, which are: preparation, trial testing, and complete implementation--which means eliminating all remaining pockets of illiteracy.

The General Superintendency for the Education of Girls began by opening five schools for the elimination of illiteracy in the year 1392-93 A.H. Then the number of these schools gradually increased until, 3 years later, every town or village covered by the plan had one or more schools for the elimination of illiteracy. In the third year of the program, the total number of these schools went up to 322, and the number of literacy classes was about three times as large as the number of such classes during the previous 2 years. One result of this was a tremendous increase in the number of female literacy students.

It should be noted here that the efforts made to eliminate illiteracy have not been restricted to quantity, but have also been directed toward qualitative development. Efforts are constantly being made to improve the anti-illiteracy programs as far as the courses, planning, and school books are concerned, so that the programs are appropriate for women, respond to the needs of their daily lives, and incorporate the possibility of these women to make a conscious contribution toward the development of society. There are also programs which are being prepared for educating women in matters regarding motherhood, children, the family, principles of sanitation, and household management. Since the Superintendency realizes the importance of eliminating illiteracy among women, it participates in all conferences [dealing with this matter] which are held. It has participated in both the international UNESCO conferences and the Arab UNESCO conferences.

## Development of the Courses

When the literacy schools for women were opened, they had no special course. They proceeded in accordance with the literacy and adult education course which the Ministry of Education had set up--and which was basically set up for male literacy students. But then in 1397 A.H. a special course for women was set up in order to enable them to educate the young. In other words, courses were developed which were appropriate for women's mission in life and for their own particular cultural realms.

## The Second Five-Year Plan

When the second five-year plan began, it contained particular objectives with regard to the elimination of illiteracy. These objectives included the following:

1. Increasing the number of anti-illiteracy centers in order to include, as students, the largest possible number of illiterate women. At the end of the second five-year plan, there were 1,312 literacy schools.
2. Increasing the number of literacy classes. By the end of the second five-year plan the number of such classes went up from 963 to 13,125.
3. Decreasing the number of students in each class so that there would be no more than 30 students in each one.
4. Providing educational opportunities for eliminating illiteracy in rural areas.
5. Increasing the total number of [female] literacy students. At the end of the second five-year plan the number of such students totalled 393,751.
6. Increasing the number of newly-recruited [female] students.
7. Striving to choose a particular type of [female] teacher to work in the anti-illiteracy program. This was to be achieved by training such teachers in educational methods appropriate for the type of students they would have.
8. Providing the necessary academic requirements to complete the educational process.
9. Use of various types of informational media in these centers. Here we should point out that the anti-illiteracy centers have also opened their doors to women who are not Saudis. At the end of the second five-year plan, the number of [non-Saudi] Arab female students was more than 2,500, and the number of [non-Arab] foreign female students was nearly 1,500.

## Integration of Efforts

In addition to what has already been mentioned, the Ministry of Social Affairs has opened literacy classes for women in its Centers of Development and Social Service. These classes use the courses set up by the Ministry of Education, and the Ministry provides them with the necessary technical assistance.

There are also private national associations for the teaching and education of women, and these associations are found in Saudi Arabia's large cities. Of course, these efforts have also resulted in a large increase in the number of female literacy students.

### The Field Study

With this as a theoretical scientific background for the research topic, the scholars began the second part of their undertaking, which was the field study. The study was conducted with a sample population of 200 female students in the anti-illiteracy schools run by the General Superintendency for the Education of Girls. Also, another comparable sample population of 50 illiterate women was chosen. This was done in order to discover the effect which the elimination of illiteracy had had on both their public and private lives, and to find out if there was any difference between what educated women and illiterate women do in their daily lives.

### Surprising Results

By comparing the results of the social status of both the literacy students and the illiterate women, surprising results were arrived at, and they were different from what the researchers had expected. In fact, they were precisely the opposite of what they had expected. They found out the following:

1. Size of the family: The female literacy students live in an extended family which includes grandparents, children, husbands and wives, and the children of those of the men who are married, together with their wives. But we find that the illiterate women live in families which include only husbands and children. It was found that women in extended families saw the children going through the various stages of education and that this was an incentive for them to become educated.
2. Educational status: The percentage of illiterate people in the families of the female literacy students was not more than 15 percent, whereas this percentage in the families of illiterate women was 64 percent. This confirms the previous result arrived at.
3. Children: The literacy students have no children younger than 10 years of age. The illiterate women, though, have children who are not old enough to go to school and who therefore take up their time, not giving them a chance to take advantage of opportunities for education.
4. Husbands: The husbands of the literacy students are usually merchants and men who engage in the free professions, and their work requires them to be gone from home for long periods of time. The number of working hours which these husbands spend away from home varies from 6 to 9 hours, and this gives their wives an opportunity to study. But in the case of the husbands of the illiterate women, their working hours total no more than 7 hours.

### Comparative Study

Then the researchers compared the answers of the literacy students with those of the illiterate women in five particular realms in order to find out what the effect of education has been on their private and public lives.

## Household Development

Concerning household development, the researchers found that 40.5 percent of the literacy students had moved to better living areas, 91 percent of them had changed their household furniture, and 44 percent of them were unhappy with their housing and were thinking about moving to another place. Sometimes they mentioned that the reason for this was that the living conditions were not sanitary. What this means is that they had acquired particular standards for their homes and wanted to put them into practice. In addition to this, it was found that literacy students utilized their resources in a more progressive fashion. They allocate a monthly sum for the renovation of household supplies and goods, and they save part of the income in the form of jewelry. Although this means freezing a part of the household income, through education they can learn to switch over from doing this to investing their financial surplus.

On the other hand, none of the illiterate women had changed their place of residence, although 36 percent of the illiterate women in the sample population had renovated their household furniture. Although one-third of those in the sample population complained about cramped living quarters or high rents, none of them had found a way to solve these problems. In addition to this, it was found that they spend all of their family income on food, clothing, education, and entertaining guests--and on this latter activity they spend large sums of money.

## Manner of Dealing With Others

The study showed that the literacy students had eight different ways in which they felt they had to interact with their husbands, and that they had learned about these ways from five sources. The illiterate women, though, knew only two ways of doing their marital duties, and had learned them from three sources.

As for dealing with the children, the study showed that there were seven areas involving child care and five methods of accomplishing this child care. This was the result of the answers given by the literacy students. But the illiterate women said that they were involved in only four areas of child care and that this was accomplished by three methods. They did not feel that it was necessary to supervise their children when they played, and they did not know the benefit of taking the children for a walk in the fresh air.

The results also showed a difference when it came to dealing with neighbors. The literacy students said that they had five different ways of trying to be a good neighbor, and that they had learned these things from five different sources. The illiterate women, on the other hand, knew of only three such methods and had learned them from only two sources.

## Application of Religious Knowledge

In spite of the religious atmosphere which is especially prevalent in Saudi society, it was shown that education had its effect in increasing and intensifying knowledge of religion. This was clearly shown by the percentages of the sources from which the women in the two sample groups acquired their information when interacting with their husbands, children, and neighbors. It turned out that 25 percent of the illiterate women acquired their information from their knowledge of religion, whereas this percentage among the literacy students was 48 percent. As for knowledge

about religious observances and teachings, the literacy students had much more knowledge concerning these matters. Their knowledge was measured at 92 percent, whereas this knowledge among the illiterate women was only 49 percent.

#### Use of Spare Time

The literacy students knew the value of taking walks with the children and the effect that such walks had on integration of the family and on promoting mutual understanding between the generations and bringing them closer. This is something that not even one of the illiterate women knew. They also had learned how to organize their spare time every day so that it would be divided between the household, caring for the children, and educating and furthering [themselves].

#### Scientific Approach

It was also shown that learning gave the literacy students educational awareness concerning how to solve their problems in all realms, and that they resort to a scientific approach when doing so. And the more educated the person was, the less that person resorted to a non-scientific approach.

#### For Educated Women Only

The researchers directed a number of particular questions to the educated women alone in order to find out what problems they encountered of an educational, economic, and social nature, and how they were able to deal with and solve these problems. Concerning educational problems, the respondents confirmed that there were five of them, namely: lack of ability to learn, fear of or embarrassment about making mistakes, lack of time, how the teachers dealt with them, and inappropriate study topics. They also mentioned ten reasons for failing in their school work, including: neglect, laziness, lack of concentration, not being able to study full-time, and a poor memory. They suggested seven ways of dealing with these problems, including: paying more attention, organizing one's time, going to school longer, and the use of more audio-visual aids.

What this shows is that they were able to identify the reasons and were able to suggest solutions.

As for economic problems, those who had acquired education were able to switch from one job to another which paid more and was less strenuous. Also, some of them had been able to acquire a new type of job. In both cases they strove to earn more money and to balance the household budget in a more comprehensive fashion. As for social problems, 22 percent of the respondents said that they faced the problem of the husband having a previous wife. Four-fifths of this 22 percent were able to keep their husbands, and their husbands did not marry again after marrying them. In the case of the illiterate women, 20 percent of them married husbands who had previous wives. However, only half of the women in this 20 percent were able to keep their husbands.

#### Clear Effect of Education

1. Improving their household situation as well as their income situation, either by budgeting the money for spending and saving or by increasing the income through getting a job or by changing from one job to another.

2. Finding numerous ways of exercising their duties as a spouse, and the same was true with regard to care of the children.
3. Increasing their knowledge of their religion and applying this knowledge well since they understood the importance of it.
4. Learning the value of time and how to make use of it by organizing their spare time and utilizing it in different realms.
5. The use, by a large percentage of the literacy students, of a scientific approach toward solving their problems.

#### Important Recommendations

As a conclusion to the scientific results which the researchers arrived at, they presented a number of important recommendations which we should take up. They included the following: The concept of eliminating illiteracy traditionally relies on teaching reading, writing, and arithmetic to illiterate adults. In this sense, it is an educational process more than it is a social process since the elimination of illiteracy leads to the opening of broader horizons of knowledge to an individual. However, it would be better to expand the objectives and programs of this approach of teaching adults so that it would include the following:

The social aspect: The anit-illiteracy programs should try to educate their [female] students so that they will be enlightened and able to keep pace with the modern development within whose framework society is moving toward a better life.

The intellectual and psychological aspect: This aspect grants these students the opportunity to develop and grow within their society. Perhaps these students are unable to benefit from modern changes because they are unable to understand them in an enlightened manner.

Therefore, the anit-illiteracy programs should be oriented toward having their students acquire new intellectual skills, values, and directions which complement their personalities. They should provide them with new means of fulfilling their lives, should enable them to better understand life, and should enable them to continually utilize what they have learned from their self-development and from the development of their society. They should become able to make sound judgments concerning the events in their lives and should be able to participate, in a positive and effective way, in the solving of the social problems which confront them.

#### Being Part of a Group

Elimination of illiteracy is traditionally done by means of a particular school book. But in the opinion of the literacy students, it would be better if the program, for its educational material and in order to move toward achieving its objectives, would rely on the long experience which the literacy students have had in their own lives. The programs should use this experience as a basis for their teaching. This should be done so that such adult education will fulfill the needs of the individual students and satisfy their aspirations for a better life--and at the same time develop their knowledge so that it can keep pace with modern changes.

## The Importance of Further Study

The researchers emphasize the necessity of keeping track of those students who fail to attend class, of helping them to solve the problems which prevent them from pursuing their studies, and of enabling them to maintain the level of knowledge which they have achieved. This requires that the class hours be well chosen after ascertaining the preferences of the students who will be taking part in the literacy courses, and this should be done before the classes begin. This also requires being fully aware of the objectives of the program of study and linking the program to the everyday needs of the students. This should be done because adult education should always be based on a realistic premise which impels the student to assess her current status and to see what benefit will be gained from the educational experience in terms of improving her status. It is also necessary to have the successful graduates continue their studies, and this should be done by opening the doors of evening classes to them in all of the other educational and vocational levels. For example, they should be able to take classes in order to become lab assistants and nurses. All of this should be done in order to prevent them from once again reverting to their former status of being illiterates.

## Using Informational Media

Efforts should be made to utilize informational media in awareness campaigns concerning the elimination of illiteracy. At the same time, careful selection should be made of successful programs and methods which are appropriate for the person requesting the informational media, and this should be done by means of indirect notification.

## Methods of Learning

A student needs correct orientation and needs to be trained how to listen to and follow the lessons. She also needs to have the freedom to express her ideas and feelings and to engage in discussion without any feeling of fear or embarrassment. The students should also get acquainted with and get used to each other. Likewise they should participate in the teaching process. And they should work toward mastering the course. In addition to all of this, the students' general social motives should be linked to their own particular motives, and if this takes place then the school can thereby help them to formulate their own motives for learning.

## Previous and Future Research Studies

At the end of their research study, the scholars were careful to mention previous studies that had been made. One such study was a field study concerning the degree to which literacy students had benefited from anti-illiteracy programs in the year 1397 A.H. This study was conducted by a group of students from the Institute, and their sample population consisted of 90 literacy students. They were asked the following questions: Why are you taking the course? Do you intend to continue with it? Do you study diligently for the course? What is your opinion about what you are studying and about how useful the course is? What is your opinion about the teaching method of the course? What are the greatest difficulties that you are facing? What are your suggestions concerning this?

The respondents answered that they were taking the course because they personally wanted to, and they wished to continue with it. They answered that they had

benefited from the courses that were being taught, and they agreed that there were several difficulties which they faced, mainly the difficulty of the courses. They said that they did not have enough time to study, and that too much study was required each day.

Concerning future research studies, the literacy students suggested the possibility of using this study as an aid when conducting other research studies that would be more comprehensive and would include sample populations from among literacy students in classes in cities, rural areas, and desert areas in all regions of the country. On the basis of such studies one could gain an overall picture which would be helpful in the planning of literacy courses for women.

9468

CSO: 4304/143

PLANS FOR NEW RAILROAD LINE REVIEWED

Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 24 Aug 81 p 3

[Article: "A Railroad Line Connecting Mecca with Medina Is in the Fourth Five-Year Plan; the Riyadh Customs Station Is Ready to Unload 2,000 Containers a Month; the Fixing of Fees for Transporting Containers from al-Dammam to Riyadh"]

[Text] Al-Ta'if, Saudi News Agency--Yesterday there was a meeting of the board of directors of the Saudi Government Railroad Organization, chaired by His Excellency Dr Ghazi al-Qusaybi, minister of industry and electricity and deputy minister of communications. Those present at the meeting were the members of the board of directors.

After the meeting, Shaykh Faysal al-Shahil, the director-general of the Organization, told the press that the board discussed the subject of setting rates for the transport of containers from the port of al-Dammam to the customs station in Riyadh. He said that the purpose of this discussion was to determine some of the fees and rates connected with this activity. He said that the board made sure that these fees and rates would be reasonable so that they would not be a burden to consumers and, at the same time, would not be competitive with those charged by truckers. He said that the board approved what was submitted to it concerning this matter. Shaykh al-Shahil indicated that there were companies which had gotten in touch with the Government Railroad Organization concerning the use of railroad cars to transport dry cement from al-Dammam to Riyadh, and that particular rates had been approved for transporting these materials. He also indicated that the board had approved the Organization's budget for the year 1402-03 A.H. He added that the board had approved the promotion of some of the Organization's employees and that it had granted the Organization's director-general some emergency powers.

Concerning a question dealing with the possibility of having a railroad line connecting Riyadh with the Hijaz, al-Shahil said that the third five-year plan included a comprehensive study of the railroad lines in all of the regions of Saudi Arabia as well as a study of their economic feasibility and which priority was to be given to which line or to which area, depending on the results of the study. As for linking Saudi Arabia by rail with some of its neighboring Arab countries, he said that this subject was currently under study.

He pointed out that the government of Kuwait had suggested the construction of a railroad line which would connect it with Saudi Arabia. He said: "We suggested to our fellow-Arabs in Kuwait that the plan be postponed until Kuwait is linked [by rail]

with Iraq so that there would be greater benefit in having a railroad line between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. [The possibility of constructing] this railroad line is currently under study." The director-general of the Saudi Government Railroad Organization denied that the customs station in Riyadh was suffering from any congestion. He said: "So far we have not felt any pressure, but there is an increasing amount of activity. The first month that the station was open it unloaded 150 containers, and the third month after it was opened this figure totaled 980 containers." He assured us that the station was prepared to unload approximately 2,000 containers per month. "If we see that there is too much pressure on the station, then we will construct new railroad lines since we are prepared to do this in terms of what we have in the way of financial allocations, equipment, and job slots."

Concerning the railroad line which would connect the holy places of pilgrimage with each other, al-Shahil said that this subject had already been discussed in the first two meetings organized by the Ministry of Planning in Riyadh and in Jiddah. He pointed out that the two meetings had approved a working paper which had been submitted by the Saudi Government Railroad Organization. This working paper had stated that the construction of railroad lines should not be restricted to the holy places of pilgrimage and Jiddah, but should connect all of the holy pilgrimage places, including Medina. In addition to this, the working paper also said that there should be transportation of goods along with a customs station, [meaning that] the goods should be shipped from Jiddah and processed by customs in Mecca as is done in the station which is in Riyadh. It is expected that this railroad line will be built during the fourth five-year plan. He expressed his satisfaction concerning the level of efficiency and expertise in their jobs which Saudi personnel working in the Railroad Organization have achieved. He pointed out that the Railroad Organization had established a vocational training center in order to create a new generation [of employees] who would have the skills necessary to do jobs connected with the railroad system. Concerning the importation of new trains, the director-general of the Saudi Government Railroad Organization said that many of the air-conditioned trains had been renovated and that they were faster than the old trains. He also said that modern methods of microfilming had been introduced into the work of the Organization, and that the Organization intended to introduce the use of computers--in cooperation with the University of Petroleum and Minerals.

9468

CSO: 4304/143

## FIVE PORTS HANDLE INCREASING IMPORTS

Jiddah SAUDI BUSINESS in English No 24, 9 Oct 81 pp 15-17

[Article by Ahmad Kamal Khusro: "Five Ports Handle SR 100bn in Imports"]

[Text]

**I**MPORTS NOW valued at more than SR100 billion a year and vital to the Kingdom's development, continue to flow into Saudi ports. Dr. Fayed I. Badr, chairman of the Saudi Ports Authority (SPA) said in 1976 SPA's five major ports handled about 10 million tons of cargo. In 1980 the figure rose to 28.8 million tons, a remarkable increase of 188 per cent.

The chairman, reviewing progress of the ports during the last year, said the allocation for seaports in the Third Development Plan is almost SR24 billion and is a testimony to "the success which has been achieved in the four years since the creation of the Ports Authority in September 1976."

He pointed out the authority has been able to introduce modern management techniques, large-scale investments in basic berth capacity and sophisticated cargo-handling equipment. "Significant milestones passed during the year include the publication of unified and consolidated rules for the ports, the preparation of unified tariffs and greatly improved safety measures for personnel and cargo," said Badr. "In the future, the completion of the hydrographic survey of the Kingdom's Red Sea Coast and the provision of ship repair yards at Jeddah and Dammam will be of immeasurable value to those who navigate in the Red Sea."

Badr cited the increasing role of ports, noting "ports will become our new pipelines carrying raw materials

and manufactured goods to and from the Kingdom. The Kingdom's commitment to free trade combined with its ever increasing import requirements mean that in the next five years we expect at least a further 50 per cent increase in cargo passing through the ports."

In its annual report for 1980, SPA said that compared with 1979, the total volume of cargo discharged rose by more than 3 million tons to 27.5 million tons, an increase of 13 per cent. There was a noted improvement in the performance of the ports of Jubail, Jizan and Yanbu, whose development as modern ports started only recently. Cargo discharge at Jubail increased by 58 per cent from just under 1 million tons in 1979 to over 1.5 million tons last year. Jizan port and Yanbu Commercial Port discharged 1.5 million and 1.3 million tons respectively, increases of 42 per cent and 24 per cent over 1979. The Kingdom's largest port, Jeddah Islamic Port maintained its pre-eminent position. About 14 million tons of cargo, representing 51 per cent of the Kingdom's seaborne imports came through this port, an increase of 11 per cent from last year. At King Abdul Aziz Port, Dammam, discharge increased by 5 per cent to 9.2 million tons.

Reflecting the Kingdom's continuing development plans, construction materials formed the major part of seaborne imports, amounting to 1.7 million tons.

an increase of 13 per cent over 1979. Within this group of commodities, imports of bulk cement rose by 43 per cent to 9.2 million tons. The much less efficient import of bagged cement declined by 52 per cent to 1.5 million tons, showing the market's support of the SPA's decision to provide efficient and cost-saving specialist bulk cement facilities.

Foodstuff imports during last year rose by more than 12 per cent to 5.9 million tons. Imports through Jeddah port alone amounted to 4.4 million tons, representing an increase of 21 per cent over last year. The number of livestock handled at Jeddah rose by 19 per cent to nearly 3 million head, and the port maintained its position as the world's largest livestock handling port.

The trend toward containerization of exports to the Kingdom continued steadily during last year, the report said. Nearly 820,000 TEUs were handled compared with 714,000 TEUs in 1979, showing an increase of 15 per cent. This increase helped both Jeddah and Dammam ports to enhance their position among the 50 most important container ports of the world.

Since this trend toward containerization is to gather speed in the coming years, the Ports Authority is providing better facilities to handle container cargo. About 35 per cent of all general cargo arriving in Jeddah is now containerized. To keep pace with rapidly changing patterns of cargo structure, container freight stations are being developed in Dammam and Jeddah. These stations will start operation in 1982, reducing the proportion of bulk cargo and raising productivity still further.

Refrigerated cargo represented nearly 15 per cent of all food imports in

1979 and 1980, the discharge itself being affected by the lack of cold stores in the Jeddah area. In view of the climate conditions and the importance of this cargo, berths 13 and 14 are being developed as a multipurpose food and fruit terminal. Vessels carrying chilled cargo generally will be allocated there. This new terminal, scheduled for completion in 1983, will have fully computerized discharge and delivery procedures.

According to the report, plans are ready for a livestock terminal which will facilitate more efficient discharge, care and delivery of animals. A new multipurpose terminal will be built in the northwest area of the port. The new berths at this terminal will provide productive facilities for dealing with timber, steel and vehicles. Another passenger terminal will be developed in the northwest area to provide improved services to pilgrims.

During 1980 six new berths have been brought into operation, increasing the number of berths available from 37 to 43. Other construction to date includes a 1.5-km causeway and the formation of a 11-hectare island. The steel skeleton of the 12,000-sq.-meter workshop and storage facility is largely completed, as is work on main buildings.

Installation of overhead cranes will start shortly. Construction of mooring dolphins in depths of up to 30 meters has begun. All work continues without any disruption in the Jeddah port's normal operations. The shipyard's two floating docks with lifting capacities of 16,000 and 11,000 tons will be capable of accommodating vessels of 45,000 and 16,000 deadweight tons respectively and will provide much needed facilities for all vessels using the Red Sea.

## BRIEFS

NEW SCHOOLS IN WESTERN PROVINCE--Al-Ta'if, Saudi News Agency--At the present time the Department of Education in the Western Province is preparing to open 43 new schools, of various educational levels, in the Western Province for the new school year of 1401-02 A.H. This was announced by Dr 'Abdallah Muhammad al-Zayd, director-general of education in Western Province. He indicated that these schools include the following: 3 secondary schools in Jiddah and environs; 7 secondary schools in villages of the city of al-Ta'if, which are: Tur'ah Thagif, Huda, Sawa Bani Harith, Busal, al-Sayl al-Kabir, Qaya Bani Harith, and ('Mba Shibh); 3 fully-constituted intermediate schools in Jiddah and environs; 1 intermediate school in Mecca; and 5 intermediate schools in villages of the city of al-Ta'if, of which 3 are in Bani Malik, 1 is in (Mishqfan), and 1 is in Jalil. Dr al-Zayd said that, of the new elementary schools in the Western Province, 10 will be in Mecca, 6 will be in Jiddah, and 8 will be in al-Ta'if. He affirmed that the Department of Education in the Western Province is continuing its work of providing furnishings for these schools and preparing them to be ready to receive their pupils at the beginning of the new school year. This is so that these schools will achieve their objective of receiving their new pupils at all educational levels in the cities and villages of the Western Province. [Text] [Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 23 Aug 81 p 2] 9468

AGREEMENT WITH U.S. OIL FIRMS--Riyadh, 9 Nov (SPA)--The governor of the General Establishment of Petroleum and Minerals (PETROMIN), Dr Abdalhaid Tahir, signed today with both Chevron and Texaco international companies, the final agreement for the construction of a lubrication oils refinery at al-Jubayil, in partnership with the two mentioned companies. The cost of the project is nearly \$1 billion. The refinery will produce 12,000 barrels per day, and this refinery will actively contribute to the comprehensive plans for the development of the oil industry in the kingdom. [Text] [LD091657 Riyadh SPA in Arabic 1440 GMT 9 Nov 81]

CSO: 4404/110

## BRIEFS

TUNISIAN AMBASSADOR--Khartoum, [no day] Nov (SUNA)--President Ja'far Muhammad Numayri confirmed Sudan's endeavours to consolidate the bases of Arabs co-operation and the reject of differences for the solidification of solidarity. President Numayri who received today the credentials of the Tunisian ambassador to Khartoum said that the conformity in the two countries policies in the Arab and African spheres which were based on international pacts and the principles of noninterference in other countries' affairs meets with strong support. He said Sudan and Tunisia's loyalty to the Arab League and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) constitutes a heavy task of bolstering Afro-Arab cooperation for the benefit of Arab and African nations. The Tunisian new ambassador ('Abd al-Hamid al-Shaykh) said in the reception ceremony that the two countries wise policies which reject extremism and nonplanning had helped in strengthening cooperation and understanding between leaders in Tunisia and Sudan in different issues of concern to Arab and African nations. This political orientation of the two countries had its positive impact in supporting Arab situation and its dimensions far from nonmeasured and non-rationalized reactions said (al-Shaykh) who confirmed President Habib Bourguiba's concern over the support of brotherhood and constructive co-operation between the two brother peoples. [Text] [JN071811 Khartoum SUNA in English 1750 GMT 7 Nov 81]

MESSAGE FROM NUMAYRI--Khartoum, 15 Nov (SUNA)--Ahmed Bensouda, adviser to Moroccan King Hussan II, arrived in Khartoum last night with a message from his majesty to President Numayri. In a statement on arrival, Bensouda said that his visit comes within the framework of a tour of five Arab countries during which he will deliver messages from King Hassan II to the leaders of these countries. He added that he began his tour with Sudan in view of the personal relations he has with Sudanese officials. Referring to the forthcoming Arab summit in Fes, the Moroccan official said that the Rabat summit conference in 1974 was a decisive turning point which had placed the Palestinian cause on a clear course and that the Fes summit conference would be a decisive factor bringing the Palestinian cause closer to a solution. For this reason, the Moroccan king has sent messages to Arab leaders to attend the summit to become acquainted with each other's viewpoints, from which a working paper may be created. The Moroccan official's tour also includes Somalia, Djibouti, the YAR and the PDRY. [Text] [JN151130 Khartoum SUNA in Arabic 1030 GMT 15 Nov 81]

MESSAGE FROM MITTERRAND--Khartoum, 7 Nov (SUNA)--President Numayri today received an oral message from French President Francois Mitterrand on bilateral relations, means of further promoting them and consultation on several issues, particularly African ones and the importance of exchanging viewpoints in order to serve coordination between the two countries. The message was conveyed to the president by Foreign Minister Muhammad Mirghani Mubarak, who returned from Paris last night after participating in the recent French-African summit conference. [Text] [JN071459 Khartoum SUNA in Arabic 1430 GMT 7 Nov 81]

ADDITIONAL SSU DUTIES--Khartoum, 9 Nov (SUNA)--President Numayri, chairman of the Sudanese Socialist Union [SSU], today issued a decree appointing Kamil Mahjub as the assistant secretary of the SSU presidential and organizational department, in addition to his duties as secretary of the SSU Organizational Committee. [Text] [JN091509 Khartoum SUNA in Arabic 1435 GMT 9 Nov 81]

CSO: 4504/66

## TUNIS/SOVIET COOPERATION

[Editorial Report] PM091521 Tunis L'ACTION in French 27-31 October and 1 November carries on pages 6, 4 and 4 respectively unattributed reports totalling 1,700 words on a visit to Tunisia by Serafim Ivanov, collegium member of the Soviet ministry of land reclamation and water resources. L'ACTION of 27 October reports a 26 October meeting between Ivanov and Tunisian Minister of Public Works Mohamd Sayah at which Ivanov reportedly expressed "his government's desire to extend and strengthen co-operation with Tunisia, particularly in the sphere of water resources, which is vital for agricultural development." The 30 October edition of L'ACTION reports on another meeting between Sayah and Ivanov on 29 October at which they reviewed past cooperation in the sphere of water resources and examined ways of extending it in the framework of Tunisia's sixth development plan. Ivanov reportedly expressed his government's desire for a "major program of cooperation for the future." The 1 November edition of L'ACTION reports a meeting on 31 October between Ivanov and Tunisian President Bourguiba, after which Ivanov issued a statement to the TAP Agency describing the meeting as "very useful and fruitful" and saying it "will contribute to extending the spheres of cooperation between Tunisia and the Soviet Union."

CSO: 4519/37

## TUNISIA

### ARMS DEAL REVEALED

[Editorial Report] PM091410 Paris LE MONDE in French 6 Nov 81 p 10 unattributed report: "Tunisia Has Bought Three Missile-Launching Patrol Boats From France." Tunisia has bought from France three missile-launching patrol boats, building of which will begin next year at the Normandy naval shipyards at Cherbourg. This is revealed by the Flottes de Combat 1982 [1982 battle fleets] yearbook, which has just been published. With a displacement of 425 tons fully laden, these ships, capable of a speed of more than 36 knots (approximately 65 kph) thanks to four 15,000-horsepower diesel engines, will be equipped with eight MM-40 surface-to-surface missiles and three anti-aircraft guns of 76MM and 40MM. The MM-40 missile has a range of 60km. According to Flottes de Comate 1982 the contract between Tunisia and France was actually concluded in June 1981. It will be recalled that Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson and Defense Minister Charles Hernu visited Tunis, the former in July 1981, the latter in August 1981, to guarantee the continuity of Franco-Tunisian relations and France's aid in the modernization of the Tunisian armed forces' equipment.

CSO: 4519/37

YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC

PRESIDENT'S THANK-YOU CABLES TO SAUDI KING, PRINCE

JN082135 San'a' Domestic Service in Arabic 1700 GMT 8 Nov 81

[Text] The brother leader Col 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih, president of the republic and commander in chief of the armed forces, sent the following cable to King Khalid upon leaving Riyadh Airport:

His Majesty Brother Khalid ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz al Sa'ud, Riyadh. As the members of my delegation and I leave fraternal Saudi Arabia, I would like to express my sincere appreciation for the great hospitality accorded us during our stay in the kingdom. I hope that our meetings and consultations will be repeated in interest of both fraternal countries and all Arab and Islamic issues.

While repeating my profound thanks and appreciation to your majesty all the brother officials, I wish your majesty continued good health and happiness and the fraternal Saudi people continued progress and prosperity under your faithful leadership.

[Signed] Your brother Col 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih, YAR president and commander in chief of the armed forces.

President Salih also sent the following cable to Saudi Crown Prince Fahd:

His Royal Highness Brother Prince Fahd ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, crown prince and first deputy premier, Riyadh. On my own behalf and on behalf of the members of my delegation, I would like to express our profound thanks and appreciation for the fraternal hospitality which you and all the brother officials accorded us during our stay to the kingdom. We pray to God Almighty to make all our meetings successful in the interest of both countries and the Arab and Islamic nations.

I wish your highness continued good health and happiness.

[Signed] Your brother Col 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih, YAR president and commander in chief of the armed forces.

CSO: 4404/110

END

**END OF**

**FICHE**

**DATE FILMED**

Nov. 27, 1981